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Growing awareness of the effects of man-made global warming is leading societies
worldwide to re-evaluate our seemingly ever-increasing energy requirements. The
need to understand and mitigate the issues brought about by our current use of the
world’s resources has thus become a pivotal element in the political agendas of most
regions. Accordingly, curbing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has been the
goal of many of the political decisions of the past decade. In this context, the elec-
tricity sector is undergoing deep structural changes to accommodate intermittent
renewable electricity generation resources into a system originally designed to rely
on dispatchable power plants to supply our energy needs. One of the main changes
consists of a decentralisation of the sector, bringing the generation assets closer to
the place of final consumption. This creates regulatory challenges that may jeop-
ardise the integration of distributed renewable energy resources (DER). This PhD
dissertation presents several research contributions dealing with these challenges.
In the first part of our work, we have created a simulation-based approach to
study the effects of different regulatory frameworks on the deployment of DER in-
stallations. DER deployment, in turn, is shown to have a notable impact on the
revenue of the distribution system operator (DSO), which is also assessed with our
simulator. Our approach is designed so as to offer a tool for policy makers and regu-
lators to discriminate between different regulatory frameworks depending on their
impact on the distribution network, before implementing them in real life.
The second part of our dissertation models different decentralised electricity
markets where consumers may exchange electricity, focusing on the concept of re-
newable energy communities (REC). We have designed a model of interaction that
simulates an REC where its members can offer flexibility services by means of a
centralised agent such as the REC manager. In addition, we analyse the allocation
of local electricity generation among the REC members, and propose an algorithm
based on repartition keys to minimise the total electricity costs of the REC.
The modelling tools developed in this thesis highlight a trade-off between pro-
moting the integration of DER and containing their impact on the DSO revenue. In
addition, they show that creating RECs may help maximise the use of local produc-
tion and, therefore, lower the electricity costs of these communities.
Despite having been studied for a few decades now, the promotion of DER is still
very much in the political agenda in many regions. Unstable policies concerning
these technologies, along with an insufficient understanding of the challenges they
pose to the traditional electricity system, have hindered their natural integration into
the electricity networks. These problems, though deeply studied in this thesis, call
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Worldwide, the energy sector is undergoing a revolution – in fact, this revolution
has been ongoing for over a decade now. Whilst in the past the most worrisome
prospect for society was to run out of fossil fuels to power our lives, the threat of
climate change, caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, has rearranged
the priorities. Today, the most worrisome prospect is not gaining independence from
fossil fuels fast enough. For this reason, over the past decades, researchers and policy
makers all around the globe have been trying to work out solutions to the challenges
posed by climate change.
In December 2015, during the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the
Paris Agreement was adopted [1]. This agreement aims at holding global warm-
ing below 2 degrees Celsius, with the ambition of limiting it to 1.5 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels. In compliance with this agreement, signing countries
have had to outline their post-2020 climate actions in the form of intended nationally
determined contributions. These climate actions, nonetheless, have been deemed
insufficient, according to some scientific publications, to curb greenhouse gas emis-
sions to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius [2, 3]. Some researchers even
questioned, back in 2016, whether the goal of 2 degrees Celsius is enough to attain
these targets [4]. Raising a similar concern, the authors in [5] claim that some tip-
ping points (points-of-no-return which if surpassed would lock the world into a new
dynamics) have come so close that, even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions
were to stop today (2021), we are already past some of these points-of-no-return.
Their results show a sustained melting of the permafrost for hundreds of years af-
ter the emissions are halted. In this context, the intergovernmental panel on climate
change (IPCC)1 published in 2018 a report analysing the risks associated to a 1.5 - 2
degrees Celsius global warming with respect to pre-industrial levels [7]. Such risks,
reported for numerous areas of human development, provide a grim overview of
what might come about, should actions towards climate change mitigation not take
place in short order.
In the European context, the European Union (EU) established in 2015 the EU
Energy Union [8] to provide EU consumers with secure, sustainable, competitive
1The IPCC was established in 1988 with the mission of assessing climate change based on the latest
science [6].
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and affordable energy. Central to this Energy Union is the Clean Energy for all Eu-
ropeans Package [9]. This package represents an update of the EU’s energy policy
framework towards delivering the EU’s commitments in the Paris Agreement. One
of the directives brought forward by this package is the recast of the 2009 European
renewable energy directive, published in 2018 [10, 11]. This document establishes a
new binding renewable energy target for the EU for 2030 of, at least, 32% in gross
final energy consumption. However, no fixed path exists at the European level, and
Member States may use different strategies toward meeting these targets. In this
regard, three possible scenarios are analysed in the last ten-year network develop-
ment plan (TYNDP) of the European network of transmission system operators for
electricity (ENTSO-E) and for gas (ENTSOG). These three scenarios are compiled
in two documents: [12] and [13]. The first scenario –National Trends– reflects the
commitment of each Member State to meet the EU targets for 2030 - 2050, whilst
the other two aim to reach the target set by the Paris Agreement (i.e. a warming of
1.5 degrees Celsius below pre-industrial levels). Of the latter two scenarios, the first
one –Global Ambition– looks at a possible future that is led by developments in cen-
tralised generation, and the other one –Distributed Energy– is specifically designed
to embrace a decentralised approach to the energy transition. In this context, the
terms centralised and decentralised refer to the manner the electricity is generated:
the former indicates that the electricity is generated mostly in central power plants,
whereas the latter implies that electricity production partially takes place where it
is consumed, by means of smaller generation devices owned sometimes by the con-
sumers. A substantial amount of research has been produced over the last few years
on how a decentralised electricity system may work. In this regard, technological
advances in electricity generation from renewable sources, notably including solar
photovoltaic (PV), have a natural market in private investments –such as households
that deploy these technologies on their rooftops– in a decentralised fashion.
This thesis revolves around this decentralisation of the power sector as a way of
achieving renewable energy targets such as the Paris Agreement. In particular, this
work focuses on some of the regulatory challenges posed by such a decentralisation,
proposing a mathematical description to them as well as modelling solutions.
1.1 The decentralisation of the power sector
The idea of decentralising the electricity sector is not new. One of the first works
mentioning the possibility of taking a decentralised energy path, as opposed to the
business as usual centralised policy, dates back to 1976 [14]. In this work the au-
thor argues that this path would lead to social, economic, and geopolitical advan-
tages2. Another early work on this topic is the essay “Power Systems ‘2000’: hier-
archical control strategies”, written in 1978 by Fred C. Schweppe [15]. In his vision,
2Geopolitical advantages relate mostly to curbing the nuclear proliferation which, at that time, was
a very relevant objective. In our work however, we abstract from this type of arguments.
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Schweppe elaborated upon the importance of demand-side procurement of electric-
ity services, mostly combined heat and power, owing to the limitations of the time.
1.1.1 Definition of decentralised generation units
Despite the existence of some pioneers in the field, it was not until many years later
that the scientific literature on the decentralisation of the power sector and, in partic-
ular, on the integration of distributed generation, gained momentum. Two scientific
papers from 1995 and 1996 elaborate, probably for the first time, on the technical
aspects of integrating what the author calls embedded generation into the distribution
networks [16, 17]. In these two papers the author suggests that embedded gen-
eration –what is now understood as distributed energy resources (DER)– can pro-
vide only energy and not capacity to the electricity system3. These two works claim
that some institutional arrangements would be needed to integrate great amounts
of DER in the system. Back then, however, this type of technology was yet to be for-
mally defined. The first work addressing this definition was published in 2001 [18].
This scientific paper provides the first formal description of distributed generation
as electric power generation within distribution networks or on the customer side of
the network. Dealing with the same problem, the authors in [19] define distributed
generation as small generation units of 30 MW or less which are located at or near
customer sites to meet their specific needs. The definition of distributed generation
(or embedded or decentralised generation) is further addressed in two other early
works describing these technologies and discussing their benefits and issues [20, 21].
These two works list a collection of definitions provided by different authors in the
previous literature, highlighting that all the definitions include small-scale genera-
tion devices connected to the distribution grid. Some works, however, also include
in this definition larger-scale cogeneration units or large wind farms connected to
the transmission network. Finally, in the European context, the trends for distributed
generation integration are addressed in [22]. In this paper, the authors highlight a
gap in the literature to formally agree on what constitutes distributed generation,
suggesting the importance of coming up with a universal definition. They, nev-
ertheless, agree on some common characteristics seen across the existing research
works: DER are small-scale generation units that are connected to the distribution
network. Using this broad definition, one of the first works focusing on the emer-
gent DER technologies was published as a white paper in 2002. In this paper, the
authors consider DER as a way to supply, in an efficient fashion, the growing elec-
tricity needs of customers, suggesting the concept of microgrids to organise these
resources [23]. Finally, the previous definition of DER is used in [24], another early
3When talking about procurement of electricity we can distinguish between energy procurement
which refers to the ability to meet the overall energy consumption of the system, and capacity procure-
ment which refers to the ability to meet instantaneous loads.
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work which proposes a virtual power plant approach where several DER installa-
tions are aggregated. This provides the distribution system operator (DSO) with
enhanced visibility and control.
In this thesis we adhere to the use of the definition of DER proposed in [22],
considering as distributed generation any small scale electricity generation devices
located at or near the consumer end at the distribution level. In particular, we focus
on solar PV installations deployed by traditional consumers –who therefore turn
into prosumers– or by small companies connected to the distribution network.
1.1.2 Drivers for the integration of decentralised generation
A number of drivers can explain the explosion of the adoption of DER technolo-
gies such as rooftop solar PV. These drivers are studied in [25], where the authors
establish two distinct categories classifying them:
1. Commercial drivers, which comprise the uncertainty of electricity markets
and the enhanced power quality they provide.
2. Regulatory drivers, among which the most relevant are the incentives to di-
versify energy sources in order to improve energy security, or the support for
competition that increase the amount of players in the market by introducing
economically beneficial policies for DER. The latter, though, requires that DER
owners trade in the electricity markets, which in turns necessitates appropriate
frameworks, as it is discussed later in this introduction.
A consistent decrease of technology prices (including solar PV and batteries) can be
added to the list of these drivers [26]. In addition to them, the authors in [25] list
a series of challenges brought about by the integration of DER. Examples of these
challenges are, according to this work, steering clear of over-voltages, ensuring the
power quality, the protection of DER equipments, stability issues in the distribution
network, and regulatory issues, which are largely discussed in this document. This
paper highlights the importance of moving away from the traditional fit-and-forget
approach used to manage the distribution networks. Some other works have fo-
cused on the integration of DER, pinpointing challenges and benefits, often from a
technical standpoint, as seen in [27]. In this line, the report entitled “The Utility of
the Future” deals with challenges and opportunities stemming from the integration
of DER, focusing on the evolution of the power system for the coming decades [28].
While this report aims to provide a thorough framework for the cost-efficient inte-
gration of both centralised and distributed (decentralised) resources, the importance
of DER is remarked throughout the whole document. One of its key messages is that
the electricity sector is shifting from a paradigm where large power plants, far from
the consumption of electricity, are operated according to the plan of a central author-
ity, to a decentralised fashion of electricity generation by which small generators are
deployed close to the loads. The drivers for such a paradigm shift are mainly three:
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(i) technological advances leading to substantial cost reduction for DER technolo-
gies; (ii) policies related to the deployment of renewable energy technologies and
the de-carbonisation of the power sector; and (iii) consumer choices and preferences
by which passive consumers are able to express their preferences through decisions
concerning their provision of electricity services.
This review on the evolution of the power sector is not intended to be exhaustive
but rather to provide the reader with an overview of the trends in the electricity
sector over the last decades as well as the outlook to the future. Among these trends,
a very prominent one consists in the decentralisation of the electricity generation.
Such a decentralisation has been heralded by researchers for many decades, but only
over the last few years has become a reality. This is why a large body of literature
has been devoted to address new challenges and problems brought about by the
integration of these technologies.
1.2 Challenges posed by integrating decentralised generation
By now, it is clear that the revolution in new generation technologies, in combination
with policies and regulations worldwide, have pushed the adoption of distributed
generation. This integration of distributed generation has become pivotal to the
de-carbonisation of the electricity sector, since a very significant proportion of the
new DER installations consist of renewable technologies such as solar photovoltaic
(PV). However, this distributed renewable integration does not come free of prob-
lems and, albeit it offers promising benefits for the future of the power systems, it
may also bring about several problems for this system which must be carefully stud-
ied. Accordingly, since the electricity distribution networks were designed decades
ago when multi-directional electricity flows were rare, they were not engineered to
absorb and re-distribute large amounts of distributed generation. Figure 1.1 presents
a schematic of how the electricity flows in a distribution network, before and after
the decentralisation of the power sector.
Because of this decentralisation, the integration of renewable electricity genera-
tion resources into the electricity distribution networks poses a number of challenges
and uncertainties that may jeopardise the adequate operation of the distribution net-
works. These challenges can be broadly divided, depending on their nature, into
technical and regulatory.
1.2.1 Technical challenges
This type of challenges are well known since the beginning of the decentralisation
and, therefore, have been studied extensively over the years. They typically range
from unbalances on the three phases due to power withdrawals or injections, to
under- and over-voltages in the low-voltage distribution networks [25]. A detailed
analysis of these problems can be found in [26], where the author proposes several
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(A) Before the decentralisa-
tion of the electricity gener-
ation sector.
(B) After the decentralisation
of the electricity generation
sector.
FIGURE 1.1: Distribution network set-up.
algorithmic solutions to them. Although more research can be provided to alleviate
these challenges, their study falls out of the scope of the present thesis, not being
addressed in this document.
1.2.2 Regulatory challenges
The rise in distributed generation resources have prompted a whole different type of
challenges, stemming from inadequate regulatory frameworks that cannot provide
a stable and level playing field for these new technologies. These regulatory frame-
works define the way the power sector is organised. In the particular case of the
decentralisation of the sector, they are composed of a number of specific rules that
control how distributed generation resources are integrated in the distributed net-
works. In this context, ill-devised frameworks can cause problems, as they may chal-
lenge the correct functioning of the electricity system. Furthermore, in an evolving
sector where distributed generation resources are more prominent than they were
in the past, these frameworks must be adapted to accommodate new –distributed–
generation technologies.
The type of regulatory challenges brought about by the integration of distributed
generation energy resources are multifaceted. They span from problems derived
from an inadequate design of the distribution network tariff or selection of the me-
tering technology used to an increasing need for establishing the ground rules of
new local electricity markets where distributed prosumer4 can sell their electricity
surplus. In this section, these two types of challenges are further elaborated.
4The term prosumer is now widely accepted, indicating those consumers who deploy DER instal-
lations for their own self-consumption but who can also sell their surplus of electricity, either to their
retailers, or to a local electricity market. Note that, in Europe, if the latter is the case, the latest EU
directive states that the main activity of these prosumers cannot be to sell their local generation [9].
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Distribution network tariff design and metering technology
One of the first works discussing this type of regulatory challenge dates back to 2002,
where the authors mention, possibly for the first time, that distribution network tar-
iff structures might need to be revisited in the presence of a significant amount of
DER [29]. The authors of this paper highlight that, should distributed generation
become widely spread, the distribution network will undergo a long-term trans-
formation where communities and microgrids will naturally emerge. The research
on this topic continued over the years in a rather prolific fashion. Consequently,
researchers worldwide have been able to pinpoint some of the most prominent chal-
lenges stemming from an inadequate design of distribution network tariffs, in the
context of an increasing integration of distributed generation into the distribution
networks. Two of these challenges stand out: (i) the collapse of the economic sus-
tainability of DSOs, illustrated by the “death spiral” of the utility (see Figure 1.2);
and (ii) the cross-subsidies among final customers of the distribution network. These
two challenges may be further aggravated depending on the metering technology.
The economic (un)sustainability of DSO: The design of the distribution tariff has
a strong impact on the DSO remuneration mechanism. This mechanism works by
collecting revenue from final customers connected to the distribution network, and
comparing it with the DSO costs. The way revenue are collected depends on the
distribution network tariff design and on the metering technology in place. Typ-
ically, this tariff may be based on (i) energy charges in e per kWh consumed –
commonly known as volumetric charges–, (ii) power charges in e per kWp with-
drawn –commonly known as capacity charges–, or (iii) fixed charges in e per con-
nection point. In addition, variations can be introduced to these charges, such as
the time-of-use (ToU) fees in which different levels of energy or power charges are
applied depending on the time of consumption [30]. Furthermore, the metering
technology in place strongly impacts on the way the electricity consumption is mea-
sured on the prosumers end. Note that the metering technology is only relevant for
prosumers, since it alters the way the electricity exchanges between the prosumers
and the grid are measured – for regular consumers the metering is either a mechani-
cal meter that measures energy consumption, or a smart meter that measures power
and energy consumption. There are two main metering technologies for prosumers,
both addressed in this thesis: net-metering, and net-billing (sometimes referred to
as net-purchasing) [30].
• Net-metering consists of one single mechanical meter that records imports
from the grid by adding units of energy, and exports to the grid by subtracting
units of energy. Both types of exchange are assigned with the same monetary
value, namely the retail electricity tariff. With this metering system, if the ex-
ports exceed the imports, the excess is not remunerated to the prosumer.
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• Net-billing consists of two independent mechanical meters, or a smart meter
that can measure imports and export separately. In this setting, imports are
charged at retail price, and exports are compensated at a selling price. No
limit exists, in principle, to the amount of exports allowed.
Regarding the costs of the DSO, they typically depend on the physical infrastructure
of the distribution network, as well as on the level of use of such an infrastructure.
Both costs are known to the DSO [31, 32]. The comparison between costs and rev-
enue may yield an imbalance where either one is greater than the other. In such
cases, the DSO must increase or decrease the distribution tariff to ensure a level of
revenue that is sufficient to break even5. On this basis, a non-negligible proportion
of final customers deploying DER installations and turning into prosumers may lead
to a drop in the revenue of the DSO, since prosumers consume less electricity from
the DSO (be it in the form of energy or power) and, thereby, pay less in distribution
fees6. This drop in the revenue will be multiplied if a net-metering system is in place,
since prosumers will see their imports reduced when they export electricity, heav-
ily eroding the revenue collected by the DSO7. Such a revenue drop may, in turn,
create a feedback loop leading to an increase in distribution rates. This increase can
positively contribute to improve the business case of prosumers, thereby having the
potential to spur even more DER deployment, and further erode the DSO revenue
[33]. This feedback loop is what some authors have termed the “death spiral” of the
utility [34, 35]. Figure 1.2 illustrates this feedback loop.
Cross-subsidisation among final customers: This is one of the most studied chal-
lenges arising from an inadequate distribution network tariff design [30, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41]. As with the previous challenge, it all starts with an economic imbal-
ance of the DSO. Then, the DSO, through the remuneration mechanism, adjusts (typ-
ically increases) the distribution tariff – be it based on energy or power consumed. In
this situation, depending on the distribution tariff design and the metering technol-
ogy in place, some final customers may be more affected than others by the increase
in the distribution tariff. Accordingly, those final customers relying on the DSO to
cover the totality of their electricity (i.e. traditional consumers) are more exposed to
these changes in tariff than prosumers, who can partially self-consume their electric-
ity needs. In these cases, consumers may wind up bearing most of the costs related to
the distribution of electricity, cross-subsidising prosumers. This cross-subsidisation
stems from an over compensation to DER owners (i.e. final customers who own a
5In this context, a positive imbalance, meaning that the revenues collected by the DSO are greater
than the costs, must be met by a reduction of the distribution tariff. Conversely, a negative imbalance,
meaning that the revenues collected by the DSO are lower than the costs, will lead to increased rates
in the distribution tariff. Note that, depending on the country or region, the increase or decrease in the
tariff is computed directly by the DSO, or by the regulatory authority.
6This will only occur under volumetric or capacity tariffs, since fixed fees are independent of the
level of use of the distribution network.
7This will only occur under volumetric fees, since capacity and fixed fees are independent of the
energy consumed.













FIGURE 1.2: Feedback loop also known as the “death spiral” of the
utility. Prosumers deploying DER installations exert an impact on the
level of revenue of the DSO, which, in turn, increases the distribu-
tion tariff. A feedback then emerges as higher distribution rates spur
further deployment of DER installations.
DER installation, typically in the form of PV and/or batteries) who, sometimes, end
up free-riding on the electricity distribution costs [42, 33, 43]. It is worth noting that
this effect is highly contingent on the tariff design and on the metering technology.
Volumetric and capacity tariffs have the potential to lead to cross-subsidies, whereas
this is not true for fixed charges. Likewise, the potential of net-metering to lead to
cross-subsidies is higher than such of net-billing [33, 30, 44]
From these challenges it can be pointed up –as many authors have highlighted–
that the design of the distribution tariff is of paramount importance for the adequate
operation of the distribution network. If these challenges are not tackled in a timely
fashion, they may create severe economic strain to the DSO. However, most of these
challenges have solely been studied from a qualitative standpoint and, therefore,
there is a limited body of literature on their quantitative impact. Furthermore, these
challenges present a dynamic aspect that has not been addressed in the prevailing
literature, where the impact of prosumers on distribution tariffs and of distribution
tariffs on prosumers can be assessed over time, estimating how these two elements
evolve and influence each other over time.
In this thesis, the regulatory challenges related to an inadequate distribution tar-
iff design are studied from a modelling standpoint. Thanks to this approach, both a
qualitative analysis of the main drivers of these problems and a quantitative evalu-
ation of the dynamics of distribution networks is made possible. The latter provides
the action–reaction feedback effect of the relation between prosumers and distribu-
tion network prices, allowing for predicting the impact a given distribution network
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tariff design will have on both the adoption level of prosumers and distribution net-
work rates.
New local electricity markets
The large penetration of DER has also prompted a need to create new frameworks
that allow for electricity trading in a decentralised manner. Indeed, despite the em-
powerment of final customers observed as part of the decentralisation of the power
sector, the rules by which these customers interact with the rest of the network are
not yet up to date with their capabilities. This means that DER owners have limi-
tations in the way they can use their installations. In fact, to date, usually the only
mechanism available for them is to use as much of the energy produced by their
installations as possible, exporting the surplus to the distribution network by means
of either a net-metering or a net-billing system8 [33, 43]. To fill this gap in the regula-
tion, some authors have proposed solutions based on central entities managing the
communications between several final customers, some of whom are also DER own-
ers, with the goal of maximising the usage of locally generated electricity [45, 46].
Most of the literature, however, has focused on peer-to-peer electricity exchanges,
where DER owners trade their electricity surplus without any central entity acting
as intermediary [47, 48, 49]. Another popular concept over the last years, concern-
ing the cooperation between final customers, is the renewable energy community
(REC). The European Commission, in the 2018 recast of the 2009 European renew-
able energy directive [11], introduced in Article 22 the RECs as communities of final
customers who may also be prosumers (i.e. DER owners) and who may share the
renewable energy produced by their generation units or the units owned by the
REC. In addition, access to the electricity markets must be ensured in the context of
RECs, either directly or through an aggregator. Since this is a rather new concept,
the literature on the topic is scarce, and the rules that apply to RECs in some of the
existing works [50, 51], are not consistent with new regulations. In the first of these
two works, the authors present an energy community where the energy commu-
nity manager (ECM) acts as the interface between the community members and the
market. In addition, the ECM has the ability of computing and offering electricity
prices to the REC members. In the second work, a benevolent planner maximises
the welfare of the community redistributing revenue and costs among REC mem-
bers so that all of them are better-off after the REC is established. This problem is
cast as a bi-level optimisation where the lower level solves the clearing problem of
the REC whereas the upper level shares the profits among the entities. Besides these
two works, the practical implementation of RECs is, to date, not well studied.
This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature, notably by addressing the prob-
lem of creating stable frameworks for RECs. This problem is studied from two an-
gles. On the one hand, this thesis analyses the regular operation of an REC with a
8Other metering systems exists as, for instance a set-up with three meters sometimes used in Ger-
many, these systems are, however, far less common and are not specifically studied in this work.
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unique retailer that must perform the demand provisioning in the day-ahead mar-
ket, accounting for the local consumption and production from the REC members
as well as for flexible load in the form of flexibility bids provided by flexible con-
sumers [46]. On the other hand, the problem of allocation of local production in
the REC context is examined, providing a solution based on an ex-post settlement
where the financial exchanges of an REC are optimised aiming to maximise the self-
sufficiency rate of the community, that is, the proportion of REC electricity demand
covered by local generation [52].
1.3 Objectives of this thesis
The aforementioned challenges, posed by the integration of decentralised electricity
generation units, lead to one broad research question: how to create adequate mech-
anisms for the integration of DER that do not disrupt the adequate functioning of the
distribution networks and facilitate a seamless decentralisation of the power sector?
This question can be decomposed in two parts, focusing on particular aspects of the
DER integration:
1. what are the qualitative as well as the quantitative impacts of the deployment
of DERs on the economic sustainability of distribution networks, and what
roles do the design of the distribution network tariff and the metering tech-
nology play in these dynamics?
2. how should new consumer-centric electricity markets be designed and imple-
mented, in particular facing the new regulations concerning RECs?
This thesis sets out to provide answers to these two questions. To that end, dif-
ferent aspects of these questions are addressed in separate chapters which focus on
some of the elements described in this introduction: (i) the metering system, (ii) the
distribution tariff structure, (iii) the simulation of an REC, and (iv) the allocation of





This dissertation is based on different contributions in the domain of regulation for
distribution networks, addressing in particular the modelling of new local electric-
ity markets and regulatory frameworks for the integration of distributed electricity
generation resources. Each of these contributions deals with one particular aspect of
this general topic. Consequently, this document is organised two parts, each of them
comprising several chapters.
2.1 Structure of the thesis
After the first part introducing the thesis, consisting of Chapters 1 and 2, the remain-
der of this manuscript is organised as follows:
The study of the relevance of the regulatory framework fixing the metering tech-
nology as well as the distribution network tariff design is addressed in Part I. In
particular, the impact of the different metering technologies available is studied in
Chapter 3, where the modelling of these technologies is presented, showcasing pre-
liminary results of their effects on final customers and DSO. Then, Chapter 4 intro-
duces the mathematical formalisation of an agent based simulation-based approach
in which the final customers of a distribution network are modelled as individual
agents who can elect to deploy DER installations composed of PV panels and/or
storage devices in the form of batteries. In addition, this simulation-based approach
encapsulates several salient characteristics of the distribution network tariff design,
enabling the simulation of tariffs based on aggregated energy (volumetric), peak
power (capacity), or fixed fees. The feedback loop known as “the death spiral of
the utility” is simulated through this approach, where the actions of the final cus-
tomers (i.e. deploy DER installations) show an impact on the DSO, and the DSO, in
turn, reacts by adjusting the distribution networks rates. Finally, the impact of these
different metering systems and distribution network tariff designs on the distribu-
tion network is shown in Chapter 5. In this chapter, all the previously developed
modelling tools are used to simulate a real-life case. Using the most representative
features of the distribution networks in Wallonia (southern region of Belgium), a vir-
tual distribution network is simulated, mimicking the real network as accurately as
possible. This virtual distribution network permits analysing the impact of using
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different combinations of metering systems and tariff designs on electricity prices
and DER integration.
Part II of this manuscript deals with new models for local electricity markets that
may enable a seamless integration of distributed electricity generation resources.
This second part consists of three chapters. In Chapter 6, the model of interaction of
the members of an REC is presented. This model of interaction mimics the electricity
and financial exchanges within an REC, and creates the basis for a complex analysis
on the rules regulating its functioning. The advantages of using flexible consump-
tion in this context are evaluated in Chapter 7. In this chapter, flexible consumers
offer flexibility bids that increase or decrease their instantaneous consumption, at
the expense of a rebound a few time-steps later. The retailer of the community may
make use of these flexibility bids to reduce the total costs of performing the de-
mand provisioning in the wholesale electricity markets such as the day-ahead mar-
ket. Lastly, Chapter 8 presents a novel framework to allocate the local electricity
generated within an REC among its members. This framework, based on the con-
cept of repartition keys, allows for different objectives such as the maximisation of
the self-sufficiency rates (proportion of demand covered by local electricity) of the
REC members or the minimisation of total electricity costs.
Finally, in the last part of this thesis, Chapter 9 presents the overall conclusion
and final remarks as well as the outlook and future work.
In addition, two publications are collected in the appendix. Appendix A shows a
preliminary study concerning the differences between net-metering and net-billing.
Appendix B presents a first approach to introduce fixed fees for the distribution
network.
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gies. 2019; 12(7): 1203.
• Chapter 4 is based on [30]:
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users”. In: International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems.
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The impact of the metering
technology
This chapter introduces the first elements of a simulation-based approach that mod-
els a distribution network and computes, among other variables, the electricity ex-
changes taking place within it. These exchanges include the energy imported by
traditional consumers from the distribution network as well as the energy imported
and exported by prosumers from and to the distribution network, respectively. The
methodology presented in this chapter is based on a multi-agent discrete-time dy-
namical system where traditional consumers have the ability to deploy distributed
electricity generation resources (DER) composed of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels
and (or) batteries. Consequently, the cardinality of traditional consumers and pro-
sumers is not fixed but can rather evolve dynamically over time, and therefore the
electricity exchanges computed by our simulation-based approach are not static and
their evolution can be determined. From these exchanges, the simulator then calcu-
lates the level of revenue of the distribution system operator (DSO), and determines
any necessary adjustments to the distribution tariff (part of the overall retail electric-
ity price that finances this entity) to ensure that the DSO breaks even. Those tariff
adjustments may impact on the investing decision of traditional consumers, which is
reflected in the simulator by means of an investment decision process. This process
is further developed in Chapter 4 and, by means of a cost comparison of potential
prosumers with and without DER installation, steer the investment decision of con-
sumers. Our simulation-based approach can thereby compute the evolution of the
distribution tariff and of the changes in the final customer’s composition (cardinal-
ity of consumers and prosumers) – these variables show an impact on one another,
leading to a dynamically evolving distribution network.
The main idea behind this simulation-based approach is, by taking advantage of
its capability to compute the evolution of DER penetration (final customer’s compo-
sition) and of distribution tariff level, to compute different trajectories of evolutions
corresponding to different regulatory frameworks. These frameworks comprise the
set of rules, such as the metering technology or the distribution tariff design, that
control different aspects of the distribution and have a notable impact on the DSO
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revenue and the investment decision of consumers. To simulate different frame-
works, their salient features (including the metering technology and the design of
the distribution tariff) must be modelled and introduced into the simulator. This
chapter focuses on the choice of metering technology, modelling two different me-
tering systems, net-metering and net-billing, and integrating them into the different
elements of the simulation-based approach. To test these metering systems we as-
sume a tariff design based on volumetric fees is used, in which a gradually increas-
ing proportion of the costs are covered by means of fixed fees.
3.1 Introduction
One of the primary enablers of the energy transition is the widespread growth in
the integration of DER into the electricity mix [54]. For this reason, distributed gen-
erating technologies as, for example, PV, have been (and are being) globally stim-
ulated by means of policies and directives in order to foster their deployment (see
for instance the European Parliament Directive 2009/28/EC [10]). These policies are
usually translated into different incentive mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs (FiT),
feed-in premiums (FiP), or other monetary aids which help improve the business
models of DER as generating technologies. Along with the incentive mechanisms,
there are several indirect key drivers of DER deployment. Two such drivers are
the distribution tariff design (which for simplicity will be called tariff design in this
chapter), and the technology costs. Regarding the former, they are typically regu-
lated by the incumbent regulatory authority, which can be regional (e.g. in Belgium
the tariffs are regulated by three different regulatory authorities depending on the
region, namely, Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia) or national (e.g. in Germany the
tariff design is regulated at a national level). As for the technology costs, over the
last few years these have been decreasing, and according to the projections, they
may still progressively decrease during the coming decade, owing to economy of
scales and technological maturity [55]. All these factors combined and, in particu-
lar, the widespread use of incentive mechanisms, have contributed to a substantial
deployment of DER; however, such a DER integration might conceal the potential
to create both technical problems (e.g. under- and over-voltages or increased energy
losses) [25] and regulatory challenges (e.g. cross-subsidisation amongst electricity
consumers) [33, 37, 56].
These regulatory challenges are multifaceted, and notably comprise, amongst
others: (i) cross-subsidies amongst the consumers of the distribution networks cre-
ated by an unfair allocation of the electricity distribution costs [37]; (ii) the potential
failure of the DSOs remuneration mechanisms [33]; or (iii) a generalised increase in
the distribution tariff, i.e. the distribution component of the overall retail electricity
price, the price end consumers are exposed to, which is composed of energy costs,
transmission costs, distribution costs, taxes, and the retailer margin [34].
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The scope of this chapter is to quantitatively assess the nature and extent of these
regulatory challenges, making use of a simulation environment to evaluate how the
deployment of substantial amounts of DER may alter the remuneration mechanisms
of DSOs and how this, in turn, may have an impact on the distribution tariffs. In
particular, we introduce the first elements of a methodology to compute the impact
of different regulatory frameworks on the agents of a distribution network. This
methodology allows for dynamically evaluating such impacts, moving beyond the
static assessments which are usually performed. In a static analysis, the variables
of the system (e.g. deployed DER or distribution tariff level) are computed once
(i.e. DER are deployed reacting to increased network tariffs). In a dynamical system
approach, each variable evolves over time, rendering different states of the system
at every evaluated time-step (i.e. the reaction of DER is evaluated at several points
in time). In this context, the complete evolution of the system can be computed by
fixing the set of rules (i.e. the regulatory framework) controlling the interactions be-
tween the variables. The regulatory framework describes the distribution tariff de-
sign (including the metering technology), the remuneration mechanism of the DSO,
the incentive mechanisms, and the technology costs. Finally, this methodology en-
ables employing different regulatory frameworks, allowing for testing the short to
middle run effects of distinct regulatory practices on the distribution networks and
their agents.
For the remainder of this chapter, Section 3.2 documents previous works deal-
ing with the regulatory challenges posed by a large integration of DER. Section 3.3
introduces a high level description of the simulator. Section 3.4 explains how the
regulatory framework (including the metering technology) is modelled. Section 3.5
exhibits a case study in which we make use of the developed simulator. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes and exposes the limitations of our approach.
3.2 Related works
Studying the regulatory challenges existing in distribution networks has been the
subject of debate over the last decades, as the available literature reveals. In one of
the first research papers on this topic [57], the authors identify two main elements to
regulate: setting the distribution tariff allocating the total costs among all the users,
and establishing an adequate remuneration mechanism for the DSO. Moreover, they
propose a remuneration mechanism based on a revenue limitation scheme, as previ-
ously described in [58]. The two first documents dealing with the issue of distributed
generation (DG) in distribution networks are [59] and [60]. The former focuses on
the impact of DG on the power systems, while the latter discusses the effects of reg-
ulation on the deployment of DG. The concept of DG as generating technologies,
generally of reduced installed capacity, and connected to the distribution networks
is introduced in [20], where the authors showcase different DG technologies and
their different costs. As mentioned in the introduction, the foremost drivers of DG
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integration (in which DER are included) are identified. Two of them are the distribu-
tion tariff design on the one hand, and the use of incentive mechanisms on the other
hand. The existing literature can be divided accordingly.
3.2.1 Distribution tariff design and metering technology
Concerning distribution tariff design, most of the existing literature focuses on ex-
ploring how distribution costs should be charged to end consumers. A series of
rules for the design of distribution tariffs can be found in [61], as well as in the
CEER report [62]. According to these works, the design of a tariff should account
for the choice of remuneration mechanisms, the tariff structure, and the allocation
of allowed costs. Furthermore, the key regulatory principles to design a tariff are
identified, e.g. sustainability, non-discriminatory access, efficiency, transparency, or
tariff additivity. These principles are, by and large, shared in [63, 64], where relevant
regulatory principles are listed. In [36], the authors recommend that DG (both DER
and combined heat and power) pay regulated shallow connection costs in order to
facilitate the integration of these generation resources. The discussion shallow vis-
à-vis deep connection costs is also addressed in [56, 65, 66, 67, 39, 68], where diverse
methodologies are assessed. In short, deep connection costs comprise the connec-
tion cost itself as well as the costs derived from reinforcing the network, and shallow
connection costs consist only of the connection cost whereas the potential costs of re-
inforcing the network are socialised via the distribution tariff. Some of the existing
works experiment with different distribution tariff designs, looking into their im-
pact on DG and on the DSO ability to recover its costs. In this regard, the authors in
[69] explore designs based on the cost-causality principle, claiming that such tariffs
function better than average cost distribution tariffs to recover fixed network costs.
In [63], the authors suggest a method to assign costs according to the same prin-
ciple, based on peak demand, overall energy demand, and geographical location.
Moreover, in this work it is highlighted that, since consumers may react to the tar-
iffs, setting an adequate tariff might be an iterative process. In [70], the researchers
propose a way of taking into consideration the impact of DG on the cost-causality
criterion used to design and compute distribution tariffs. In these studies, different
metering technologies are mentioned for measuring the energy consumption and
production of the DER installation, namely net-metering and net-billing.
• Net-metering (NM): consists of one meter that records imports (DER← Grid)
by running forwards, and exports (DER to Grid) by running backwards. There-
fore, both directions are assigned with the same monetary value, namely the
retail electricity tariff. Additionally, if the exports exceed the imports, the ex-
cess is not remunerated.
• Net-billing (NB), also called net purchase and sale: consists of two indepen-
dent meters for imports and exports, in this setting imports are charged at re-
tail price, and exports are compensated at a selling price. There is, in principle,
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no limit to the amount of exports allowed.
Several authors have discussed the impact of these two systems. In [71], a model
to evaluate the impact of NM policies in introduced, concluding that this system is
extremely beneficial for consumers owners of a DER installation (prosumers), but
may create macroeconomic problems such as the increase of the distribution tariff.
Similar analyses are conducted in [33, 72] where the authors compare NM with NB,
claiming that NM may lead to both cross-subsidies amongst the users of a distribu-
tion network and an uncontrolled increase in distribution prices, also known as the
death spiral of the utility [34, 72]. Analogous conclusions are drawn by [37], where
the authors state that NM presents a trade-off between incentivising DG and secur-
ing the financial stability of the DSO. In [73, 74], NM in the United States is analysed,
these papers suggest that NM enhances the value of behind-the-meter devices and
claim that the potential feedback created by NM (i.e. the utility death spiral) is rather
modest.
Another way of spurring the deployment of DER installations is by introducing
changes in the method used to charge consumers and prosumers for their electric-
ity consumption. Various methods have been explored in all the previous works,
e.g. capacity or demand tariffs (e/kW), volumetric tariffs (e/kWh), fixed tariffs
(e/connection), or time-of-use (ToU) tariffs. In this regard, the analysis in [75] shows
that when applying volumetric distribution charges, in a setting where NM is in
place, an increase in the distribution tariff leads to household PV deployment. In
[35], the author demonstrates that a peak demand capacity tariff is more efficient
and cost-reflective than its volumetric counterpart.
3.2.2 Incentive mechanisms
Concerning incentive mechanisms (or support schemes), several authors have ex-
amined the effect of FiTs. In [76] FiTs are compared with traditional schemes such
as renewable obligations, proposing a two-part FiT with capacity and energy pay-
ments which the authors claim to be a more effective framework for fostering the
deployment of DER than the existing alternatives. The authors in [77] review the
regulatory and policy frameworks of FiT schemes, laying stress on how these have
affected the solar PV market. They highlight that, due to generous tariffs the market
bloomed in 2008, nevertheless, FiTs have failed to continue supporting PV integra-
tion since they tend to distort the electricity prices leading to economic instability.
On the same topic, [78] shows that FiTs are likely to work better than quantity-based
systems (e.g. quota-obligation) when it comes to fostering DER.
In addition, a few works can be found assessing the use of incentive mechanisms
to promote the deployment of DER, for a range of different tariff designs. For exam-
ple, in [79, 80] the authors analyse the use of FiTs in combination with NM and with
NB. However, the results of these studies are inconclusive insofar as they greatly de-
pend on the initial conditions (e.g. level of DER penetration, or distribution prices).
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3.2.3 Modelling
To date, the level of modelling in all these analyses is rather limited owing to the
complexity of representing abstract regulatory principles in an exact manner. Fur-
thermore, modelling the behaviour of prosumers is complex since they may not act
rationally (see for instance [81]). For these reasons, in most of the existing literature,
the penetration of DER as well as the distribution prices are considered parameters
to study with little or no interaction between them. There are some works, nonethe-
less, where this is addressed. In [82], the authors highlight the importance of de-
signing efficient distribution charges in the context of increasing DER integration,
claiming that the network peak is the main driver of network investment. A model
is introduced in this paper in which users can react to distribution charges by de-
ploying fix-sized DER installations in order to overcome high distribution charges.
Moreover, in [42], a model of interaction between prosumers and DSO is proposed
comparing NM with NB; in this model, prosumers react to distribution prices by
deploying optimally sized DER installations, the tariff is then updated by the DSO,
responding to a change in energy consumption. In [40] a model including capacity
charges and injection fees is proposed, concluding that transitioning to rate struc-
tures including capacity charges will not disrupt the adoption of PV and will lower
the costs of consumers. Finally, in [31] a game-theoretical model is proposed to as-
sess volumetric and capacity tariffs, their impact on the potential prosumers, and
the consequences for the consumers.
3.2.4 Motivation
As we can see, some of the questions proposed in this chapter have been to some
extent studied in the previous literature, although from a purely qualitative stand-
point. Only a few works exist tackling this issue from a more quantitative perspec-
tive, using mathematical tools to simulate the behaviour of end-users in a distribu-
tion network and, although with limitations, to estimate the repercussions of such
behaviours for the distribution networks and, in particular, for the distribution tar-
iff. This chapter proposes a methodology to quantify the development of distribu-
tion networks across time, as a function of the DER deployment and the distribution
tariff evolution. Furthermore, an interaction between DER deployment and distri-
bution rates is modelled by which they impact one another and evolve over time,
attaining –or not– an equilibrium after the simulation is completed (the horizon is
reached). Our work includes notably the analysis of different metering technologies
in a simulation environment in which the actors are the residential consumers some
of which may become prosumers, and the DSO.
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3.3 Simulator
The simulator introduced in this section relies on multi-agent modelling. It allows
modelling every consumer/prosumer of the distribution network as a rational agent,
who may deploy an optimally sized DER installation if it is cost-efficient compared
to the retail prices. Furthermore, the DSO is also modelled as an agent that can ad-
just the distribution tariff to recover its costs of providing the distribution service.
To assess the evolution of the distribution network, we introduce a discrete time dy-
namical system that enables computing the actions of the agents at every time step.
Finally, to compare different regulatory frameworks, we introduce the concept of
environment, which includes all of the rules characterising them. In our simulator,
the agents interact (perform actions) within a particular environment. By modifying
the environment, we also modify the actions of the agents, allowing the assessment
of the distribution network evolution under different regulatory frameworks.
3.3.1 Environment representation
Every environment is built with three distinct elements: (i) tariff design, (ii) incentive
mechanism, and (iii) technology costs (assumed linearly decreasing over time). Note
that in our work, we consider the metering technology as an incentive mechanism.
We introduce distinct tariffs based on different proportions of volumetric fees,
paid in e/kWh, and fixed fees, paid in e/connection. Furthermore, we include
two different incentive mechanisms for the consumers to deploy DER, NM and NB,
which have previously been explained.
3.3.2 Actions of the agents
There are two types of agents:
• Consumers: at the beginning of the simulation they simply draw electricity
from the distribution network. However, as the simulation proceeds over the
discrete time dynamical system, they take actions to gradually deploy opti-
mally sized DER installations, becoming prosumers. The prosumers may draw
(import) and inject (export) electricity to the distribution network. To model
the planning and operation of these agents, i.e. the computation of their elec-
tricity trades (imports and exports), and the transition consumer to prosumer
(DER deployment), we resort to an optimisation framework instantiated as a
mixed integer linear program (MILP). This MILP is loosely based on the LP
found in [83], and aims at minimising the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)
of the DER installation. The potential investment allowed for the consumers
consists of an optimally sized PV installation with or without batteries (de-
pending on the optimisation).
• DSO: the actions of this agent consist in adjusting the distribution tariff ac-
cording to the environment in place. For example, after collecting revenues,
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this agent may increase or decrease the distribution tariff, under the assump-
tion that it must break-even (here it is assumed that if the DSO collects the total
amount of allowed revenues, it will completely cover its costs). The DSO can-
not modify the tariff design, since this is imposed by the environment. Hence,
if the tariff design set by the environment consists of a fully volumetric dis-
tribution tariff, the DSO will be able to adjust the price per kWh, but it will
not be able to recover costs by applying extra charges to the distribution net-
work consumers. The operation of this agent is modelled with its remunera-
tion mechanism.
3.3.3 Discrete time dynamical system
The actions of the agents lead to the evolution of the distribution network. The con-
sumers, by deploying DER, reduce their dependency on the distribution network,
lowering their apparent consumption, which refers to the energy recorded by the
meter at the end of the billing period. In response to the consumers actions, the DSO
will adjust the distribution tariff according to its remuneration mechanism. Thus, we
can compute the distribution network evolution as a function of the agents actions,
by evaluating them at every time step of a discrete time dynamical system.
Let n ∈ N denote the time index of the discrete time dynamical system, with
N = {0, . . . , N− 1}. At every time step n, our simulator computes the actions of the
agents, controlling the transition from n to n+ 1. This computation follows a specific
order: (1) the transition from consumer to prosumer is calculated, determining their
apparent consumption Ξn; (2) the DSO adjusts the distribution tariff Π
(dis)
n . In Figure

















FIGURE 3.1: Time-line of the discrete time dynamical system. The
simulation starts by assuming a distribution tariff Π(dis)n . Then, at ev-
ery time step, there is a transition from consumer to prosumer leading
to a change in the aggregated apparent consumption Ξn. This change
induces an adjustment of the distribution tariff Π(dis)n .
The first billing period is necessary so that the consumers can observe their elec-
tricity bill under the initial conditions. Then, the transition from consumer to pro-
sumer can be computed, and from it, we determine the total apparent consumption
Ξn+1 (which corresponds to the period n+ 1 to n+ 2). Since the consumption during
the period n to n + 1 and the consumption under the initial conditions are the same,
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the distribution tariff does not change (Π(dis)n ≡ Π(dis)n+1 ). However, once Ξn+1 is com-
puted, it induces a change in the distribution tariff for the following period Π(dis)n+2
(after the DSO observation of its revenue during the period n + 1 to n + 2). We as-
sume that the consumers can react immediately to this distribution tariff adjustment
since they already have knowledge regarding their consumption. Then, the aggre-
gated apparent consumption Ξn+2 can be calculated. The discrete time dynamical
system continues in this fashion until no more consumers can turn into prosumers,
or until the stopping criteria are met: when reaching the finite time horizon N, or
when the DER are not economically profitable .
Every time step of the discrete time dynamical system, except for the first one,
is computed with one run of our simulator. Thus, the developed simulator is run
recursively to simulate the complete dynamical system. The end of one run will be
used as starting point for the next one. The flow diagram representing an outline of
one run of the simulator can be found in Figure 3.2.
FIGURE 3.2: Flow diagram of the proposed multi-agent simulator.
The flow of actions occurs from left to right. The distribution network
consumers undergo individual MILP optimisations to minimise their
LCOEs. A transition from consumer to prosumer is computed (in-
vestment decision tab (yellow) on the Figure), and finally the DSO
adjusts the distribution tariff.
The simulation starts with a pool of consumers who may become prosumers at
any point of our discrete time dynamical system. These agents, characterised by
their load, are modelled through an MILP to plan and operate a DER installation
minimising their LCOEs. Such an optimisation requires the retail electricity price at
each time step, as well as the demand profile of the consumers. After the optimisa-
tion, a transition consumer to prosumer is computed by comparing the costs of the
consumers with and without DER installation. The aggregated apparent consump-
tion Ξn is then calculated and added to the residual demand of the system (those
consumers of the distribution network who cannot deploy DER due to technical or
economic constraints). Finally, the DSO revenues are computed, and, assuming con-
stant costs across the discrete time dynamical system, the distribution tariff Π(dis)n for
the following time step is determined so as to fully recover those costs.
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3.4 Modelling the regulatory framework
In this simulator we introduce the concept of environment as the container of the
set of rules that characterise the distribution network, namely the tariff design, the
incentive mechanism, and the technology costs. Hence, to model the agents actions,
we must take into account the distinct possible environments. Every single agent
take individual actions, therefore, we need to introduce the set I = {1, . . . , I} repre-
senting the consumers/prosumers, where I is the number of consumers/prosumers.
In the following, we present the differences in the simulator, depending on metering
technology and the the tariff design.
3.4.1 Metering technology
We may use net-metering or net-billing. This choice impacts the individual apparent
consumption, and as such, the aggregated one.
Net-metering
The individual apparent consumption of the consumers/prosumers is given by:











where ρ(−)i,n and ρ
(+)
i,n are, respectively, the imports and exports of the i
th prosumer at
the nth time step.
Net-billing
In this case, the exports do not affect the apparent consumption, thus:
∀i, n ∈ I ×N ξi,n = ρ(−)i,n (3.2)
3.4.2 Tariff design
In this chapter we use the most commonly adopted design, based on volumetric
charges. In addition, we introduce a gradually increasing fixed term to cover part of
the tariff.
Under this setting, the individual electricity costs ψi,n of the agents in I are cal-
culated as follows:





where ξi,n represents the individual apparent consumption of the ith prosumer at the
nth time step, Π(dis)n is the distribution tariff set by the DSO, and Π(en) represents the
costs of energy, transmission and taxes, held constant across the simulation.
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The DSO revenues are calculated as:
∀n ∈ N Rn = Π(dis)n · (Ω + Ξn) (3.4)
with Ω being the residual demand of the system (held constant), and Ξn is the ag-
gregated apparent consumption of the consumers/prosumers, which is calculated
as Ξn = ∑Ii=1 ξi,n
To introduce a fixed fee into the tariff, we introduce a fixed term in the calcula-
tions. The electricity costs of the consumers/prosumers are calculated as follows:





where the term ci is set at the beginning of the simulation (see equation (3.8)) and
kept constant. As for the DSO, its revenues are computed as follows:
∀n ∈ N Rn = Π(dis)n · (Ω + Ξn) + C (3.6)
where C = ∑(I+J)i=1 ci, with J being the amount of consumers who make up the resid-
ual demand Ω.
3.4.3 Distribution tariff update
For every option of tariff design and incentive mechanism, the distribution tariff is
updated at every time-step according to the following equation:
∀n ∈ N Π(dis)n+1 =
Θ + ∆n − C
Ω + Ξn
(3.7)
where Θ are the costs of the DSO, which are calculated as the revenues of the first
time step R0, and held constant across the dynamical system. The imbalance from
the previous period is introduced with the difference ∆n = Θ− Rn. In other words,
Θ represents the costs of the DSO, ∆n represents the “missing money” from the pre-
vious period, and C represents the money recovered through fix charges, the sum
of these parameters thus represents a quantity in e. Then, Ω represents the residual
demand of the system (only consumers), and Ξn represents the demand of the pro-
sumers, the sum of these parameters is therefore a quantity in kWh. The mechanism
works in a way the the tariff Π(dis)n+1 is updated according to costs divided by demand.
3.5 Case study
To assess the impact of different environments on the distribution network evolu-
tion, we introduce a case study in which we compare nine different environments
(regulatory frameworks). The simulator necessitates a set of consumers/prosumers
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to work. Each consumer/prosumer is characterised by a demand profile and a pro-
duction profile. Once we have produced the set of consumers/prosumers we evalu-
ate: (i) four distinct designs with decreasing proportions of costs recovered through
volumetric charges being replaced by fixed ones (where the incentive mechanism
is kept fixed for all of them), and (ii) five different incentive mechanisms (where the
proportion of volumetric charges is kept fixed for all of them). The different assessed
environments are presented next.
• Different proportions of volumetric and fixed charges:
– E1: environment with 100% volumetric charges. NB is used as incentive
mechanism with a selling price of 0.04e.
– E2: environment with 75% volumetric charges and 25% fixed charges. NB
is used as incentive mechanism with a selling price of 0.04e.
– E3: environment with 50% volumetric charges and 50% fixed charges. NB
is used as incentive mechanism with a selling price of 0.04e.
– E4: environment with 25% volumetric charges and 75% fixed charges. NB
is used as incentive mechanism with a selling price of 0.04e.
• Different incentive mechanisms:
– E5: environment with NM as incentive mechanism and with 100% volu-
metric charges.
– E6: environment with NB as incentive mechanism, a selling price of 0.04e and
with 100% volumetric charges. Note that this is the same as E1, but for
the sake of clarity in the plots, it is used with the two names.
– E7: environment with NB as incentive mechanism, a selling price of 0.04e and
with 100% volumetric charges.
– E8: environment with NB as incentive mechanism, a selling price of 0.04e and
with 100% volumetric charges.
– E9: environment with NB as incentive mechanism, a selling price of 0.04e and
with 100% volumetric charges.
For all of the environments we set the value of Π(en) to 0.132e/kWh. Further-
more, we assume an initial distribution tariff Π(dis)n of 0.088e/kWh (making an
equivalent retail price of 0.22e/kWh). To determine two-part tariffs (E2 - E4), we
compute:
∀i ∈ I ci =






where η is the percentage of volumetric charges, and γi,n is an adjustment factor
applied depending on the peak demand of the consumer/prosumer, which is useful
to charge users fixed costs depending on their power consumption. In this case
study γi is assumed equal to 1 for all prosumers.
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3.5.1 Results
To represent the distribution network evolution for each environment we rely on
four metrics: (i) the evolution of the variable (volumetric) term of the distribution
tariff, (ii) the penetration of DER relative to the maximum potential I, (iii) the actual
deployed PV and battery capacity (in kWp and kWh), and (iv) the LCOE of the
deployed DER installations (in e/kWh).












































































FIGURE 3.3: Evolution of Π(dis)n (upper two figures) and of the DER
adoption (lower two figures) across the discrete time dynamical sys-
tem, for the evaluation of tariff designs E1 - E4 (left hand side figures),
and of the incentive mechanisms E5 - E9 (right hand side figures).
Tariff designs (E1 - E4)
According to Figure 3.3, upper-left subfigure, the variable (volumetric) term of the
distribution tariff increases in a quicker fashion when the share of this term in the
two-part tariff design is large. Likewise, the deployment of DER over time (Figure
3.3, lower-left subfigure), and the actual DER deployed capacity (Figure 3.4, upper
subfigure) which represents the counterpart to the growth of the distribution tariff,
increase in environments where the variable term in the two-part design is more
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FIGURE 3.4: Cumulative sum of the size of the deployed DER instal-
lations (including PV and batteries), over the discrete time dynami-
cal system. The upper figure corresponds to the evaluation of tariff
designs, whereas the lower one corresponds to the evaluation of the
incentive mechanisms.
prominent. In Figure 3.5, we can observe that the probability density functions of
environments E1 - E4 exhibit larger installation sizes for E1 (note that E1 and E6
represent the same environment) than E2, E3, and E4. Finally, regarding the LCOE
of the DER installations, the four cases costs are similar to the equivalent retail price.
Note that higher volume shares (E1) results in lower LCOEs. Finally, in Figure 3.6
the resulting LCOE of the prosumers is showcased. The red, dotted line indicate the
electricity price (at the initialisation conditions) in e/kWh, without DER installation
(i.e. for consumers).
Incentive mechanisms (E5 - E9)
Figure 3.3, upper-right subfigure, shows two different trends, one for the NM envi-
ronment (E5), and another for the rest. E5 variable term outgrows the other four by
at least 5%, followed by E8, E7, E9, and E6 at the end (n=10) of the simulation. The
same trends are observed in Figure 3.3, lower-right subfigure, which represents the
total DER penetration. However, examining the total capacities of deployed DER
(Figure 3.4, lower subfigure, and Figure 3.5), it is visible that, despite the larger DER
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FIGURE 3.5: Gaussian kernel density estimation of the installed ca-
pacity of PV (upper plot), and of batteries (lower plot). These figures
represent the probability density function for the kernel density esti-
mation of PV and battery capacities, for every environment (E1 - E9).
This probability is computed based on the calculated DER installation
size of the set I .




























FIGURE 3.6: Levelized cost of electricity of the prosumers in set I , for
every environment (E1 - E9).
penetration, E5 results in lower total capacity of deployed PV and batteries. Regard-
ing the LCOE, E5 displays a considerably lower LCOE than the rest of the environ-
ments. Figure 3.6 displays the resulting LCOE of the prosumers for scenarios E5 to
E9, as well as for the previous ones.
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3.5.2 Discussion
Tariff designs (E1 - E4)
We observe that by increasing the share of the variable term in the distribution tariff,
the business case to deploy DER installations improves, thus facilitating the transi-
tion from consumer to prosumer. This, in turn, causes the distribution tariff to grow
further in the environments with higher share of variable term, indicating a larger
potential death spiral behaviour for those environments. Hence, introducing a two-
part design reduces the instability of the system, as already highlighted in [35]. If
we observe the total amount of PV and battery deployed (Figure 3.4), we can de-
duce that relying on distribution tariffs which are predominantly volumetric results
in larger deployed DER capacities. This suggests a trade-off between DER pene-
tration and total capacity installed, and a distribution price spiral. Such a trade-off
must be addressed by policy makers in order to decide the desired trend. Finally,
since the incentive mechanism in place (NB with a selling price of 0.04e/kWh) does
not significantly improve the DER business case, the four LCOEs are similar to the
equivalent retail price, as can be seen in Figure 3.6. The lowest LCOE corresponds
to E1, which is consistent with Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
Incentive mechanisms (E5 - E9)
The different trends observed for NM and NB are a consequence of the distinct be-
haviour of prosumers they induce. With NM there is no incentive to make a business
case selling electricity or becoming self-sufficient. NM offers the perfect scenario for
the prosumers to adjust their production so that they import and export equivalent
amounts of energy (ξi,n = 0). For this reason, the variable term in E5 (Figure 3.3),
outgrows the other four environments, since the apparent consumption with E5 is
close to zero, and the DSO needs to adjust the distribution tariff in a larger extent.
We may also note that, under NM, no batteries are deployed (Figure 3.5). This is
compatible with the findings in [33], where the authors observe that, with this sys-
tem, batteries and imports are perfect substitutes. In Figure 3.6, we can the LCOE
of these environments. The low LCOE of E5 is also consequence of the extremely
low apparent consumption of the prosumers under NM. In the other four environ-
ments, the prosumers tend to deploy more PV and battery capacity to reduce their
imports. Interestingly, when the selling price is high (E9), the prosumers rely on
selling electricity as a business case, not reducing their apparent consumption in the
same extent as E7 or E8. Hence, the increase in the distribution tariff is not so promi-
nent in E9. A new trade-off appears between selling price and a distribution price
spiral, where both imply an extra burden for the community.
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3.6 Conclusion
In the context of increasing decentralised electricity generation, this chapter has eval-
uated the effects of different regulatory frameworks and, in particular, different me-
tering technologies, on the evolution of distribution networks. A multi-agent model
is used to simulate the behaviour of the agents of a distribution network. The actions
of the agents are evaluated at several time-steps, leading to the evolution of the dis-
tribution network. Electricity consumers interacting with a single distribution net-
work are modelled as rational agents that may invest in optimally sized distributed
energy installations composed of PV and/or batteries. Finally, the distribution tariff
is adapted according to the remuneration mechanism of the DSO.
We have designed and simulated several examples based on the metering tech-
nology, on the selling price of electricity applied when net-billing is used, and on
gradually decreasing the proportion of volumetric charges switching them by fixed
ones. The results are presented according to four distinct metrics: (i) the evolution
of the volumetric term of the distribution tariff, (ii) the penetration of DER instal-
lations, (iii) the amount of deployed PV and batteries, and (iv) the LCOE of the
deployed DER installations.
The results show that using net-metering creates a potential spiral of the distri-
bution tariff, with no integration of battery capacity in the system. When net-billing
is used instead, the spiral of prices may be more easily contained by controlling the
electricity selling prices. Furthermore, replacing volumetric charges with fixed ones
impairs the economic business case of the consumers willing to deploy DER in the
system. In general, we observe a trade-off between spiralling electricity prices and
the desired penetration of PV and batteries. Such trade-off may be tuned by pol-
icy makers by adjusting key parameters such as the level of fixed charges, or the
selling price of electricity when net-billing is utilised, the latter being possible only




The impact of the distribution
network tariff design
This chapter elaborates upon the ideas introduced in Chapter 3, expanding the scope
of the previously introduced simulation-based approach, enhancing its capabilities,
and accurately formalising its various elements. On the one hand, this chapter pro-
vides the mathematical formalisation of all the elements of this simulation-based
approach. On the other hand, it completes such an approach by improving the mod-
elling of certain constraints such as the investment costs, and by introducing new
elements as, for example, a redesigned investment decision process to control the
transition from traditional consumer to prosumer. However, the most relevant fea-
ture added in this chapter is the possibility of simulating several types of distribution
tariff design. Accordingly, four types of tariff designs are modelled in this chapter,
based on: energy consumed (volumetric), power consumed (capacity), fixed con-
nection fees, and time-dependent rates that are contingent on the time of energy or
power consumption (time-of-use or ToU fees). Among these four types of tariff de-
sign, the capacity and the ToU fees require smart meters to work. Consequently, the
methodology presented in this chapter assumes a full roll out of smart meters, in
addition to accounting for the uncertainties posed by the integration of distributed
electricity generation resources. All these new capabilities enable our simulation-
based approach to perform more realistic simulations that take into account differ-
ent types of metering technologies (as explained in the previous chapter) as well as
several types of distribution tariff design.
This redesigned simulation-based approach can simulate the dynamics of the in-
teractions between the different final customers of a distribution network and the
distribution system operator (DSO). In this context, traditional consumers have the
possibility to deploy distributed electricity generation resources (DER) in the form
of solar photovoltaic (PV) and batteries. This is modelled through an optimisation
framework and an investment decision process that gradually deploys household
PV installations depending on their profitability and the electricity charges, includ-
ing the distribution rates. The electricity exchanges taking place within the distribu-
tion network heavily depend on the proportion of consumers and prosumers, since
prosumers are less reliant on the network to cover their electricity needs. Finally,
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these exchanges dictate the level of revenue of the DSO and, eventually, the need for
adjusting the tariff if such a level is not sufficient for this entity to break even. This
is measured by an accurate modelling of the remuneration mechanism of the DSO,
which can adapt to various distribution tariff designs.
All the previously described dynamics occurring within a distribution network
are greatly affected by the regulatory framework in place. For this reason, the pre-
sented approach allows for modelling the salient features of a regulatory framework,
assessing then their impact on the final customers and the DSO. This assessment is
carried out over a discrete-time dynamical system, computing the evolution of dif-
ferent variables, such as the level of penetration of DER or the distribution tariff
level. Lastly, since different regulatory frameworks lead to different interactions,
several frameworks may be analysed and compared with the presented approach.
Our methodology is illustrated in a broad range of examples of distribution tar-
iffs including traditional –based on energy consumption or on per-connection fixed
fees– as well as novel –based on power consumption or time-of use fees– designs.
Finally, we provide a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the proposed simulation
environment to the main parameters of the methodology.
Notation
Sets of the MILP
T Set of time-steps comprising each year of the optimisation with t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
Y Set of years comprising the optimisation horizon with y ∈ {0, . . . , Y− 1}
Parameters of the MILP
Q(pv) Deployment costs of PV
Q(bat) Deployment costs of battery
P(pv) Scaling costs of PV per kWp installed
P(bat) Scaling costs of battery per kWh installed
Πot Sum of energy and transmission costs, and taxes in e/kWh
Πsp Selling price of electricity surplus for prosumers e/kWh
Πvol Volumetric term of the distribution tariff e/kWh
Πcap Power (capacity) term of the distribution tariff e/kWp
Π f ix Fixed term of the distribution tariff e/consumer
η(−) Battery charge efficiency
η(+) Battery discharge efficiency
F(−) Battery maximum charge rate
F(+) Battery maximum discharge rate
B Battery lifetime in years
U(c)t Time-series of consumption
U(p)t Time-series of production
p Maximum PV potential per prosumer
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b Maximum battery potential per prosumer
r Discount rate
Decision variables of the MILP
p PV capacity deployed in kWp
b Battery capacity deployed in kWh
χ Investment costs of a single DER installation
ρ
(−)
t Imports of energy of a prosumer
ρ
(+)
t Exports of energy of a prosumer
ξy Yearly energy consumption of a prosumer in kWh
γ Peak demand of a prosumer in kWp
υy Yearly distribution costs
ψy Yearly transmission and taxes costs
my Yearly operation and maintenance costs
φy Total yearly costs
kt PV output of a prosumer in kW
j(−)t Energy flow into the battery
j(+)t Energy flow out of the battery
vt State of charge of the battery
ζy Revenue of a prosumer from electricity surplus sales
Auxiliary variables of the MILP
τ(pv) Binary variable enforcing the deployment costs of PV
τ(bat) Binary variable enforcing the deployment costs of battery
σt Binary variable controlling the status –charging or discharging– of the battery
Additional sets
I Set of potential prosumers with i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
N Set of time-steps of the dynamical system with n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
Jn Set potential prosumers at time n where Jn ⊆ I
Additional parameters
α Continuous [0,1] bias of Bernoulli distribution
Ω Residual demand of the system made of consumers
Additional variables
A∗ Optimal sizing configuration of a prosumer
LVOE Levelised value of electricity of a prosumer
Λ Levelised costs of an actual prosumer as though there was no DER
Γ Price ratio between LVOE and Λ
Ξ Aggregated consumption of prosumers in set I
R Revenue of the DSO
42 Chapter 4. The impact of the distribution network tariff design
∆ Economic imbalance of the DSO
Θ Costs of the DSO
4.1 Introduction
One of the central objectives of the energy transition process is to progressively
shift from fossil fuel-based power generation to low-carbon, renewable alternatives
[84]. The integration of DER has been deemed a key enabler of a successful energy
transition and thereby, DERs are typically promoted by means of various incentive
mechanisms, which vary from region to region [85]. These incentive mechanisms,
nonetheless, may sometimes have unforeseen and harmful effects on the electricity
distribution sector, which are difficult to identify a priori. Indeed, since the distri-
bution networks are not technically and administratively designed to absorb large
amounts of distributed generation [86], the incorporation of DER may cause both se-
vere technical disruption [25] and regulatory challenges [36]. This paper proposes a
methodology to test novel regulatory frameworks promoting the integration of res-
idential DER, usually composed of solar PV panels and/or batteries, evaluate their
effectiveness, and identify their shortcomings. More precisely, assuming that a con-
stant part of the DSO costs must be recovered through the distribution charges to
distribution network users, we investigate how business models exploiting behind-
the-meter devices to reduce electricity bills may impact on the remuneration mech-
anisms of DSOs.
Previous studies on the topic suggest that the integration of DERs into the dis-
tribution networks induce changes in the way in which the distribution network is
used, challenging its normal operation. Such changes, according to [87], are region
independent, therefore representing a worldwide dilemma, and raise the question
of how to distribute the costs in these new distribution systems. The authors of this
report review the distribution tariff structures of several countries/regions1, and
simulate their effects through notional households. The authors introduce several
notions of fairness, highlighting the importance of finding the right scheme to deter
an unfair allocation of distribution costs among final customers, and stressing that
the fairness of the scheme depends on the interpretation of this concept. Another re-
port, this time centred in Australia, discusses distribution tariff reforms in Victoria’s
distribution network [88]. The authors outline different tariff options toward distinct
objectives, making use of the principles of simplicity, efficiency, adaptability, afford-
ability, and equity. Similar principles are suggested in other research articles such
1This report ([87]) analyses four European Union Member States: Italy, Portugal, Romania, and
The Netherlands; one European Economic Area State: Norway, and one state outside European juris-
diction: the State of California in the US. The distribution tariff schemes in each of these examples is
different: Italy – energy, power, and fixed components, with an increasing block tariff; Portugal – en-
ergy and power components, with a time-of-use basis; Romania – energy component; The Netherlands
– power and fixed components; Norway – energy and fixed components; California – energy and fixed
components, with an increasing block tariff and a time-of-use basis.
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as [89, 82]. The works presented in [37, 33] indicate that, under certain regulatory
frameworks designing the DSO remuneration strategies, the deployment of DER,
such as household PV units, may be responsible for a non-negligible increase in the
distribution component of the overall retail price of electricity (the latter typically in-
cluding energy generation costs, transmission costs, distribution costs, and taxes). In
particular, [37] suggests reviewing tariff designs based on volumetric charges with
single metering, arguing that these designs are not cost reflective and potentially
lead to cross-subsidies, proposing bi-directional metering as an alternative. To add
to the previous, the authors in [33] make the comparison of a single metering mech-
anism (net-metering) with a dual one (net-purchasing), advocating the use of the
latter in order to create more accurate price signals to synchronise consumption and
production and to avoid cross-subsidisation from consumers to prosumers. Further-
more, the authors in [75] show, with empirical data, that in a setting where the distri-
bution charges to the consumers are predominantly volumetric (i.e. in e/kWh), an
increase in the distribution tariff leads to a corresponding increase in household PV
deployment. The combination of these effects can result in a potentially disrupting
phenomenon known as the death spiral of the utility.
This concept is introduced in [34], where it is analysed in depth and tentative
solutions from the DSO stand point are proposed to mitigate its potentially harm-
ing effects (e.g., approval of new rate-making practices or support for new business
models). In another work, [35], the author states that an inadequate flat-rate tariff
design in Queensland, Australia has led to network price increases of 112% owing to
a death-spiral-related problem. The death spiral takes place in two stages: (1) distri-
bution tariffs increase due to the deployment of DER (DSOs struggle to recover their
costs and must increase the distribution tariffs), and (2) higher distribution tariffs in-
duce the proliferation of DER installations (or other types of response from final cus-
tomers to mitigate on their end the tariff increase). Should this phenomenon proceed
unchecked for some time, an uncontrolled increase in distribution tariffs may occur,
in which the extra financial burden resulting from higher tariffs is mostly met by the
users who have not deployed DER, and who are thus more exposed to price fluctua-
tions, as shown in [33, 42]. The latter work proposes a stylised framework assessing
the costs for consumers and prosumers after the deployment of DER installations, in
a setting where net-metering is employed, quantifying the difference in costs. This
difference in costs may result in cross-subsidies from traditional consumers to DER
owners, as shown in [37, 41]. In [41], the authors suggest a connection between
the self-consumption rate (i.e., the proportion of a prosumer’s consumption covered
by their own DER installation) and the level of cross-subsidies from consumers to
prosumers, in a study focused on France. A similar observation is made across the
Atlantic in [90], where different distribution tariff designs in Texas, US, are assessed,
reporting on their impact on the distribution network as a function of the level of
cross-subsidisation –proxy for unfairness according to the authors– they induce.
To cope with these problems, several DSO remuneration strategies have been
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proposed and analysed – strategies that better reflect the costs of the electricity dis-
tribution, and induce electricity rates that serve as efficient signals for the users of the
distribution network, as explained and recommended in [28, 64]. The challenges cre-
ated by the integration of DER are qualitatively analysed in [67], where the authors
recommend regulatory improvements on the remuneration mechanism of DSOs,
taking into account the cost-reflectivity principle. In particular, they recommend the
use of incentive regulation based on price or revenue caps rather than rate of return
regulation, where DSOs are allowed to keep any efficiency gains from efficient DER
integration. Other cost-reflective strategies are analysed in [69], where the transition
from a distribution tariff based on average costs to a cost-causation tariff that looks
into time and location to determine the costs (via e.g., coincident peak) is analysed.
The authors ultimately show the importance of breaking down the different effects a
change in distribution tariff may induce, to quantitatively understand their foresee-
able impacts. Hence, quantitatively assessing the effectiveness and potential pitfalls
of novel DSO remuneration strategies is essential, and simulation-based techniques
can be invoked to test them in various technological and regulatory settings.
We can find several examples in the literature where the authors have made use
of different simulation-based techniques to attain similar goals. The authors in [57]
develop an framework to establish the remuneration mechanisms of DSOs. Such a
framework lays out a global remuneration scheme to compute the distribution tar-
iff, which is based on a revenue-limitation scheme that considers initial distribution
costs, annual market increases, and efficiency gains. Several works have made use
of agent-based modelling to analyse this type of problem. For instance, in [91], a
simulation approach based on multi-agent modelling is developed to analyse the
impact of the integration of renewable resources (wind in this case) on the efficient
use of the transmission system in Québec, Canada. Similarly, in [92], a multi-agent-
based model is developed and applied to study the integration of distributed gen-
eration units where the agents are the DER installations. This tool is employed to
help ensure the power system balance control in Hungary. The previous two works
focus on control problems but show the suitability of these frameworks to model
renewables resources and, in particular, DER integration. In [93], a quantitative ap-
proach is presented to assess distribution network performances when presented
with incentive-based regulation. These performances are measured with and with-
out DERs, and serve to guide DSO investments as well as to quantify the impact of
incentive regulation on these investments. This topic is also dealt with in [94], where
a method for regulators to find the right incentive scheme for distributed genera-
tion is exposed. The proposed method is based on a multi-objective optimisation
problem that provides pareto-optimal solutions to the decision to invest in DERs
from the investor (maximisation of the net present value) and the DSO (maximisa-
tion of the net present value derived from the provided incentives) perspectives. In
[95], an active distribution network is simulated by means of multi-agent system-
based modelling, using cooperative agents representing different loading scenarios.
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A non-cooperative game is proposed in [31], where different tariff structures are
evaluated, and their impacts on the electricity users are studied. This work is fur-
ther developed in [32], where the authors introduce three types of fee to design the
distribution tariff: energy, power and fixed; considering prospective, in additional to
sunk costs, to set the tariff level. In [82], the design of cost-reflective distribution tar-
iffs is addressed, introducing a model in which users can react to high distribution
charges by deploying fix-sized DER installations in order to reduce their electricity
bills. The impact of regulation on the willingness of DSOs to integrate distributed
generation is addressed in [96], where a method is proposed and applied to different
case studies. Finally, [43] introduces a stylised set-up where two different metering
systems (net-metering and net-billing) are analysed in their ability to promote the
deployment of DER. In the latter work, the impact of such metering systems on
the consumers in the distribution network and on the electricity prices is studied,
concluding that the death spiral of the utility might be a potential issue, in partic-
ular in the net-metering case which can be considered as an incentive mechanism
on its own. All these works deal with simulation-based analysis of the relation be-
tween DSO remuneration strategies, DER integration, and impact on distribution
networks.
Building upon the existing literature, the presented paper introduces a simulation-
based computational tool that enables the modelling and study of the multi-agent
system dynamics resulting from interactions between the agents of a distribution
network, namely the distribution network users and the DSO. At every time-step,
agents may either stay idle or perform a pre-defined action: the distribution network
users can deploy optimally sized PV installations with or without batteries aiming at
minimising their electricity bills, whereas the DSO can adjust the distribution tariff
in order to collect sufficient revenue so as to break even. Hence, the present paper
adds to the literature by explicitly modelling the action-reaction dynamics of agents
under various tariff structures, thereby allowing to represent the system evolution
over time and estimate the short-to-middle-run effects of specific pieces of regulation
on aforementioned distribution network attributes.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 4.2 establishes the concrete contributions
of our work. Section 4.3 provides an introductory overview of the simulation-based
approach. Section 4.4 details the underpinning mathematical models. Section 4.5
illustrates the methodology considering various regulatory frameworks and DSO
remuneration strategies, and tests the limits of the simulation-based computational
tool by introducing an extensive sensitivity analysis of the main parameters of the
model. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Contributions
Our approach adds to the previous works (notably including [43]) by:
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• Mathematically formalising a sizing tool which is used to optimally size DER
installations.
• Mathematically formalising an investment decision process for modelling the
adoption and deployment of DER installations based on the cost-efficiency and
profitability of the installation.
• Modelling, in a realistic fashion, the non-linear investment costs of deploy-
ing DER installations by making use of a continuous piecewise approximation
which is more accurate than the traditional approach whilst being computa-
tionally efficient.
• Mathematically formalising the remuneration mechanism of DSOs that deter-
mines the economic balance (or imbalance) of the DSO, which depends on the
distribution tariff and the DSO costs – this mechanism must take into account
all possible distribution tariff structures (i.e. based on units of energy con-
sumed, units of power consumed, or type of access point to the distribution
network).
• Introducing the concept of levelised value of electricity (LVOE) as an extension
of the traditional levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) to take into account not
only the costs of DER installations, but also potential revenue via electricity
sales – the LVOE is then used both as the objective function of a minimisation
problem and as a metric on which to report.
The simulation environment presented in our work requires a tariff design as
input, which is typically set by the regulator. In previous works (such as [43]), these
designs were limited to mechanical meters, therefore only volumetric and fixed fees
were possible. In this paper we assume full roll out of smart meters, opening the
door to new tariff designs. Thus, in addition to the previous, we expand the current
literature by introducing:
• Capacity fees by which the DSO charges the users depending on the power
they draw from the distribution network.
• Time-of-use (ToU) fees that are time varying, i.e. the costs for the users depend
on the time of the day.
We thus provide one single simulation environment which can assess, in a realis-
tic fashion, the impact of all the different tariff designs (volume, capacity, fixed, ToU)
on a detailed investment decision process where prosumers are accurately modelled
through an optimisation framework, taking into account a coherent representation
of the DSO remuneration mechanism.
4.3. Simulation configuration 47
4.3 Simulation configuration
The proposed methodology relies on a multi-agent system formalisation in which
the agents (i.e. consumers, potential prosumers, actual prosumers, and the DSO)
interact with each other within a given set of rules characterising a technical and a
regulatory framework. Through the agent’s interactions over time, the topology of
the distribution network changes, and so does the distribution tariff and, by tracking
the actions of agents across a provided simulation horizon, we can determine trajec-
tories of topologies and prices over such a horizon. By using this principle utilising
various starting conditions, we may estimate the different topology changes those
starting conditions induce.
Each type of agent interacts in a different way:
• Consumers are passive agents who simply consume electricity from the distri-
bution network according to their demand profiles. They cannot become pro-
sumers owing to technical or economic constraints and are modelled through
their electricity demand.
• Potential prosumers are agents who may deploy an optimally sized DER in-
stallation, turning into actual prosumers; the decision to deploy such an instal-
lation depends on its cost-efficiency when compared to the retail price of elec-
tricity. After the comparison is computed, a probabilistic investment decision
process is laid out to determine whether a given potential prosumer becomes
an actual prosumer.
• Actual prosumers are passive agents who consume and produce electricity
from the distribution network according to their demand and production pro-
files. Such profiles are established only when potential prosumers become ac-
tual prosumers, therefore reflecting the after-the-meter consumption or pro-
duction accounting for the deployed DER installations.
• The DSO manages the distribution network, incurring certain costs in this role.
Through its remuneration mechanism, the DSO collects charges for the use
of the distribution network by the three types of user (consumers, potential
prosumers, and actual prosumers), and is entitled to adjust the distribution
tariff so that it recovers the totality of its costs, breaking-even.
Through the agent’s interactions over time, it is possible to determine the evolu-
tion of the proportions of consumers, potential prosumers, and actual prosumers, as
well as the evolution of distribution tariff and electricity exchanges over a provided
simulation horizon. The simulation starts with a pool of potential prosumers who
may become actual prosumers during the simulation, relying less on the distribution
network. The DSO, expecting to collect a certain level of charges from these poten-
tial prosumers, in fact collects a different level since the consumption behaviour of
actual prosumers is different to that of potential prosumers. As a result, the DSO
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may adjust the distribution tariff to adapt to the new situation. The full modelling of
these agents as well as the simulation procedure is detailed in the following section.
4.4 Modelling and problem formalisation
In this section, we present the models used in our simulation-based computational
tool. We start by describing the set of rules defining the technical and regulatory
frameworks and then, we formalise the different agents and their interaction mech-
anisms.
4.4.1 Rules defining the technical and regulatory frameworks
These rules define the playing field for agents to interact. A real-life playing field
includes many rules, which may not all be relevant to our modelling. Against this
backdrop, we identified and selected a sub-set of rules capturing key drivers for
DER deployment: tariff design and technology costs.
Tariff design
This sub-set of rules defines the structure of the distribution costs charged to the
users of the distribution network. In our work we consider that the distribution tariff
might be based on volume of energy drawn from the grid charged ine/kWh, power
drawn charged in e/kWp, or connection point charged in e/user. The amount of
money charged by the DSO for its services over a given billing period is obtained as
a weighted sum of those fees, whose respective proportions are regulated. To design
a tariff, it is possible to use any combination of these fees.
In addition, in our simulation-based approach we introduce ToU tariffs by setting
different time-dependent price levels. Those levels can be applied both to volume
fees and/or to capacity fees. Accordingly, under a ToU tariff, the volume and/or the
capacity fee of the distribution tariff will comprise several sub-fees, depending on
the time of consumption.
Technology costs
This sub-set of rules has an impact on the investment costs of prosumers. In our
work, we divide these costs in two.
• Deployment costs are charges that depend on whether the DER installation
is deployed or not. They represent the costs of installation, including the PV,
inverter, and (if any) batteries.
• Scaling costs are the charges depending on the scale of the installation. We as-
sume these costs to be linearly dependent on the size of the installation, there-
fore on the total deployed capacity of PV and battery.
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These are therefore non-linear costs that we model using a piecewise linear approxi-
mation where the two terms are introduced (see 4.4.3 for more details). Furthermore,
we assume these two components will linearly decrease over time. This means that
the technology will be more expensive at the beginning of the simulated period than
at the end. In this sense, prosumers who deploy DER later in time will pay less for
their installations.
4.4.2 Users
Users are divided into three groups: (i) consumers, (ii) potential prosumers, and
(iii) actual prosumers. The consumers group comprises users who will not deploy
a DER installation due to economic or technical constraints. Their aggregated de-
mand (also known as the residual demand of the distribution network) is used in
the simulation. We define potential prosumers as all the users who may deploy a
DER installation, provided that the conditions are favourable. Potential prosumers
are, initially, consumers importing electricity from the grid to cover their demand.
Then, as the simulation proceeds over time, the number of potential prosumers may
decrease as they elect to invest in and progressively deploy optimally-sized DER in-
stallations, effectively turning into actual prosumers. Finally, actual prosumers are
able to import and export electricity from and into the distribution network.
To model the interactions of potential and actual prosumers, we make use of an
optimisation framework. We formulate this optimisation as a mixed integer linear
problem (MILP) aimed at minimising the levelised value of electricity (LVOE) of a
DER installation. We introduce the concept of LVOE –whose formulation can be
found in Section 4.4.3– as an extension of the traditional levelised cost of electricity
(LCOE). The difference between these two concepts is that whilst the LCOE can only
account for the costs incurred by the DER installation, the LVOE can take into consid-
eration both costs and revenue (for instance revenue obtained from electricity sold).
Adding the dimension of revenue was not needed in the past, where net-metering
was predominant, since, with this system, the revenue are implicitly taken into ac-
count. However, with the introduction of other mechanisms such as net-billing,
where imports and exports are measured separately, the concept of LCOE falls short
in accurately describing the dynamics of prosumers, being necessary to introduce
the LVOE to explicitly integrate the revenue. The LCOE is therefore computed as
costs divided by demand, whereas the LVOE is expressed as costs minus revenue
divided by demand (in all cases an annual discount rate is applied to costs, revenue,
and demand). Hence, the LVOE provides an indication of the net economic gain of
potential prosumers, should they become actual prosumers. Moreover, by compar-
ing the LVOE with the electricity costs without DER we can compute the probabilis-
tic investment decision process of potential prosumers becoming actual prosumers.
Both the MILP and the investment decision process are presented in the remainder
of this section.
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4.4.3 Optimisation framework formalisation
For every individual potential prosumer, this optimisation program is used to com-
pute the electricity trades (imports and exports), the minimised LVOE, and the op-
timal sizing configuration of the DER installation leading to the minimum LVOE.
Hence, both sizing and operation are optimised under a perfect forecast assump-
tion. The optimisation horizon is set to Y ∈ N years, where Y = {0, . . . , Y − 1}
(not to be confused with the simulation horizon, which will be presented later in
Section 4.4.4). Each year is divided into T time-steps. Let T = {0, . . . , T− 1}, where
T = 8760 represents a time discretisation of one year in hours. The MILP requires
several parameters as inputs; these parameters are constant over the simulation hori-
zon Y since they do not evolve from year to year of the optimisation (note that some
of them will evolve over the simulation horizon, see Section 4.4.4). Let G denote a
4-tuple gathering these inputs:




















Q(pv), Q(bat), P(pv), P(bat)
)
represent the deployment costs of PV (Q(pv))
and batteries (Q(bat)), as well as the scaling costs of PV per kWp (P(pv)) and




Π(ot), Π(sp), Π(vol), Π(cap), Π( f ix)
)
are price signals. Π(ot) is the aggre-
gation of energy costs, transmission costs, and taxes, in e/kWh. Π(sp) corre-
sponds to the price at which prosumers sell the electricity in e/kWh. Π(vol)
is the volumetric term of the distribution tariff in e/kWh. Π(cap) represents
the capacity term of the distribution tariff in e/kWp. Π( f ix) represents a fixed
charge to be paid by every user connected to the distribution network, in e.
In the case of ToU tariffs, Π(vol) and/or Π(cap) will present different levels de-
pending on the time of consumption.
• H =
(
η(−), η(+), F(−), F(+), B
)
defines the battery parameters. η(−) is the
charge efficiency. η(+) is the discharge efficiency. F(−) represents the maxi-
mum charge rate. F(+) stands for the maximum discharge rate. Finally B is the
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Let A =
{
(p, b) |p ∈ [0, p] ; b ∈ [0, b]
}
denote the space of sizing variables con-
taining: PV size (p) in kWp, battery size (b) in kWh; with p, and b being parameters
denoting the upper bounds on PV and battery capacities, respectively. Furthermore,
let τ(pv) and τ(bat) denote binary variables enforcing the deployment costs when ei-
ther PV or batteries are installed. Finally, let χ represent the investment costs of PV
and batteries, which are linearised by means of a piecewise affine function, and are
dependent on the sizing variables A ∈ A.
χ = p · P(pv) + Y
B
· b · P(bat) + τ(pv) ·Q(pv) + τ(bat) ·Q(bat) (4.1)
where the control of the binary variables τ(pv) and τ(bat) is given by:
p ≤ p · τ(pv) (4.2)
b ≤ b · τ(bat) (4.3)
The yearly costs incurred by a prosumer are represented by φy, and computed
by means of the following equation:
φy = υy + ψy + my, ∀y ∈ Y (4.4)
where υy represents the yearly electricity distribution costs, computed according to
Equation (4.5). ψy stands for the yearly costs of electricity not related to distribution
costs, i.e. transmission and energy costs, computed using Equation (4.6). my are the
costs of operating and maintaining the DER installation; these costs are computed
as in [97], following Equation (4.7).
υy = ξy ·Π(vol) + γ ·Π(cap) + Π( f ix), ∀y ∈ Y (4.5)




· p + 1
100
· b, ∀y ∈ Y (4.7)
in these equations, ξy and γ represent the yearly consumption and the peak demand












t |t = 0, . . . , T − 1
}
(4.9)
where ρ(−)t are the hourly imports of a prosumer. To define the energy balance we
need to define: the exports of electricity ρ(+)t , the PV output of each DER kt (Equation
4.10), and the energy flows into and out of the battery j(−)t and j
(+)
t respectively
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(Equations 4.11 to 4.14).
kt = p ·U(p)t , ∀t ∈ T (4.10)
j(−)t ≤ b ·
1
F(−)
, ∀t ∈ T (4.11)
j(+)t ≤ b ·
1
F(+)
, ∀t ∈ T (4.12)
j(−)t ≤ b · σt, ∀t ∈ T (4.13)
j(+)t ≤ b · (1− σt), ∀t ∈ T (4.14)
In these equations, σt is a binary variable taking a value of 1 when the battery is









t , ∀t ∈ T (4.15)
The last variable of our model is the state of charge of the battery, vt.





+ j(−)t · η(−), ∀t ∈ T \ {0}
0 if t = 0
(4.17)
Finally, let LVOE denote the general objective function of the MILP that repre-
sents the levelised value of electricity. This function will be minimised when the
MILP is instantiated and solved, it is a mapping from (G ×A) to R. For a given pair
(G, A) ∈ (G,A), LVOE (G, A) is defined as follows:










where ζy is the revenue of the prosumer from electricity sales, and r is the discount
rate. By subtracting ζy from the operational costs φy, we compute the actual value
offered by the DER installation (LVOE), instead of simply its levelised cost. This term
depends on the total amount of energy exported to the grid and on the selling price








t ·Π(sp), ∀y ∈ Y (4.19)
From this MILP we extract the values of several variables to be used later on,
they are the optimal sizing variables p and b; the yearly consumption ξy the yearly
peak demand γ.
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4.4.4 Expanding the optimisation framework to multiple time-steps and
prosumers
At the heart of the simulation-based approach lies a discrete-time dynamical pro-
cess computing the evolution of a set of indicators. Let n ∈ N denote the discrete-
time variable used to refer to the iterations of this dynamical process, where N =
{0, . . . , N − 1}, and N ∈N is the time horizon. Furthermore, to represent the diver-
sity of users, we introduce a set of I ∈ N potential prosumers, with I = {1, . . . , I}.
At every iteration n, each potential prosumer i ∈ I is characterised by a time series







. Therefore, at every iteration n, and for every
user i, we can define:
Gi,n = (Pn, Πi,n, Hn, Ui,n) ∀(i, n) ∈ I ×N , (4.20)
where Pn and Hn do not depend on i since they refer to technology costs and techni-
cal characteristics, assumed identical for all users. Consequently, we define L̂VOEGi,n




LVOE (Gi,n, A) (4.21)
Furthermore, the optimal sizing configuration is written as:
A∗Gi,n ∈ arg min
A ∈ A
s.t.(4.1)− (4.19)
LVOE (Gi,n, A) (4.22)
4.4.5 Investment decision process
From one time-step in the simulation horizon to the next, we compute the transition
from potential to actual prosumer. For each potential prosumer, the L̂VOEGi,n is
compared to the levelised cost without DER (denoted by Λi,n). The outcome of this
comparison defines whether or not a transition occurs. Let Jn ⊆ I denote the set
of potential prosumers at time n. Initially, |J0| = |I|. Assuming that prosumers
cannot turn back into consumers, one has ∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, |Jn| ≤ |Jn−1|. Then,
















∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N , (4.23)





∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N . (4.24)
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In this last equation, Λi,n is strictly positive provided that the demand of the user and
the electricity prices are strictly positive. Γi,n will therefore adopt a value between
0 and 1, since L̂VOEGi,n cannot be greater than Λi,n, by design of the optimisation
problem. To establish whether a consumer will decide to deploy a DER installation,
we make use of a Bernoulli random variable whose parameter pi,n is a function of
Γi,n.
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N ∃ fi,n : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] ,
pi,n = fi,n (Γi,n)
(4.25)
For simplicity, in the following we assume that all the previously defined mappings
fi,n are equal to a unique linear mapping, given by:
pi,n = (α · Γi,n|α ∈ [0, 1]) ∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N , (4.26)
where α is included to model a broad range of investment behaviours, e.g. a small
value implies a increased tendency to invest. Then, the random variable βi,n, that
controls the decision of investing or not in a DER installation of size A∗Gi,n , is drawn
from the Bernoulli distribution B(1, pi,n):
βi,n ∼ B(1, pi,n) ∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N . (4.27)
Finally, the decision for every potential prosumer is given by:
θi,n = 1− βi,n ∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N , (4.28)
with θi,n ∈ {0, 1} by definition of the Bernoulli distribution. If θi,n = 1, a DER
installation of size A∗Gi,n is deployed by the agent i. This agent is then removed from
the set of users Jn. In this way, when a DER installation of size A∗Gi,n is deployed, the
user i is prevented from investing in the future. If θi,n = 0, the DER installation is
not deployed, and another opportunity will be given to user i at the following step
n + 1. The set Jn+1 can thus be computed as follows:
Jn+1 = Jn \ {i|θi,n = 1}. (4.29)
Modelling the investment decision-making process in such fashion ensures the
deployment of some DER units even when the viability of the DER installations lie
at the economically feasible limit (for instance when the technology costs are high
or the retail price of electricity is low), representing the behaviour of those users
who are eager to invest. Likewise, this investment decision-making mechanism will
prevent some agents from investing even under favourable conditions, represent-
ing those agents more reluctant to invest. Also, slightly randomising the decision
process using a Bernoulli distribution allows to aggregate the effect of variables that
influence the decision making process but that are not explicitly modelled in this
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article, such as the access to capital for investing in DER, or the interest in renewable
energy.
4.4.6 Distribution system operator’s remuneration mechanism
The DSO distributes electricity to the users of the distribution network, charging a
distribution fee for the service. This fee must be sufficiently large so as to collect the
revenue that allows the DSO to break-even financially. Hence, assigning an adequate
level of a distribution fee is a delicate process. An under-estimated fee may lead to
insufficient remuneration, creating an economic imbalance that must eventually be
socialised via higher rates. On the other hand, an inflated tariff may place excessive
economic strain on users. Both deviations from the optimum are symptoms of an
inefficient DSO remuneration strategy. To model the interactions of the DSO, we
represent its remuneration mechanism, which includes the adjustment of the distri-
bution fee when needed. Note that the tariff design cannot be modified by the DSO
since it is controlled by the incumbent regulatory authority, and it is thereby out of
the scope of our work.
The remuneration mechanism computes the distribution fee by comparing the
costs (Θn) and the revenue (Rn) of the DSO in the previous tariff period and comput-
ing its difference ∆n = Θn − Rn. If ∆n = 0, it means that the distribution tariff level
is adequate. However, if ∆n > 0 or ∆n < 0, it indicates an under- or over-estimation
of the distribution fee, respectively. It is important to note that the applied fee is al-
ways an estimation of the real one, based on forecasts of consumption. In our work,
we assume that the forecast used by the DSO is a continuation of the last observed
state of the system. Furthermore, we assume that at the initial state, the system is
economically balanced, i.e. ∆−1 = 0 and therefore Θ−1 = R−1. Hence, the initial
costs of the system can be calculated by determining the initial revenue. The general
expression to compute the DSO revenue is:
Rn =
[












Π( f ix)n · (I + I0)
]
∀n ∈ N ,
(4.30)
where Π(vol)n , Π
(cap)
n , and Π
( f ix)
n represent the volumetric, capacity, and fixed fees,
respectively, at the nth time-step. I0 stands for the number of consumers who make
up the residual demand (i.e. non prosumers). γi,n represents the optimised peak
demand of the ith user, output of the MILP. Ω represents the residual demand of
the system, which is an input of the simulation and is held constant throughout the
entire simulation process. Finally, Ξn represents the aggregated consumption of the







i,n ∀n ∈ N , (4.31)
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where ρ(−)i,n represents the optimised imports of the i
th potential or actual prosumer
at the nth time-step, which is an output of the MILP.
To begin the simulation we need the initial costs (Θ−1). These are, as previously
explained, equal to the initial revenue (R−1). The latter can be easily computed by
means of Equation (4.30), since the demand profiles of the potential prosumers and
the residual demand are known. Once the initial revenue (and therefore the initial
costs) of the DSO are computed, the remuneration mechanism can distribute them
across the different types of fees: volumetric, capacity, or fixed, thus obtaining three
different fees which are applied to the final customers’ electricity bills (note that ToU
fees are a particular case of volumetric fees). The same distribution mechanism is
used for computing the initial fees and to update them in subsequent time-steps of















· µ2 ∀n ∈ N , (4.33)





· µ3 ∀n ∈ N . (4.34)
In these equations, µ1, µ2, and µ3 represent the share of the volumetric, capac-
ity, and fixed fee, respectively, imposed by the DSO remuneration strategy, and
thereby by the regulatory framework set by the regulator. These shares comply with
∑3j=1 µj = 1.
To compute the fees for time-step n = 0, we know Θ−1 as it equals the revenue
at this time-step. Furthermore, we know that ∆−1 = 0. The rest of the elements in
Equations (4.32), (4.33), and (4.34) are given by the profiles of the users, which are
known. Once the simulation starts, at every time-step n, some potential prosumers
may turn into actual prosumers, impacting the revenue of the DSO and, in particular,
Ξn and γi,n. The DSO, in turn, reacts by updating the different components of the
distribution tariff. Finally, since we work under the assumption that the DSO uses its
last observed state of the system as forecast for the following tariff period, the costs
at a given period will be the same as the revenue at the previous one Θn = Rn−1.
4.4.7 User’s electricity bill
The electricity bills of the distribution network’s final customers depend on their
imports and their exports (if any) of electricity. In this paper, we assume a full roll out
of smart meters, therefore these two electricity flows are registered independently by
the metering device, and have two different price signals associated.
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Imports of electricity This is the overall price of electricity the final customers
(consumers and potential and actual prosumers) pay to use the network and con-
sume electricity from it. This price includes commodity, transmission, distribution
and others. In this work we are interested in the distribution part, therefore, all the
other elements making up the electricity price are grouped in one element, Π(ot), in-
troduced in eq. (4.6) and set in e/kWh. As for the distribution fee, the smart meters
allow us to split the distribution component of the electricity bill into its constituents:
Π(vol), Π(cap), and Π( f ix), as in (4.5). The contribution of each element is given by µj
(see eqs. (4.32) - (4.34)) and depends on the DSO remuneration mechanism.
Exports of electricity This is the selling price of the actual prosumers when export-
ing electricity to the grid. It is introduced by Π(sp) in eq. (4.19) and set in e/kWh.
4.5 Test case: simulator demonstration
To test and illustrate the proposed simulation-based approach, this section presents
an extensive range of tests showcasing the potential of the presented methodology
to flexibly simulate a wide range of scenarios. To create these scenarios, we need: (i)
a set of users, and (ii) a set of rules representing a regulatory framework (designing
the DSO remuneration strategy). Then, by using the same set of users for different
remuneration strategies, we can analyse the impact of the latter on different features
inherent to distribution networks, notably the distribution network prices and the
level of penetration of distributed generation in the distribution network.
Set of users:
Users are characterised by individual demand and production profiles. A bottom-
up approach, the CREST model [98], was used to generate demand profiles. Using
the CREST model we produced a range of daily profiles representing weekends and
weekdays and then, by means of a randomisation process, different demand pro-
files spanning one year and with a resolution of one hour, were generated. As for
the production profiles, they were generated with the same time span and resolution
(one year and one hour, respectively), representing the potential for PV generation
of prosumers. To do so, the Python library PVLIB [99] was used. The profiles thus
produced are based on solar radiation historical data, obtained through typical me-
teorological years (tmy), which were downloaded from the Joint Research Centre of
the European Commission2. From a range of different tmy, and making variations
on the tilt and orientation of the PV panels (parameters of PVLIB), different profiles
were generated. These profiles represent the load factor, i.e. percentage of the total
installed capacity that is produced at each time-step.
In total, 1,000 demand and production profiles were generated, to represent 1,000
potential prosumers. In addition to them, 5,000 consumers were created for whom
2Joint Research Centre photovoltaic geographical information system https://re.jrc.ec.
europa.eu/pvg_tools/en/tools.html#TMY.
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only the aggregated yearly demand and the peak demand is needed as they make up
what we call residual demand of the system. Both groups of customers (consumers
and prosumers) have been created according to the Belgian reality, that is, the pro-
files are consistent with electricity consumption and solar radiation in Belgium. The
proportion prosumers/consumers is selected so as to reflect the real-life situation in
Belgium, as described in footnote 7 of [44].
Set of rules of a regulatory framework
Two groups of scenarios are proposed:
• Simulation-based approach capabilities: First we generate several scenar-
ios showcasing the capabilities of the proposed simulation-based approach to
compute a prediction of the evolution of distribution network features (distri-
bution prices and penetration of DER). These scenarios represent various DSO
remuneration strategies.
• Sensitivity analyses: Then, the sensitivity of our approach to several parame-
ters is tested, reporting on the impacts these parameters have on the simulation-
based approach capabilities to predict the distribution network development.
4.5.1 Simulation-based approach capabilities
In this part of the simulation results, we test seven scenarios mimicking different
initial conditions set by the regulator. Accordingly, we can introduce different val-
ues of µj for each scenario. These values will impact on the evolution of the dif-
ferent elements of the distribution tariff, as described by Equations (4.32), (4.33),
and (4.34). In these equations, all the variables are known. Therefore, to start the
simulations we only need an initial state, i.e. the initial costs of the system (by
assumption equal to the initial revenue Θ−1 = R−1). To compute the initial rev-
enue, in this example we use the current situation in Belgium, where the distribution
fee is based on a volumetric tariff which, on average, amounts to 0.08 e/kWh (i.e.
Π(vol)−1 = 0.08, Π
(cap)
−1 = 0, Π
( f ix)
−1 = 0) and determine R−1 as expressed in Equation
(4.30). Since this initial revenue must be the same regardless of the scenario we want
to test, we can break it down for different initial states representing different distri-
butions of volume, capacity, and fixed fees (i.e. different scenarios), using Equations
(4.32), (4.33), and (4.34). Using this procedure, we have built seven scenarios, show-
casing a range of different possible tariff designs. Along with these, one additional
scenario has been created to test the impact of ToU distribution tariffs based on vol-
umetric fees. All these scenarios are listed in Table 4.1.
Finally, Table 4.2 lists the rest of the inputs used to run the scenarios. To assess
each scenario, we use three metrics: (i) the penetration of actual prosumers relative
to the maximum potential; (ii) the evolution of the electricity costs for consumers
and prosumers; and (iii) the actual deployed PV and battery capacities (in kWp and
kWh respectively).
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TABLE 4.1: Construction of the different scenarios
Scenario Description µ1 µ2 µ3
VOL Based on fully volumetric distribution fees 1 0 0
CAP Based on fully capacity distribution fees 0 1 0
FIX Based on fully fixed fees, per connection point 0 0 1
VOL_CAP Based 50% on volume and 50% on capacity fees 1/2 1/2 0
VOL_FIX Based 50% on volume and 50% on fixed fees 1/2 0 1/2
CAP_FIX Based 50% on capacity and 50% on fixed fees 0 1/2 1/2
EVEN Based on a even distribution of the weights 1/3 1/3 1/3
TOU Time-of-use tariff* 1 0 0
* The ToU distribution tariff is created by using a fully volumetric fee such as VOL, where differ-
ent levels of the fee are applied depending on the time of the day. In our particular example,
three different levels are applied corresponding to peak rates, off-peak rates, and shoulder
rates: Peak rates (+10%): 07:00–08:00 & 11:00–12:00 & 17:00–19:00. Off-peak rates (–): 06:00–
07:00 & 08:00–11:00 & 12:00–17:00 & 19:00–22:00. Shoulder rates (-10%): 22:00–06:00.

















Ω 85% of total load [kWh]
I 1000 [#]
* Prices at time n = 0, they linearly decrease over
time by 5% each tariff period.
Results
To quantitatively show the evolution of the penetration of actual prosumers over
time, Figure 4.1a presents the percentage of actual prosumers with respect to the
maximum potential, for each time-step of the dynamical system. Furthermore, to
show the evolution of the distribution tariff, driven by Equations (4.32), (4.33), and
(4.34), we compute the total costs for consumers, which depict the same evolution as
only the distribution component of the overall retail electricity tariff can change over
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time3. We compute these costs at each time-step and normalise them by the initial
costs t = 0, displaying the evolution in Figure 4.1b.


































(A) Penetration of DER in
the distribution network as
a proportion of the total
potential penetration over
time.






























(B) Growth of the over-
all electricity cost for con-
sumers over time.
FIGURE 4.1: Evolution of the DER penetration and the electricity
prices for consumers over the simulation period.
On the one hand these plots show the effectiveness of each scenario to stimulate
the adoption of PV and batteries (i.e. prosumers), and on the other hand the reper-
cussions of such a deployment in terms of electricity costs for the regular consumers
of the distribution network. In these examples, all the scenarios with the exception
of the one based on only fixed fees (FIX), lead to increased electricity costs. However,
the information in these plots is incomplete, since they do not provide any details
on how the actual amount of PV and batteries deployed by prosumers. Figure 4.2
shows the total accumulated installed capacity of PV and batteries for each scenario.
This information adds to that previously provided by including details of the com-
position of the prosumers’ installations.
Finally, Table 4.3 shows the annual electricity costs for an average consumer and
an average prosumer at the end of the simulated period (i.e., at time-step 10). This
provides the actual value in EUR consumers and prosumers pay to cover their elec-
tricity needs for each scenario.
We can extract a few general remarks from Figures 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.2, and from
Table 4.3.
• Tariff structures prominently based on volumetric fees induce a large deploy-
ment of PV panels and batteries (mainly the former) as well as rapid transition
from potential to actual prosumer. This deployment is followed by an also
large growth of the overall electricity costs for consumers. Moreover, these
3Note that for this calculation only consumers are used and not prosumers. The reason for this is
that the electricity costs of prosumers depend on their DER installations as well as on the distribution
tariff, and consequently the evolution described by these costs is not equal to the one described by
the distribution tariff alone. Therefore, as our only interest is to show the evolution of the distribution
tariff, prosumers can be left out from this computation.
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FIGURE 4.2: Total capacity of installed PV capacity (blue), total ca-
pacity of installed battery (red), total imports from the distribution
network (green), and total exports to the distribution network (yel-
low) at the end of the simulation period.
TABLE 4.3: Annual electricity costs for an average consumer and an
average actual prosumer at the end of the simulated period.









tariffs lead to substantial exports from prosumers’ DER installations to the dis-
tribution network, owing to larger PV capacities. In addition, these tariff struc-
tures lead to substantial inequalities in the electricity costs, in particular when
no other component is added to the tariff (i.e., fully volumetric structures such
as VOL and TOU); in these cases the economic burden of maintaining the DSO is
mostly carried by consumers.
• When the tariff design is weighted toward capacity fees, the deployment of
PV panels and batteries is also spurred, although to a lesser extent and inclines
the balance toward more batteries this time. However, the induced increase in
electricity costs is larger than in the previous case. The bias of these scenarios
toward using batteries is explained by the ability of actual prosumers to shave
their peaks (γi in Equation (4.5)) thus paying less in capacity fees. This is con-
sistent with the findings in [100]. Moreover, tariffs based on these fees tend
to import more electricity than export it – this electricity is stored in the larger
batteries to shave the peak demand. Regarding the cost distribution shown in
Table 4.3, these types of tariff result in highly unequal distributions, similar to
those observed with volumetric fees, where the financial burden of the DSO is
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born by consumers.
• Adding a fixed term helps reduce the impact on the electricity costs for con-
sumers in either volumetric or capacity fees. However, using purely fixed fees
does not seem to promote the deployment of PV panels and batteries, in par-
ticular the latter. Balancing several part tariffs results in a trade-off that must
be carefully studied (as exposed by P. Simshauser in [35]), falling outwith the
scope of our work.
• Using ToU tariffs creates the more extreme outcome – the quickest transition
from potential to actual prosumers among all assessed scenarios is only fol-
lowed by the largest increase in electricity costs for consumers. The incentive
to install PV panels is the second largest (after VOL), whereas the incentive to
install batteries is the largest one. These results are explained by the possibility
of actual prosumers benefiting from both PV panels to limit their exposure to
the volumetric fees and batteries to shift load from peak and off-peak to shoul-
der hours (ρ(−)t in Equation (4.8)). In a similar way as with volumetric fees,
ToU fees lead to more exports than imports. However, in this case, the spread
between both is smaller, since the electricity surplus with ToU tariffs can be
stored in the batteries to shift demand.
Discussion
These analyses show that different initial conditions, notably including various tariff
structures, induce vastly different outputs that can be quantitatively assessed. The
presented simulation environment can be used to discriminate between the possible
outcomes of employing distinct tariff structures. It may therefore be valuable for
assessing a distribution tariff structure before putting it in force.
Extracting meaningful conclusions with this tool necessitates a previous tun-
ing phase where the various parameters of the simulation-based approach (e.g., α,
prices, bounds p and b) must be adapted to the particular context that one wants to
simulate. In this regard, in [44] this simulation-based approach is employed to sim-
ulate a generic distribution network with the characteristics inherent to the Walloon
region of Belgium, providing policy recommendations for this particular case.
Although the example provided in this section does not correspond to any par-
ticular context (i.e., no previous tuning phase has been performed to adapt the
simulation-based approach to any particular case), there are a few general obser-
vations that can be drawn. In particular, these observations are based on the prin-
ciples for distribution tariff design, as presented in the CEER report [89] and by I.
Abdelmotteleb in [82].
• Distribution tariff designs based on volumetric fees (totally or partially) pro-
mote the largest adoptions of PV panels and batteries; however, they lead to
the largest inequalities between consumers and prosumers. On the one hand,
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their implementation is straight forward, complying with the principles of
transparency, simplicity, and predictability. On the other hand, they distort
the decisions concerning the use of the network, they are not cost reflective (in
fact prosumers, who use the network more, end up paying significantly less
than consumers), resulting in discrimination among the users where not all of
them pay the same for the same service.
• Capacity charges lead to high battery deployment and relatively high PV panel
adoption. However, as with volumetric charges, the economic inequalities
between consumers and prosumers are substantial. In terms of the tariff de-
sign principles, capacity charges are not as predictable, transparent and simple
as volumetric ones, and moreover they induce distortion and discrimination
among the network users. Finally their cost-reflectivity in already developed
distribution networks is questionable, as typically network costs are sunk.
• Fixed fees comply with most of the principles of tariff design (non-distorting,
non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and simple). However, they do
not promote the adoption of DER installations, which has been a high-level
goal of all energy policies over the last few years (see for instance the European
renewable directive [11]).
• Applying ToU charges on top of volumetric ones results in the largest battery
deployment and the second-largest PV panel deployment leading to the high-
est cost different between consumers and prosumers where the former pay
substantially more than the latter for their network use. This type of charges
is transparent, predictable and relatively simple, although, as volumetric ones,
they are not cost-reflective and they distort and discriminate among users.
• Tariffs based on a mix between different types of charge result in a trade-off
between promoting PV panels and battery adoption, distributing the costs
among the users in a more equal fashion, and complying with the principles
of distribution tariff design.
These remarks confirm that selecting the tariff design is not a trivial process,
where no perfect tariff exists. In general, applying fully volumetric, capacity, or
fixed fees does not seem to yield the most adequate results where either DERs are
not promoted, or they are promoted but the costs for it are mostly born by con-
sumers instead of prosumers (who generate them). A solution could be to resort to
designs where all these components are present. In these cases, a middle-ground
target can be achieved, promoting some DER adoption whilst maintaining a relative
level playing field for consumers and prosumers. Overall, promoting DER has a cost
associated, and it is the decision of regulators and policy makers to choose how to
cover it.
64 Chapter 4. The impact of the distribution network tariff design
4.5.2 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, the sensitivity of the proposed simulation-based approach to several
parameters is tested. In particular, we perform sensitivity analyses on the α parame-
ter, the selling price of electricity for prosumers (sp), and the prices of PV panels and
batteries (tp). For these analyses we use the same basic data listed in Table 4.2, only
modifying the parameter we wish to study.
Sensitivity to α
The first of the analyses presented in this section corresponds to the sensitivity to
the α parameter, as shown in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.4. As explained in Section 4.4.5,
this parameter controls the speed at which the DERs are deployed by potential pro-
sumers. It works by biasing the p parameter of a Bernoulli random variable (i.e.
the probability of drawing a 0 or a 1). The p parameter is typically computed as
the difference between the LVOE of a DER installation and the electricity costs the
potential prosumer would otherwise face without the DER installation. We further
develop this definition introducing the α parameter multiplied by the cost difference
(see Equation (4.26)). Since the investment decision is inverted (see Equation (4.28)),
a low value of α fosters the deployment of DER whilst a high value should limit it.





























(A) Sensitivity of DER de-
ployment.



























(B) Sensitivity of electricity
costs for consumers.
FIGURE 4.3: Sensitivity to α.
TABLE 4.4: Sensitivity of PV- and battery-installed capacity to α.
α=0.6 α=0.7 α=0.8 α=0.9 α=1.0 α=1.1 α=1.2 α=1.3 α=1.4
Total PV capacity [kWp] 6,071.4 6,374.6 6,738.7 7,124.9 7,673.1 7,456.1 6,506.9 4,688.2 2,460.0
Total battery [kWh] 6,379.8 6,571.9 6,828.7 7,009.1 7,295.6 6,833.6 5,713.4 4,061.8 2,161.2
As we can observe in these figures, the lower the α, the greater the deployment of
DER. This greater DER penetration, in turn, results in a higher increase of the over-
all electricity cost of traditional consumers. When looking at the total PV capacity
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and battery capacity deployed, it can be noted that for low values of α the result-
ing total capacity is lower than for values close to 1. This is explained by the fact
that, since the DER installations need to be more profitable when α = 1 than when
α = 0.6 to be deployed (i.e to draw a 0 in the Bernoulli random variable), only large
and profitable installations will be deployed. This behaviour results apparent when
α > 1. However, since in those cases the simulator does not reach 100% of DER
deployment, the total DER capacity at the end of the simulation horizon is lower
than for α = 1. A longer simulation horizon will prove those scenarios to present
the largest total deployment of PV panels and batteries. This parameter presents
an enormous variability in the outcome; this is why, before making use of the pro-
posed simulation-based approach, it is key to tune this parameter to adapt it to the
conditions of the distribution network it aims to simulate, as done in [44].
Sensitivity to the selling price
The second analysis tests the sensitivity of the model to the selling price of elec-
tricity of prosumers, as shown in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.5. These users primarily
use their local electricity production to meet their demand, however, when there
is more production than demand, they can sell this surplus to the distribution net-
work. Modifying the selling price has therefore the potential to affect the behaviour
of those users as the value associated to their electricity exports changes.



























(A) Sensitivity of DER de-
ployment.
























(B) Sensitivity of electricity
costs for consumers.
FIGURE 4.4: Sensitivity to the selling price (sp).
TABLE 4.5: Sensitivity of PV- and battery-installed capacity to the sell-
ing price (sp).
sp=0.04 sp=0.05 sp=0.06 sp=0.07 sp=0.08 sp=0.09 sp=0.10
Total PV capacity [kWp] 7,712.4 8,961.0 9,748.5 9,928.5 9,970.0 9,970.0 9,970.0
Total battery [kWh] 7,339.0 7,484.4 7,442.9 7,384.4 7,293.4 7,217.9 7,204.4
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From Figure 4.4a we can observe that higher selling prices leads greater DER
adoption and, in turn, to an overall increase in electricity costs, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.4b. From the total deployed capacity of PV and batteries (Table 4.5), it can
be deduced that the greater the selling price, the larger the PV installation. This
relation, nonetheless, is the opposite in the case of batteries, where a higher sell-
ing price leads to lower battery adoption. These effects are a result of the business
model of these two behind-the-meter devices. A greater PV capacity results in a
larger production surplus that can be sold to the network and, therefore, a higher
selling price will spur larger PV installations with substantial production surpluses.
Larger PV installations will in turn require fewer batteries to operate, since they will
produce sufficient electricity to cover the prosumers’ demand, even at times where
there is a limited solar availability. Even though the selling price clearly imposes
some changes in the adoption rate of PV and batteries, these changes are less signifi-
cant than in our first analysis. The selection of this parameter is easier than the other
two (α and technology price) for it should reflect the regulation in place.
Sensitivity to the technology price
The last of the introduced analyses deals with the sensitivity to the technology price.
To carry out this assessment, as the starting point we take the technology costs (PV
and battery) listed in Table 4.2. We then multiply them by a factor to increase or
decrease the initial technology costs, analysing the sensitivity to different factors
(costs). Note that these are the initial technology costs, which then decrease by 5%
every year. The results of this sensitivity analysis is presented in Figures 4.5 and
Table 4.6.



























(A) Sensitivity of DER de-
ployment.

























(B) Sensitivity of electricity
costs for consumers.
FIGURE 4.5: Sensitivity to the technology price (tp).
A linear relation can be seen between technology price and adoption rate of PV
and batteries. Unsurprisingly, the higher the price the lower the penetration of actual
prosumers and, as such, the lower the impact on overall electricity costs. On the
other hand, the lower the technology price, the faster and larger the deployment of
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TABLE 4.6: Sensitivity of PV- and battery-installed capacity to the
technology price (tp). Note that the shown percentages are relative
to the prices used for the first simulation.
tp=70% tp=80% tp=90% tp=100% tp=110% tp=120% tp=130%
Total PV capacity [kWp] 9,942.0 9,436.6 8,502.8 7,541.1 6,584.7 5,751.9 4,225.1
Total battery [kWh] 8,857.0 8,383.7 7,847.4 7,187.2 6,409.5 5,417.4 3,925.5
DER installations. As expected, this parameter has a strong influence on the shape
of the trend curves – it is therefore crucial to find the right level of technology prices.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper formalises and builds a framework based on a simulation-based ap-
proach to assess the impact of a wide range of DSO remuneration strategies on the
economic sustainability of the distribution network. The potential of this simulation-
based approach lies in its ability to accurately discriminate between the possible out-
comes of employing distinct remuneration strategies in order to provide sound argu-
ments that underpin the selection of one of them. It therefore serves as guidance for
policy makers and regulators to build new remuneration strategies for DSOs, aim-
ing to achieve certain specific objectives (e.g. promote the adoption of renewable
distributed generation). By means of this simulation-based tool they can compare
the strengths and drawbacks of distinct options before applying them in real life.
The proposed simulation environment contributes to the existing literature by:
• Providing the mathematical formalisation of a simulation-based approach based
on a dynamical system and on an optimisation framework that progressively
deploys DER installations over time and, as a result, adapt the distribution
network charges to make sure any imbalance of the DSO is corrected.
• Encapsulating all the most commonly used DSO remuneration strategies –(i)
volumetric fees based on energy consumed, (ii) capacity fees based on power
withdrawn, (iii) fixed fees based on the availability of a connection point, and
(iv) time-of-use fees that depend on the time of energy consumption– in the
developed mathematical formalisation of the simulation-based approach.
• Providing a computational tool encoding such a mathematical formalisation to
help policy makers and regulators decide which DSO remuneration strategy to
employ according to a specific target.
The simulation-based approach presented in this paper is written to be sufficiently
generic so that it can adapt to any context (i.e. distribution network) with ease by
tuning certain parameters as, for instance, the Bernoulli bias α, or the technology
costs. This means that before being used, this tool must be tuned so as to match the
distribution network where the experiments are to be run.
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The presented approach has been extensively tested with a case study featur-
ing eight different scenarios which illustrate the various options of the proposed
simulation environment to guide future developments in distribution network tariff
structures. This test case shows how prosumers’ choices vary from one remuner-
ation strategy to another, suggesting that it is valuable to check by simulation that
a remuneration strategy yields the desired outcome. Although this test case does
not intend to offer insights regarding any particular distribution network (i.e. the
parameters are set by default), it does provide some guidance on how to design the
remuneration strategy of a DSO:
• Strategies based on volumetric fees (including time-of-use) offer the best in-
centive for PV unit and battery deployment. However, this leads to the highest
inequalities between consumers and prosumers in terms of electricity costs.
• Strategies based on capacity fees promote the integration of storage devices
as they take action to limit the peak of consumption of prosumers, leading
once again to a cost distribution between consumers and prosumers where the
former bear most of the network costs.
• Strategies based on fixed fees significantly limit the incentives for DER deploy-
ment (PV or battery), therefore they hardly show any impact on the distribu-
tion of grid costs.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the model to several input parameters –the Bernoulli
bias α, the selling price of electricity for prosumers, and the technology price– has
been reported, showing that the trends remain constant when applying different
values to the parameters, only changing in the rate at which DER installations are






In this chapter, the third and last of Part I, we make use of the tool developed in
the previous two chapters to simulate a real life distribution network based on a
specific region – Wallonia, Belgium’s southern region. To that end, we calibrate the
simulation-based approach introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 to the specific desired
regional context. This simulator enables us to highlight how the emergence of pro-
sumers featuring solar photovoltaic (PV) installations impacts the distribution net-
work tariff and how this tariff, in turn, affects the gradual deployment of distributed
electricity generation resources (DER) by prosumers.
In Wallonia, the distribution component of the overall electricity retail tariff is
essentially volumetric, i.e. based on the final customers’ energy consumption (in
e/kWh). Residential prosumers, moreover, are connected to the grid via a net-
metering system. In this context, our simulation-based approach permits the eval-
uation of several tariff reforms currently under discussion in this region: the intro-
duction of a prosumer fee, the introduction of a capacity component into the dis-
tribution tariff, and a switch to a net-billing metering technology (also known as
net-purchasing). Some of these reforms, however, require the use of smart meters,
which is infeasible in Wallonia in the short run. Short run reforms, therefore, can
only test the prosumer fee, which consists of a fee paid by all prosumers depending
on the total installed PV capacity (in e/kWp), as well as adding a fixed term to the
tariff. In the long run, the roll out of smart meters enables the introduction of a net-
purchasing system and of a distribution tariff with a capacity component. In this
chapter we simulate both short and long run reforms using the simulation-based
approach introduced in previous chapters. Our analysis highlights one key added
value of smart meters: they allow network tariffs that are fairer and sustainable.
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5.1 Introduction
Distributed electricity generation based on renewable energy sources has boomed
globally in recent years. The deployment of this type of decentralised generation
helps decarbonise the energy system. However, since distributed generation units
are connected to the distribution network –traditionally designed to unidirectionally
distribute electricity from the transmission network to residential areas– they induce
challenges to the operation of the electricity system. In particular, they change the
nature of energy exchanges within the distribution network, which are now bidirec-
tional as households deploying solar photovoltaic panels on their rooftop not only
import but can also export electricity. In light of this paradigm change, regulatory
interventions related to how these flows are measured and priced are key in the
emergence of a more sustainable energy system. For that reason, reforms of the dis-
tribution tariffs are on the agenda in many jurisdictions.
The situation of Wallonia, Belgium’s southern region, is particularly interesting
in many respects. Households have made substantial investments in decentralised
energy production sources over the last few years. By the end of 2019, despite a rela-
tively low solar irradiance, over 10% of the households had installed solar PV panels
and became prosumers. This large adoption of PV installations can be explained by
two main factors: (i) subsidies and (ii) network regulations. First, generous up-
front investment subsidies (either in the form of direct financial support or in tax
cuts) as well as production subsidies, mainly via a green certificate system [101],
were granted by various jurisdiction levels. Second, favorable network regulations
for prosumers helped substantially decrease the electricity bills of PV owners at the
household level. According to these network regulations, distribution tariffs in Bel-
gium were (and still are) predominantly based on units of energy consumed, that is,
volumetric fees typically in e/kWh. In addition, prosumers are integrated into the
grid via a net-metering system, where the exports of electricity are registered by sub-
tracting from the meter the units of energy injected into the grid (which in practice
means that the solar production is valued at retail price). In such a context, investing
in PV panels substantially decreased the prosumers’ electricity bills, as their meters
readings, and thereby their electricity bills, could be greatly reduced.
This high take-up rate of PV adoption led to a tense debate in the public and po-
litical arena. From 2016 to 2019, 40 out of the 93 Energy Commissions of the Walloon
Parliament discussed issues related to prosumers. Since 2018, all forms of subsidies
have been phased out for new PV installations. However, the current network reg-
ulations have barely changed. One key issue facing the regulator is that Wallonia
is lagging behind other European regions in terms of smart meter adoption [102]:
as yet, albeit there is a regional target coverage of 80% of households by 2030, few
smart meters have been installed [103]. This is 10 years behind the goal set by the
2009 Electricity Directive set at the European Union level. Hence, the mechanical sin-
gle meters, i.e. the technology in place, limit the way distribution costs can be billed
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to the grid-connected users, and only the structure of the tariffs can be changed, e.g.
by relying more on fixed fees rather than on volumetric ones. Fixed fees can be ap-
plied to all users or to prosumers only. The switch to new bi-directional meters for
prosumers (mechanical or smart) will make it possible to consider a different price
for electricity imported from and exported to the grid, via a net-purchasing system.
The roll-out of smart meters will in addition facilitate the introduction of capacity
fees (based on units of power withdrawn from the grid, typically in e/kW). Fac-
ing a similar policy context in Flanders, Belgium’s northern region, The VREG, the
energy regulator, decided to switch towards capacity-based starting from 2022 on
[104].
This chapter analyzes how different distribution tariff regulations impact the
consumption, production, and (possibly) storage behaviors of residential house-
holds. For this purpose, we rely on a tariff simulator developed by [30] and we
use regional-specific load and solar irradiance profile curves to apply the model to
the case of Wallonia. Compared with other simulators used in [105] or [31] to study
a related research question, we use an agent-based modelling approach incorporat-
ing the region-specific consumption and production profiles of several thousands of
heterogeneous households. This simulator enables us to evaluate the impact of vari-
ous changes in regulation with respect to PV and battery investments, the evolution
of distribution network tariffs, the levelised value of electricity (LVOE) of prosumers
and non-prosumers, as well as the formers’ rate of self-consumption, and the peak
power withdrawals and injections. Our work highlights the importance of consid-
ering both the distribution tariff design and the technology connecting all electricity
users to the network, as only a subset of tariff regulations can be implemented in
the absence of smart meters. And, even if our simulations are computed to repre-
sent the specific situation of one region, our policy conclusions carry further away to
other legislations that want to adapt their distribution tariff to integrate distributed
generation.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we review the literature on
the integration of distributed generation into the grid. In Section 5.3, we describe
the current distribution network regulations in place in Wallonia. The tariff simula-
tor is presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 analyzes the regulatory scenarios imple-
mentable with the metering technology in place. Section 5.6 describes the regulatory
reforms and their impact that can be set in the long run with a change of meters. Sec-
tion 5.7 concludes our work.
5.2 Literature review
Our work relates to the literature focusing on the relationship between the emer-
gence of decentralised generation units and the financing of the distribution system,
in the context of an unbundled energy system. In the face of decreasing volumes
of the electricity sales owing to the presence of prosumers, the distribution system
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operator (DSO) requires a higher distribution tariff level in order to break-even [37].
However, as expounded by [106] and [33], such a reform, in a context of largely volu-
metrically based tariffs, makes PV investments even more profitable, further leading
to inefficiently large investments in solar PV. This unsustainable financing of the grid
is often referred to as the utility death spiral [35].
Our numerical model follows up on the works focusing on this feedback loop
to analyze different distribution network regulations. While our conclusions are
similar to the works previously done on this topic, we contribute to this literature
by better fitting our model with respect to the policy context studied, the Walloon
Region, on three different levels.
First, compared to [31] and [32], we use an agent-based modelling approach that
considers a large amount of residential households. The energy consumption and
production profiles of 6000 heterogeneous households are considered. Thanks to this
approach, we are able to make more realistic predictions regarding the decision to
invest in PV panels and batteries, including regarding the size of these investments.
Similar to the work of [105], our simulator allows us to discuss how tariff regulations
impact self-consumption and peak power withdrawals. In addition, we also analyze
how peak power injections, a key cost driver for a DSO, are influenced by network
regulations.
Second, the policy setting is greatly influenced by the metering technology in
place. The issue of death spiral is particularly important when a net-metering sys-
tem is in place, as the energy exported to the grid is sold at the attractive retail price.
This is the current metering technology in Wallonia1. Hence, the simulator used in
this chapter is closely related to the ones developed in [74, 108, 109] to analyze net-
work regulations in respectively California, Colombia and New South Wales Aus-
tralia 2. Compared to these works, we differentiate the implementable regulations
in the short and long run, depending on the available metering technology. In the
short run, only the tariff structure can be changed, for all on only a subset of energy
users. In the long run, a net-purchasing system can replace the net-metering system
to set different prices for the electricity imported from or exported to the grid. In
addition, smart meters, will allow complex tariff structures such as capacity-based
one. Hence, we believe that it is important to differentiate short run, second best,
regulations from long run ones that can take advantage of the technological features
of more evolved meters than those currently in place that record flows only with a
single meter.
Third, we calibrate our simulator to the context of Wallonia, though not just with
respect to the solar irradiance and the typical production profile, as traditionally
1Note that a net-metering system is also in place in a majority of U.S. states, in European countries
like Denmark, Netherlands, Greece, Hungary or Latvia as well as in various lesser developed countries
like India or Brazil (see [107]).
2In comparison, the following papers [110, 111, 112] present a simulator suited respectively for
Queensland Australia, Portugal, UK and Germany where a net-purchasing system, coupled with a
feed-in tariff, is currently in place.
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done in the literature. In this regard, our simulator is parameterised in such a way
that the impact of a distribution tariff increase on the decision to invest in a PV instal-
lation be similar to the one measured in [75] using PV installation data in Wallonia.
We trust that these three key aspects allow robust policy conclusions.
5.3 Distribution network tariff and the integration of resi-
dential solar PV in Wallonia
Distribution tariffs in Wallonia have been regulated by the regional regulator (CWaPE)
since 2014. The regulator uses a cost-plus methodology to fix the distribution tariff.
There are 7 DSOs and 13 tariff zones, where the distribution tariff levels vary sub-
stantially between zones. The tariff structure, however, is similar in all zones, with
a distribution tariff that is essentially volumetric (in e/kWh), and which includes
very small fixed fees (around 20e per household per year, covering the rental of
the meter). The other components of the electricity bills (transmission, energy, taxes
and other levies) are also based on the consumption level in kWh. Some retailers
also include a relatively small fixed fee in their contracts. In 2018, the volumetric
part of the distribution tariff ranged from 7.3 ce/kWh to 14.9 ce/kWh, with an av-
erage tariff equal to 11 ce/kWh. In Wallonia, the distribution tariff represents 36%
of the consumer’s final electricity bill, including VAT [113]; this relatively large share
can be explained, at least partially, by the large public service obligations imposed
to the DSOs, which include public lighting, social energy tariffs, and the promotion
of renewable energy integration.
In Wallonia, almost all meters are mechanical and PV adopters connect their PV
installation to the existing meter. Prosumers then have a single meter that runs for-
ward when electricity is imported from the grid, and backward when it is supplied
to the grid. To switch to net-purchasing with a different price for power injections
and withdrawals, prosumers need to change their metering technology. They can
either install a second mechanical meter to register power injection or a smart meter.
Smart meters can measure power in addition to energy, thus enabling the introduc-
tion of more sophisticated tariff designs such as adding a capacity-based component
to the tariff.3
Over the current regulatory period (2018-2022), the regulator introduced a pro-
sumer fee in October 2020 [114]. This fee is to be paid by the prosumers in contribu-
tion to the network costs. Such a fee is based on the PV capacity of each prosumer,
3Smart meters still have other advantages that we do not consider here, e.g. the possibility of having
time-of-use tariffs. As consumption is recorded almost instantaneously, the tariff can be adapted to
follow the trends of the wholesale market price. Our scenarios do not consider such a pricing but
only time-independent distribution network fees and electricity prices. For the time being, meters
measure net consumption on a yearly basis. Negative meters could also be reset to zero on a weekly
or monthly basis. Our main reason for not discussing these changes is that, to our knowledge, there
is no discussion to date of implementing such tariffs in Wallonia. This standpoint might change in
a foreseeable future as the Electricity Directive [11] requires Member States to implement dynamic
electricity price contract whenever smart meters are installed.
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and is computed to compensate the avoided distribution network fees assuming
a self-consumption rate of 37.76%. Its level depends on the tariff zones, but is on
average equal to 85e/kWp per year. Prosumers have the option to opt-out and in-
stall a dual meter (net-purchasing) and pay the regular distribution tariff for their
electricity imports.4 However, while it is useful to measure the concomitance of de-
centralised production and consumption, the roll-out of smart meters has been slow
compared to the targets set at the EU level and the adoption rates of other Member
States. The goal is to have 80% of users of the energy network equipped by 2030. 5
5.4 Tariff simulator
We rely on a multi-agent model to simulate the impact of distribution tariffs on res-
idential consumers’ investments in PV modules and batteries. The model is intro-
duced in [43] and described in further details in [30]. We present the main ingredi-
ents of this model in Section 5.4.1, and the main assumptions on which it relies in
Section 5.4.2. We describe the simulated scenarios in Section 5.4.3.
5.4.1 Model description
This simulation-based approach relies on a discrete time dynamical system with two
types of agents, the users and the Distribution System Operator (DSO), which inter-
act with each other for a given regulatory environment. Users are classified into
three categories of agents: consumers, potential prosumers, and prosumers. The
interaction between the different categories is represented in Figure 5.1.
The model is composed of several modules: an individual optimisation module
(OPT) that for each potential prosumer computes the levelised value of electricity
(LVOE), given their consumption and production profiles and the regulatory envi-
ronment in place. The LVOE differs from the traditional levelised cost of electricity
(LCOE) in that the LCOE only accounts for costs (i.e. it is computed as discounted
costs divided by discounted aggregated demand), whereas the LVOE accounts for
costs and revenues (i.e. it is computed as discounted costs minus discounted rev-
enue divided by discounted aggregated demand). The second module models the
investment decision process (IDP), where the comparison between the LVOE of each
4There is currently a disagreement between the regulator and the regional government on this pro-
sumer fee. For political reasons, the latter wants to compensate the prosumers for the introduction of
the fee. As of today, it is not clear how the government plans to do so, except that it wants corrective
measures to encourage self-consumption.
5There are two other regions in Belgium. The situation in Flanders is very similar to the one in
Wallonia where a prosumer fee has already been implemented since 2015 [115]. One key difference is
that the roll-out of smart meters will soon be completed and that capacity tariffs, similar to the ones
discussed here, will be implemented from 2022 on [104]. However, note that, in the energy decree
modified in 2019, the Flemish government has committed to maintain the net-metering system as a
way to value energy flows, for at least 15 years starting from the date of the PV installation. In Brussels,
a densely populated region with mostly shared rooftops, PV investments have been scarcer and a net-
purchasing system is in place where the import price of electricity is slightly higher than the export
price.
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individual potential prosumer and the retail electricity price determines the proba-
bility that they invest and become actual prosumers. The last module represents
the remuneration mechanism (RM) of the DSO – it computes the adjustment of the
distribution network tariff performed by the DSO as a consequence of PV (and/or
battery) investment. In this regard, the tariff is adjusted so as to cover the costs of
the DSO.
FIGURE 5.1: Multi-agent interaction model with the feedback loop
created by the deployment of residential PV panels and by the DSO’s
remuneration mechanism.
Consumers and Prosumers
At the start of the simulation, there are no prosumers and all users draw electricity
from the distribution network. However, as the simulation proceeds over the dis-
crete time dynamical system, a subset of users, i.e. potential prosumers, take action
to gradually deploy optimally sized PV installations and batteries, thus becoming
prosumers. A potential prosumer turns into an actual prosumer depending on the
difference between the LVOE and the actual electricity costs without PV installation
and on an exogenous probability. We use the results of Gautier and Jacqmin (2020)
to calibrate this probability. On the basis of data from residential prosumers in Wal-
lonia, these authors estimate, by means of an econometric analysis, the elasticity of
investment in solar PV due to an increase in the volume-based tariff and, therefore,
of the electricity price. They estimate that a 1 ce increase in the price of electricity
increases the probability of investment in a PV installation by 8%. We then created a
scenario mimicking the conditions observed in [75], called baseline. In this scenario,
an increase of 1 ce in the price of electricity for the initial period leads to an increase
in PV investment by 8%. Then from the second period on, this probability evenly
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decreases as the deployment of PV installations converges to 100% of the potential
prosumers (see benchmark in Section 5.5). Once a user has invested, thus becoming
a prosumer, this agent is removed from the subset of potential prosumers and added
to the subset of prosumers, which prevents further investment from this particular
user.
DSO
The DSO is a regulated entity. The distribution tariff is set by the regulator and com-
puted to a sufficient level so as to cover the costs deriving from the provision of
the electricity distribution service. In our model, there is no explicit cost modelling
for the DSO. We consider the distribution costs to be constant over time and equal
to their historical value. Hence, we model the financing of the DSO as a zero-sum
game: the fixed cost of the DSO must be covered and the different grid tariffs will
allocate relatively more or less of this cost to a category of consumers or another.
Prosumers’ investments in PV installations then change the revenues of the DSO,
since these are less reliant on the imports of electricity from the distribution net-
work, but they do not change the grid costs6. At every time step of the discrete time
dynamical system, the DSO then is allowed to adjust the distribution tariff in order
to cover its cost (i.e the DSO must break even and the regulator allows it to increase
the tariff to this purpose). The DSO, however, is constrained by the tariff structure,
which cannot be changed. Tariff changes then impact electricity costs by typically
increasing them, and hence the incentives to invest. Thus, there emerges a feedback
loop between the prosumers and the DSO, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
5.4.2 Main assumptions
Table 5.1 reports the main parameters used for running our simulations. The param-
eters are calibrated to represent the tariff and electricity prices in Wallonia as well as
reasonable estimates of PV and battery prices and their evolution. In addition, we
use solar irradiance data from Wallonia and standard consumption profile curves for
representative consumers for the region. These load profiles have been generated by
detailing a household’s list of electric appliances and other characteristics. In total,
we generated 1000 load profiles, corresponding to different configurations of elec-
tric appliances and inhabitants per household using the CREST Demand Model [98].
These profiles represent 1000 potential prosumers. In addition, 5000 consumers are
introduced by using an average yearly load of consumers in Wallonia. Thus, the
total population size is 6000 (5000 consumers and 1000 potential prosumers). While
potential prosumers may become prosumers over the time of the simulation, the
5000 usual consumers are regarded as the residual load of the distribution network,
representing those users who cannot become actual prosumers due to technical or
6In practice, the deployment of solar PV modifies the power injections and withdrawals on the grid
and thereby impact the grid cost. We discuss further this issue in Section 5.6.3.
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economic constraints. The set of potential prosumers and its size depend on the
characteristics of both the habitations (apartment vs. houses, rooftop size and orien-
tation) and the households (renters vs. owners, income, etc.).
In Wallonia, around 40% of the houses are detached and 66% of the households
are owners. There is, however, a lack of reliable data for PV adoption in Wallonia
because all subsidies for solar PV installations have been phased out only recently
(July 2018) and previous adoptions were massively subsidised. Hence it is difficult to
benchmark it with historical data. The comparison with Flanders, a region that bears
many institutional similarities with Wallonia, makes us confident that our model
provides a good approximation. There, subsidies were suppressed earlier and we
observed that, on average, 0.8% of the households installed PV each year, during
the period 2016-2018. This adoption rate was slightly increasing over the period
and was 1.07% in 2018. If this rate is kept constant over 10 years, we would have
that 10.7% of the households representing 64.2% of the potential prosumers turn to
prosumers at the end of the estimation period. As Flanders applies a prosumer fee,
the closest scenario to represent the situation in Flanders is the net-metering system
with a prosumer fee (NM f ee in the subsequent analysis). In our estimations, we find
that around 90% of the potential prosumers turned to prosumers in this scenario.
This makes us believe that the potential prosumer set is not undersized and the
diffusion of PV investments approximates well historical data.
The simulation-based approach is run for 10 periods, each of which corresponds
to one year. At the end of each period, the simulation-based approach retrieves the
amount of potential prosumers and of prosumers, the capacity of deployed PV pan-
els and batteries, and the distribution tariff level, among other parameters (see Table
5.1 for a detailed list of the parameters). Then, the simulator starts the simulation of a
new period using as starting conditions, our exogenous parameters set initially and
the endogenous parameters retrieved from the previous period. Table 5.1 indicates
the initial conditions used for the first step of the simulation.
TABLE 5.1: Key parameters of the model
Commodity price (e/kWh) 0.132
Initial distribution tariff (e/kWh) 0.088
Selling price (NP) (e/kWh) 0.040
Population size 6000
Potential prosumers 1000
Initial PV Price (e/kWp) 1500
Initial battery price (e/kWh) 300
Yearly change PV price (%) -5
Yearly change battery price (%) -5
PV lifetime (years) 20
Battery lifetime (years) 8
Charging rate (in C.) 4
Discharging rate (in C.) 2.5
Interest rate (%) 2
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5.4.3 Simulated scenarios
We use the simulator to generate six different scenarios, four with the net-metering
(NM) system and two with the net-purchasing (NP) system. We consider different
tariff structures, mixing fixed (Fix), volumetric (Vol), and capacity (Cap) elements
for the distribution tariff. The selected scenarios discuss the most likely reforms of
the tariff structure that are being considered in Wallonia. These scenarios are sum-
marised in Table 5.2. The first three scenarios can be implemented with the current
single meters whereas the other three require a change in the metering technology.
Scenario 5 can be implemented by installing an additional mechanical meter to the
one currently in place or a smart meter. In addition, smart meters also allow the
implementation of scenario 4 and 6 with the inclusion of a capacity component in
the tariff.
For each scenario, we report the following elements: (i) the percentage of poten-
tial prosumers who invested in solar PV and/or batteries, thus becoming prosumers;
(ii) the installed capacity of solar PV (in kWp); (iii) the installed capacity of batter-
ies (in kWh); (iv) the mean LVOE of the prosumers; (v) the percentage increase in
the electricity costs for the traditional consumers, calculated as the mean percentage
increase among the traditional consumers; (vi) the percentage of self-consumption
i.e. the share of electricity produced by the PV installations that is consumed on site
by prosumers; the peak demand withdrawn from the network; and (vii) the peak
production injected into the network.
TABLE 5.2: Simulated scenarios
Number Scenarios NM/NP Tariff structure
#1 Baseline NM Vol (100%)
#2 NM f ee NM Vol(100%) + prosumer fee (85 e/kWp )
#3 NM f ix NM Vol (70%), Fix (30%)
#4 NMcap NM Vol (50%), Cap (50%)
#5 NPvol NP Vol (100%)
#6 NPcap NP Vol (50%), Cap (50%)
5.5 Benchmark and short-term reforms
We set out considering three basic scenarios that can be easily implemented in the
short-term, without a change in the metering technology. The current net-metering
technology in place exclusively and mechanically registers the yearly energy net con-
sumption. In this context, few reforms are possible. The simplest ones consist in re-
balancing the structure of the distribution tariff bill to decrease the volumetric part,
and as compensation, adding a fixed fee, either applied exclusively to prosumers or
applied to all consumers.
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We consider the scenario baseline as a benchmark. This scenario simulates the
current situation in Wallonia. We then consider two scenarios where, in addition,
non-volumetric fees are introduced.7 In the first, prosumers pay a fee linked to the
installed power of their PV installation (scenario NM f ee). This reform is applied
since October 2020 on with an average prosumer fee of 85e per kWp of PV installed.
In the second scenario, there is a fixed fee imposed to all users, prosumers and con-
sumers (scenario NM f ix) alike. In this case, we consider that the fixed fee must cover
30% of the distribution network costs, the remainder being covered by a volumetric
tariff. This threshold has been defined to match the average tariff structure currently
applied in Europe [117].
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As shown in Figure 5.2, the baseline scenario is the more favorable one for PV in-
vestments given that the electricity generated by the PV panels is valued at the retail
tariff, which includes the price of the commodity as well as the distribution/transmission
fees and taxes. Unsurprisingly then, by the 5th of the 10 periods considered, nearly
all potential prosumers had already deployed a PV installation. Figure 5.3 shows
that this scenario is the fastest one to reach the full potential deployment of PV ca-
pacity.
The large and rapid deployment of solar PV panels reduces the total consump-
tion registered by the DSO (as the meter runs backward for prosumers) and, to cover
the DSO costs, the volumetric fee, as well as the fixed fee for scenario 3 must be
increased by the regulator. Figure 5.4 shows that the overall cost of electricity in-
creases by around 30% at the end of the 10 periods for traditional consumers. These
consumers have to bear a larger proportion of the grid costs. As this upward change
7We will focus on distributional issues between prosumers and traditional energy users. However,
as, on average, low income consumers tend to consume less electricity, increasing the fixed part of the
bill can be detrimental to low income consumers, who are also less likely to invest PV as they are typ-
ically tenants and face a binding financial constraint. This other dimension of the distributional issue
can be problematic especially in the scenario NM f ix. However, as discussed in [116], it is possible to
design fixed charges based on demand characteristics or income to mitigate the regressiveness related
to fixed charges.
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in tariff makes investing in a PV installation even more favorable to potential pro-
sumers, the financing of the DSO is not sustainable and we can observe what is
traditionally referred to as the utility death spiral.




















FIGURE 5.4: Evolution of the total tariff bill of a consumer
Introducing either a prosumer or a uniform fixed fee aims at decreasing the vol-
umetric component of the distribution tariff, and hence the benefit of net-metering.
Consequently, solar PV installations are less attractive and the rate of investment is,
by and large, lower, as seen in Figure 5.2. In Figure 5.3, a similar trend is observed
for the installed capacity of PV. In the NM f ee scenario, the fee does not apply to the
historical installations but only to the new ones, which implies that the initial tariff is
equal to the tariff in the baseline scenario. In this case, the distribution tariff increases
less compared to the benchmark (see Figure 5.4) because, on the one hand, there are
fewer PV installations, and, on the other, prosumers pay a fixed fee that partially
compensates the loss of revenue of the DSO due to the meter rolling backward.
The prosumer fee reduces the rate of investment by prosumers. In the baseline
scenario, over 80% of the potential prosumers have invested after two periods while
in the NM f ee scenario, less than 30% have made such an investment. By the end of
the simulation horizon, in the NM f ee scenario, 90% of the potential prosumers have
invested. This value, although similar to that of the baseline scenario, requires about
six or seven periods more than the baseline scenario. Note that with an increase
in potential prosumer population, the final values for both scenarios would tend to
differ more. Finally, the introduction of a uniform fixed fee (NM f ix) hardly has an
impact on the deployment of PV installations and simply serves as a re-distributive
tool to share the grid costs between prosumers and traditional consumers differently.
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The key driver of these results is that the prosumer fee substantially increases
the LVOE of PV installations, as pictured in Figure 5.5. Especially, we can observe
that, under the NM f ee scenario, the mean cost is 81% higher than in the benchmark
baseline scenario. With a uniform fixed fee, as in the NM f ix case, the mean increase
is limited to 27%. The corollary is that the cost for non-prosumers is lower in the
NM f ee and NM f ix scenario compared to our benchmark case. Hence, the cross-
subsidisation of prosumers by traditional consumers via the grid financing system















FIGURE 5.5: Evolution of the LVOE of PV installations.
The following point still needs mentioning: in none of the three scenarios do
we observe the deployment of batteries. Under net-metering, the grid acts as a giant
storage facility since exporting electricity and storing it into a battery offers the same
monetary value. In fact, deploying a battery will make the users lose some energy
owing to the round-trip efficiency of batteries. In such a setting, residential batteries
offer no added value to this kind of investment, given that the price of electricity
consumed and sold is the same.
5.6 Long-term reforms
Other metering technologies, like the installation of an additional meter to record
the energy exported to the grid or a smart meter, allow for a larger set of feasible
tariffs for financing the grid. They allow to price differently the imports and exports
of energy. Smart meters can measure and record energy consumption not only on
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a yearly basis but also in short intervals, such as every 15 minutes, and be remote-
controlled. As a consequence, they can record the peak consumption over the short
interval measured (the shorter the interval, the more accurate the measurement).
We consider two kinds of structural regulation taking advantage of these meter-
ing technologies. The first one looks into changing the tariff structure and allowing
for capacity fees in addition to the traditional fixed and volumetric distribution tariff
fees. The second one looks into the possibility of switching from a net-metering to a
net-purchasing system.
With net-metering, imports and exports of electricity are not differentiated in
terms of prices. Hence, there is no monetary incentive to self-consume and, as shown
above, prosumers do not invest in residential batteries. By measuring electricity im-
ports and exports separately, a net-purchasing system makes it possible to differ-
entiate the prices of the two flows. This, in turn, changes the incentives to invest
both in solar PV and storage systems. Furthermore, consumers may adapt their be-
havior to increase their self-consumption, e.g. by shifting demand to synchronise
consumption and production.
In the net-purchasing case, we consider that the price of exported electricity is
equal to the average of the wholesale electricity price (around 40e/MWh) and there
is no distribution fee collected on exported electricity8. The electricity imported by
prosumers is charged at the same price as for traditional consumers.
5.6.1 Net-metering system with a capacity component
In the NMcap scenario, the distribution tariff is half composed of a volumetric fee
and half of a capacity fee. The capacity fee is based on the peak consumption (in
kWp) recorded during the billing period. With a capacity fee, a battery can be used
to shave the peak consumption by displacing consumption from peak to off-peak
hours. This investment may drastically reduce the prosumers’ bills. In this scenario,
prosumers are still connected to the grid via the net-metering technology.
As shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the change in the tariff structure only slightly
curbs the deployment of solar PV compared to the fully volumetric case presented
in our benchmark baseline scenario. A major difference is that we now observe the
deployment of batteries (see Figure 5.8). This evolution, however, is rather limited
in size and is only observed from period five on (due to lower technology costs and
increasing volumetric charges). While the presence of a net-metering system pro-
vides no incentive to invest in batteries, we observe that batteries enable prosumers
to shave their peak production, i.e. to decrease their electricity bill, which is partially
capacity based.
8Increasing the purchasing price of electricity above the wholesale price increases the incentives to
invest in a PV installation, but decreases the incentives to invest in a battery. With a purchasing price
equal to the retail price, the net-purchasing scenario would be equivalent to the baseline scenario. At
least, this would be so provided that the amount of electricity that can be exported is capped to the
level of electricity consumed on a yearly basis.
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Compared to our benchmark, the capacity fee scenario (NMcap) increases the
LVOE for prosumers, but to a relatively lesser extent than when a prosumer fee is
implemented, as considered under the NM f ee scenario (see Figures 5.5 and 5.9). In
Figure 5.10, the electricity tariff paid by traditional consumers increases almost in
the same proportion as in the baseline scenario. This can be explained by the fact
that non-prosumers do not have the possibility to displace their peak production by
using batteries. Therefore we observe, as in the benchmark, that a larger fraction of
the grid costs are paid by non-prosumers.
5.6.2 Net-purchasing system
A net-purchasing system can be implemented by the installation of an extra mechan-
ical meter or of a smart meter. We consider two scenarios: a fully volumetric distri-
bution tariff (NPvol), and a tariff combining capacity and volumetric terms (NPcap)
with an equal contribution of the two components to the grid costs. The latter is
only possible in the presence of a smart meter. Thus, the tariff structure of NPvol is
the same as in the baseline scenario and the one of NPcap is the same as in scenario
NMcap.
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In figures 5.6 and 5.7, we observe that the two net-purchasing scenarios lead to
a lower number of PV installations than under any net-metering system. At the end
of the 10 periods considered, we find that 79% and 85% of the potential prosumers
have become actual prosumers under the NPvol and NPcap scenarios, respectively.
The growth trend of the investments made is constant and similar across the 10 pe-
riods considered. In terms of deployed PV capacity, both scenarios display a similar
total installed capacity. This is because a volumetric tariff induces a larger average
installation size but fewer installations.
The high deployment of batteries is another key difference between the net-
metering and the net-purchasing scenarios, as Figure 5.8 shows. Under the NPvol
scenario, over 3000 kWh of batteries are installed, while under the NPcap scenario
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FIGURE 5.8: Evolution of the deployment of batteries.
5000 kWh of storage capacity is available. In addition to a slightly lower LVOE un-
der the NPcap scenario than under the NPvol scenario (see Figure 5.9), the different
reasons behind the decision of investing in batteries explain the differences in the
number and size of the batteries installed in these two scenarios. Under NPvol , bat-
teries are installed because, financially speaking, it is more advantageous to store
(and later consume) electricity than to sell it to the grid at selling price and later
consume it at retail price. Under NPcap, in addition to the previous reasons, there
are additional incentives to invest in storage as batteries help reduce the electricity
bill by shaving the peak demand. This behavior, moreover, is rational and relatively
simple to explain from the prosumer standpoint.
Overall, switching to a new metering technology that differentiates the price of
electricity imports and exports (i.e. net-purchasing instead of net-metering), as well
as switching to distribution tariffs based partially on capacity components, leads to
a lower amount of PV installations. This change can slow down our transition to a
decarbonised energy system. However, the diffusion of panels is more even out over
the years. The extent of the cross-subsidisation of prosumers by traditional users via
the financing of the grid is less present. Prosumers, besides, are far more likely to
invest in storage devices such as batteries, and the more so when capacity fees are
in place. Finally, it is important to mention that the net-purchasing system offers
an additional degree of freedom by making it possible to adapt the selling price of
electricity. In our work, we have considered a rather small selling price, set at the
commodity price (average wholesale market price). Choosing a higher selling price
makes it possible to encourage more PV investments. This, though, would induce
lower investments in storage devices and an increasingly unequal electricity bills
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FIGURE 5.9: Evolution of the LVOE of PV installations.





















FIGURE 5.10: Evolution of the total tariff bill of a consumer
between prosumers and consumers.
5.6.3 Self-consumption and power exchanges with the grid
Finally, for each scenario, we compute the average self-consumption rate. The share
of self-consumed electricity corresponds to the total consumption minus the imports
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from the grid divided by the total consumption. By increasing self-consumption,
peak consumption from the centralised energy system can decrease, which is known
as being one of the main drivers of the grid costs [118]. Promoting self-consumption
is also important because power injections to the distribution network might be
costly. Indeed, as production is correlated locally, there may be large power injec-
tions made by several prosumers at the same time in the same low-voltage feeder,
e.g. at noon on a holiday weekend, when decentralised production is high and con-
sumption low. These power injections may cause over-voltages on the local distribu-
tion network, and the inverters to disconnect the solar PV from the network, induc-
ing a loss for the prosumers. Furthermore, owing to prosumers’ excessive electricity
injection, the DSOs might need to reinforce the distribution network, in which con-
text self-consumption reduces the overall costs of the DSO. These investments might
require new on-load tap changers, booster transformers, and static volt ampere re-
active control compensator [107]. Hence, while self-consumption is not necessarily
a goal in itself, it can be beneficial for the grid by decreasing peak consumption from
the grid and peak injection to the grid.
The self-consumption rate is usually lower for residential households than for
commercial activities [41]. Moreover, there is a high discrepancy in Wallonia be-
tween production and consumption: in the summer months, production is the high-
est and consumption the lowest and conversely in the winter months. Despite the
lack of financial incentives, around 40% of prosumers claim to take actions to syn-
chronise their consumption and production. According to [119], this is mainly true
for those who tend to spend more time during daytime at home as, for instance,
retired people.
We do not explicitly model the impact of self-consumption, via a change in ag-
gregated peak consumption and injection, on the grid costs. Nevertheless, we com-
pute the self-consumption rate for each of the six scenarios and the corresponding
peak power withdrawals and injections. Focusing only on prosumers, we measure
these two variables as the maximum aggregated amount of electricity withdrawn or
injected over a one hour period among the yearly profile. Table 5.3 presents the fig-
ures. It shows that the net-metering system does not promote self-consumption; all
three net-metering scenarios present a self-consumption rate close to 30%. Aggre-
gated peak power withdrawals and injections are marginally differing, except for
the NMcap where lower peak power withdrawals are observed due to the capacity
component (peak shaving behaviors).
A switch to the net-purchasing system implies an increase in the self-consumption
rate from 30% to 46-50%, which can easily be explained by the presence of bat-
teries. As a consequence of promoting self-consumption, aggregate peak power
withdrawals and injections are also decreasing. Under the NPvol scenario, the two
peaks decrease by respectively 0.76% and 4.62% compared with the baseline sce-
nario. When coupled with a capacity component, a net-purchasing system is able
to decrease the peaks more substantially by 64.2% and 18.95% (withdrawals and
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injection, respectively).
Hence, a net-purchasing system with capacity-based tariffs can substantially de-
crease the grid costs by shaving the import and export peaks. Compared to the
baseline scenario, the peak demand and the peak injection decrease by respectively
60% and 19%. In the present chapter these metrics can be measured only from a
physical standpoint, with no associated monetary value of the reduction in the grid
costs. Note, however, that these gains are possible thanks to private investments
into batteries rather than a collective effort from the DSO. Those cost reduction for
the DSO could be passed through consumers under the form of a lower grid tariff.
Under this NPcap scenario, these financial investments made by prosumers are esti-
mated at around one million euros. If this figure from our model is extrapolated to
the size of Wallonia, we have that households’ investments in batteries will amount
to 600 million euros to reduce grid costs. Overall, to judge the efficiency of the tar-
iffs we would need to balance more precisely these private investments made by
prosumers into batteries and the reduction in grid costs they create.
TABLE 5.3: Self-consumption and aggregate power exchanges
Absolute Self-consumption Peak Power Peak Power
Scenarios value rate withdrawals injections
baseline 1,776.89 kWh 29.67% 2,806.90 kW 4,975.55 kW
NM f ix 1,780.35 kWh 29.72% 2,805.65 kW 4,975.55 kW
NM f ee 1,775.98 kWh 29.65% 2,808.54 kW 4,975.55 kW
NMcap 1,623.91 kWh 27.11% 2,682.68 kW 4,967.99 kW
NPvol 2,809.44 kWh 46.91% 2,784.24 kW 4,745.83 kW
NPcap 2,997.92 kWh 50.05% 1,004.53 kW 4,032.66 kW
5.7 Conclusion and policy implications
This study has aimed to assess the impact of various tariff regulations and metering
technologies on the evolution of the electricity system and, in particular, the elec-
tricity distribution network in a case study applied to Wallonia, the southern region
of Belgium. Findings expressed in comparison to the baseline scenario (describing
the current situation in Wallonia) are summarised in Table 5.4. They suggest that
choosing between a net-metering and a net-purchasing technology to measure the
imports and exports of electricity from/to the distribution network is critical. The
net-metering system highly enhances the adoption of PV installations, which is one
of the primary energy targets in the European Union, compared to the other sce-
narios. However, this comes at a cost. Regardless of the distribution network tariff
structure considered, net-metering does not incentivise investments in battery in-
stallations at all and, therefore, does not encourage self-consumption. Peak power
withdrawals and injections are decreased under a net-purchasing system, in par-
ticular when capacity-based fees are applied. Net-purchasing and capacity-based
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tariffs tend to strongly complement each other. Moreover, the net-metering tech-
nology leads to largely differing electricity bills for prosumers and non-prosumers,
where non-prosumers end-up bearing most of the costs of the DSO. This issue can
potentially impair the acceptance of electricity generation technologies coming from
renewable energy.
TABLE 5.4: Summary of the results (evolution compared to the base-
line scenario)
NM f ix NM f ee NMcap NPvol NPcap
PV adoption = - - - - - -
Battery installations = = + ++ ++
Energy cost for non-prosumers - - - - - - - - -
Peak power withdrawals / injections = = - - - -
5.7.1 Policy implications
The CWaPE, the energy regulator in Wallonia, pursues various objectives relating
to: (i) economic efficiency, (ii) equity, and (iii) the stability of the revenues of the
DSO; moreover, the CWaPE aims at (iv) designing distribution tariffs that pave the
way for the energy transition. Where the net-metering technology is in place, only
the latter objective is partially fulfilled as it encourages large investments in PV pro-
duction sources. This situation, however, is unsustainable as the network costs are
financed by non-prosumers who see their electricity bills increase. The goal of the
regulator is not to financially support investments in renewable production sources
but to facilitate the energy transition via regulations targeting the DSO. As other
tariff regulations only marginally change these results, our analysis leads us to con-
clude that a net-purchasing system should be adopted. If, in addition, a capacity
component is introduced in the tariff, less investments would be required to rein-
force the grid as such a system substantially decreases peak power withdrawals and
injections. As these changes would require smart meters, we highlight the need to
deploy this technology more urgently than currently planned by the regulator. This
would shorten the gap between short and long run policies, the latter of which en-
ables the implementation of more adequate regulations.
One reason for the relatively high electricity bills in Wallonia is that they do not
only cover the costs of the commodity and the distribution network. The bills also
charge users for various public policies, such as subsidies for investments in renew-
able energy production sources, reduced energy prices for precarious households,
for the financing of public lighting, or the costs of the planned nuclear phase-out
[113]. As distribution tariffs are computed on a volumetric basis, considering these
additional costs to compute the electricity bills makes the system even less sustain-
able financially and prone to un-even allocation of those additional costs where pro-
sumers may end up not paying for public services such as lighting. All these public
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policies should be financed by the public finance system. This, in addition, would be
a much more transparent and democratic procedure as they would fall under parlia-
mentary oversight. Changing the financing sources of these policies would decrease
the pressing concerns of a utility death spiral and equity issues between prosumers
and traditional consumers.
Finally, this analysis shows the importance of designing holistic policies support-
ing PV adoption and regulating the electricity distribution network, both concerning
tariffs and metering technology, so as to facilitate a sustainable energy transition.
5.7.2 Limitations and future research
Our model relies on various assumptions relating to prosumers and the grid, which
could influence some of our results. Yet, we believe that extending the model to con-
sider these assumptions would lead to qualitatively similar results. To fully examine
them, future research will be needed.
In our model, potential prosumers are presumed to choose to invest in a PV in-
stallation or in both a PV and a battery installation. As a consequence, early PV
adopters do not have the opportunity to later invest in an additional battery sys-
tem. Allowing for this possibility would not impact the scenarios considered in the
short run, i.e. where a net-metering system is in place, as anyway no investment in
batteries is done. However, in the net-purchasing cases considered in the long run,
both investments in PV and in batteries would increase. Changing this assumption
would further strengthen the main conclusion of our analysis.
Our model considers a wide, yet for simplicity’s sake, fixed variety of consump-
tion load profiles. It is unlikely, though, that they will not evolve over time. For ex-
ample, owing to the deployment of electric vehicles, consumption profiles are likely
to change. While electric vehicles increase consumption, they also act as a storage
device potentially enabling peak shaving. As the functionalities of their batteries are
similar to those of an ordinary battery, considering evolving load profiles would lead
to lower investments in batteries in the long run scenario with a net-purchasing sys-
tem or a net-metering system with tariffs with a capacity component. The ensuing
higher consumption levels would lead to a greater deployment of PV installations
along with even larger rebates on the energy bill. Overall, taking these aspects into
consideration would not qualitatively impact the key insights of the current simula-
tor.
One final limitation deserves to be mentioned. In this chapter, we model the fi-
nancing of the network grid as a zero-sum game. Further, we have shown that some
grid regulations, and especially capacity tariffs coupled to a net-purchasing system,
lead to a decrease in peak power imports and exports. These collective benefits can
be translated into lower grid costs that are possible thanks to the private investments
into batteries by prosumers. We hope that further research will allow a more precise








Model of interaction for renewable
energy communities
This chapter introduces Part II of the thesis, which deals with the integration of dis-
tributed energy generation resources (DER) by means of new frameworks for (local)
decentralised electricity markets, such as the renewable energy community (REC).
As the business of electricity retailing changes following the current evolution of the
electricity system, new opportunities arise for emerging technologies. An example
of this evolution is the increasing number of final customers installing sophisticated
energy management systems (EMSs) – these systems can control the production or
consumption of a large variety of devices such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels with
storage solutions. EMSs provide prosumers with an agile and flexible way of man-
aging their DER installations. Additionally, they offer a seamless communication
channel between those prosumers and their retailers. This communication channel
opens the door to new products and services, such as the provision of flexibility
from prosumers to retailers, role that in the context of RECs can be adopted by the
REC manager (ECM). The the retailer (or the ECM) may then use this flexibility in
the wholesale electricity markets and imbalance settlement mechanisms, or trade it
with other balance responsible parties (BRP). Using these ideas, Chapters 6 and 7
explore the potential of REC members to offer flexibility bids to their ECM1.
The first step toward exploring this potential, and the one introduced in this
chapter, consists of building a model of interaction between the different agents in-
volved in our system. In the case of an REC, the agents whose interactions are mod-
elled are the ECM and the REC members. These interactions comprise forecasting
the electricity demand of consumers and prosumers as well as forecasting the local
production of prosumers. If flexible consumption is offered by the REC members,
it is also part of these interactions. This model of interaction relies on smart me-
ters to register the electricity exchanges and requires no modification of the current
rules and regulations of the European electricity system. Both the model of interac-
tion and a numerical example are provided in this chapter. Note that, to produce
1The model developed in this chapter can also work with other entities aggregating a portfolio of
final customers, such as aggregators or retailers.
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a generic framework, we use the term retailer throughout the chapter – this retailer
can be an aggregator or, as explained above, the ECM of an REC.
6.1 Introduction
The role of a traditional electricity retailer comprises acting as an intermediary be-
tween its clients and the rest of the electricity system. In its role, a retailer purchases
electricity for its clients based on consumption forecasts, acts as BRP for the trans-
mission system operator (TSO), and invoices its clients. The interaction between the
retailer and its clients works one way: the client benefits from the system but does
not contribute to it. To be able to manage this interaction efficiently, an increasing
number of clients are installing (or upgrading) sophisticated EMS to save energy in a
cost-efficient manner [120]. An EMS is an automated energy controller using a com-
puter as a central processor. The capabilities of the EMS may vary widely depending
on the selected model. Nonetheless, its basic capabilities are almost universal, and
notably comprise the scheduling of the electricity flows, fixing the set-points of the
batteries, alarms and safety measurements, and basic system monitoring.
An EMS can manage the production or consumption of a large variety of devices,
such as photovoltaic panels, storage solutions (e.g. batteries), and flexible loads (e.g.
demand-flexible boilers). The nature of the constraints of these different devices
thus requires dedicated management, for instance, one EMS may be designed to
control the appliances of a house, as described in [121], whilst another one could
be designed to control a microgrid with several companies, photovoltaic panels, a
run-on-the-river generator, and a storage system, as detailed in [122]. Furthermore,
there might be cases where an EMS simply controls demand response devices. From
the standpoint of a retailer, an EMS represents a higher-level manager of all these
devices (i.e. generation, storage, or flexible demand) to provide flexibility. The flex-
ibility thus provided by the clients’ EMSs is then forwarded by the retailer to the
day-ahead and intraday electricity markets. Alternatively, it can be exchanged with
other BRPs, or be used by the retailer to participate in balancing mechanisms. In this
regard, the retailer can be interpreted as a smart BRP providing single generic access
to various flexibility products, aggregating this flexibility to meet minimum vol-
ume constraints, simplifying accounting, and managing the flexibility of its clients.
This chapter aims at defining an interaction model between a retailer and several
clients (through the clients’ EMSs) to exchange flexibility. The interactions are based
on a generic interface with the EMS, ensuring the scalability of the method, which
should be simple for the most basic EMS, yet able to include the constraints of the
controlled devices and, in particular, rebound effects [123]. In this context, flexible
trading should be an addition to traditional electricity retailing. If no flexibility is
traded, the contract between the client and the retailer corresponds to a classic re-
tailing contract. The scientific literature covers most of the components required
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to define such an interaction model. However, to date, there is no implementation
covering all the requirements together.
For the remainder of this chapter: the next section reviews the relevant literature.
This review is followed by an outline of the proposed interaction model. Specific
components of the model are detailed in dedicated sections: the baseline and its
update, the flexibility bids, and the deviation mechanism. Finally, the last section
concludes the chapter and identifies the potential future prospective work.
FIGURE 6.1: Flow of interactions between a client and its retailer. A
baseline is computed for each client. Then the retailer allows, or not,
the provision of flexibility of the client. If it is not accepted, the client
falls under a classic retailing contract. If accepted, the client notifies
its capability to provide flexibility. If the retailer contracts the flexibil-
ity, the schedule of the client is modified accordingly. This schedule
may be modified upon notification of the client. The client is invoiced
based on the final schedule and the metered energy.
6.2 Literature review
The existing literature regarding the use of demand response to provide flexibility
is abundant, see for instance reviews [124] and [125]. The latter was conducted in
2018 and presents the results of 60 works. Furthermore, many projects on this topic
have been conducted over recent years. ADDRESS started in 2008 and is one of
the earliest European projects dedicated to demand response [126]. BRIDGE is a
European Commission initiative that unites Horizon 2020 Smart Grid and Energy
Storage Projects [127]. The BRIDGE project recommends implementing the Winter
Package directives into the market system regulation based on dedicated recommen-
dations related to specific dimensions: demand response access to markets, service
providers’ access to markets, product requirements, measurement and verification,
payments, and penalties [127]. To enable flexibility services, the authors in [126]
highlight the importance of introducing minor modifications in existing markets,
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rather than creating new ones. In this process, the retailer is well-placed to act as a
facilitator.
The interaction model proposed in this chapter is a market-based approach. Other
examples of such approaches for flexibility aggregation can be found in the Flexi-
ciency [128] and PowerMatcher [129] projects. The former details a European market
place facilitating interaction between agents with advanced monitoring, local energy
control, and flexibility of aggregated customers. Flexibility services are very generic
and must define various parameters such as the payment model, preconditions for
service, or detailed description of service delivery. Concerning PowerMatcher, this
project represents a practical implementation of market-based aggregation; it oper-
ates as a smart grid coordination mechanism balancing distributed energy resources
(such as renewable ones) and flexible demand. First, different devices send bids de-
tailing their willingness to consume energy, and then the aggregator sends back a
price signal so that they can determine its consumption volume at this price.
The mentioned projects interact with various types of devices, either using generic
but complex models, or several specific ones. The authors in [125] claim that, to cre-
ate a well-functioning interaction model, it is necessary to formulate standardized
but simple definitions of flexibility products, accounting for energy-constrained re-
sources, flexibility capacity shortage situations, and including the rebound effect.
One step toward the definition of such flexibility products is proposed in [130],
where a solution is tailored to harness the flexibility from heat pumps. The flexibil-
ity product introduced in the latter work is used as the base block of the interaction
model proposed in this chapter.
6.3 Proposed interaction model
The proposed interaction model between a client willing to provide flexibility and
its retailer complies with the following outline: a client provides a baseline, based
on its own consumption forecasts and additional forecasts if needed. If the EMS of
the client has no forecasting capabilities, a reference is built from historical values.
The retailer accepts or declines the participation of the client in its flexibility pool.
Once accepted, the EMS of the client computes its capability to provide flexibility
and communicates it to the retailer. The retailer processes all flexibility offers com-
ing from the different clients’ EMSs, taking into account the current status of the
energy markets and its requirements as a BRP. If the retailer contracts flexibility, the
schedule of the relevant clients are modified accordingly. Simultaneously, forecast
updates may be requested by the client. The retailer checks if the new baseline is
valid and does not impair the provision of previously accepted flexibility. Finally,
the client is invoiced based on the final schedule and the metered energy. Devia-
tions from the reference, with a specified tolerance, are penalized by the retailer. The
flow of interactions is illustrated in Figure 6.1. This interaction model relies on smart
metering and requires no modification of the current electricity market.
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6.4 Baseline and updates
A baseline is necessary to define the flexibility provided at a resolution of a mini-
mum 15 minutes, for its use in most electricity markets. Such a baseline is a specific
requirement of this kind of client-retailer interaction. For classic retailing contracts,
the baseline of a client is not compulsory. The retailer assumes the role of BRP for the
clients it represents. In this setting, the TSO computes the potential imbalance of the
retailer with respect to its net position. The computation of the net position of the
retailer is based on its electricity purchases, which are in turn based on the forecasts
of its clients. Large consumers may be requested to provide baselines to the retailer.
In that instance, a communication of the baseline will be imposed by the retailer’s
contract (i.e. as an agreement between the client and the retailer). Hence, the TSO
may not be aware of the baseline of the client and only has information concerning
the schedule of the retailer’s portfolio.
If flexibility is sold to the TSO, the baseline may be defined by the TSO itself
[131, 132]. Taking another reference would create a mismatch between the flexibility
remunerated by the TSO and the flexibility provided by the client. In this case, the
retailer communicates to the client the reference taken by the TSO, or the method if
the necessary data are not available in advance.
If flexibility is sold only as a result of a change in the retailer’s net position, the
definition of the client baseline is only an agreement between the client and the re-
tailer. Since it is technically challenging to predict the state of an EMS without the
details of the underlying devices, the EMS should provide its planned schedule to
the retailer. According to [133], baseline and flexibility should be computed by the
EMS to ensure end-user privacy and comfort. However, a concern regarding the
self-computation of the baseline and flexibility is that customers might attempt to
purposely manipulate their baseline in order to maximize their profits. The typical
way of “gaming” the baseline is that customers may declare a higher consumption
than their needs during their peak demand to sell flexibility in the form of a ficti-
tious reduction of consumption. However, such abuses may not be intentional. Any
optimization-based controller naturally exploits the flaws of a deficient interaction
model. To prevent these problems, a retailer can compare the information provided
by the client with its own forecasts. This check is essential to detect anomalies and
can be used to avoid abuses of the flexibility mechanism. One method to prevent
such potential abuses is to check the similarity of the communicated baseline with
historical measurements, applying a tolerance.
The baseline must not only cover the period in which the client is willing to pro-
vide flexibility, but also some periods before and after flexibility delivery, to consider
the rebound effect. The length of these periods depends, among other factors, on the
storage capacity behind the EMS controller. The order of magnitude of residential
thermal storage, for instance, is one and a half hours [130], whereas exploring the op-
posite extreme, a microgrid storage system may shift consumption by several hours.
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Considering these orders of magnitude, a baseline window of one day around a
flexibility window is considered for the present chapter.
A baseline should be defined before the clearing of the day-ahead energy market
so that the retailer has sufficient time to compute and issue its offers. This baseline
should therefore be computed based on day-ahead forecasts. Typically, more accu-
rate forecasts can be obtained closer to real-time, leading to the need for baseline
updates. However, an update may not always be accepted, since it could compen-
sate for previously sold flexibility or an unspecified rebound effect. Thus, two ver-
ification points are suggested: (i) a maximum relative deviation with respect to the
initial baseline, and (ii) prevention of baseline modification in the opposite direction
to the provision of flexibility services. Figure 6.2 shows a schedule update which
cancels out already sold flexibility: (a) assuming a client with a flat baseline; (b) the
client sells flexibility and the schedule is modified accordingly; (c) the client requests
a schedule update in the opposite direction to its sold flexibility. If this update is ac-
cepted, the client is paid for a flexibility it does not provide. To avoid such potential
abuses, the retailer should not accept a baseline update of an opposing sign than the
sold flexibility. In practice, a small tolerance corresponding to acceptable forecast
errors should be considered.
FIGURE 6.2: Case of a schedule update that cancels out already sold
flexibility.
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6.5 Flexibility bids
A client communicates its flexibility by means of bids. This flexibility product is
inspired by proposals of articles [130] and [134]. It consists of an offer covering
multiple market periods in which signs may vary. This product generalises the case
of a single period offer. A bid communicates the flexibility over multiple time-steps
and includes the following information:
• Energy volume for each time step;
• Type: partial/binary acceptance;
• Cost of the bid; and
• Expiration time.
A graphical representation of such a bid is provided in Figure 6.3. The retailer
selects interesting bids, either to directly use them, or to be sold (aggregated or not)
to other BRPs or to the intraday market. As for the market clearing process, many
implementations can be investigated. In any case, the clearing procedure should be
adequate to exchange flexibility close to real-time as, for example, in the real-time







(B) Modulation added to the
baseline.
FIGURE 6.3: Example of upward modulation with three payback pe-
riods.
By default, a bid allows partial acceptance of the offered flexibility volumes. The
accepted flexibility volume at each time-step is given by the offered volume multi-
plied by the acceptance ratio. The client can prevent the possibility of partial accep-
tance for any bid, imposing the complete acceptance or rejection condition, namely,
using the binary bids.
The response of the retailer to the bid submission is the status of the bid, which
can take the following values:
100 Chapter 6. Model of interaction for renewable energy communities
• FREE: Bid submitted and free to be revoked by the client.
• REVOKED: Bid revoked by the client.
• PENDING: The retailer is processing the flexibility bid and it cannot be re-
voked.
• EXPIRED: The bid reached its expiration time without being accepted or re-
jected.
• REJECTED: Bid rejected by the retailer.
• RESERVED: The bid is reserved and waits for its acceptance by its future ben-
eficiary.
• ACCEPTED: The bid is accepted and an acceptance ratio is communicated.
FIGURE 6.4: Evolution of flexibility bid statuses.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the evolution of bid statuses. Clients submit their offers to
the retailers, which are initially in a free state. They are always free to revoke an
offer if it has not been processed. Periodically, the retailer processes the current free
offers. During the processing phase, the statuses of the concerned offers is set as
pending. The retailer first filters offers that have expired due to a time-out. Next, it
selects offers to be submitted to the markets or proposed to the TSO or other BRPs.
These offers are then set to a reserved status, waiting for acceptance, while the rest of
them are switched back to the free status. The retailer could implement a wide range
of strategies to process bids. A basic one would be to forward the bids directly to
the markets, in order of profitability, discarding the ones not suitable for participa-
tion (e.g. the ones which will not generate profits). A more advanced strategy could
consist of building a market offer by aggregating a collection of flexibility bids, how-
ever, the definition of this kind of algorithm is out of the scope of this document. The
algorithm proposed in this chapter is assumed to send offers to the market, commu-
nicating back to the retailer the provided flexibility. The retailer then dispatches this
flexibility to the reserved offers and sets their status as accepted. Concerning the rest
of the offers, they are switched back to the free status for the next selection process.
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Once a flexibility bid is accepted, the schedule of the corresponding client is mod-
ified accordingly. Note that following this principle, a client has an alternative to the
baseline update mechanism to modify its schedule. The client could bid the expected
schedule update at an appealing price with respect to the one of the intraday mar-
ket. Thus, the retailer could buy or sell the corresponding energy on the market and
update the schedule of the client accordingly.
6.6 Deviation mechanism
A deviation is given by the difference between the measured consumption and the
baseline (i.e. the foreseen consumption plus the provided flexibility). Nonetheless,
these deviations are not considered an imbalance in this document since the clients
are not BRPs.
The retailer benefits from averaging its portfolio of clients to mitigate the vari-
ability of its forecasts and deviations. The client cannot benefit from this averaging
effect owing to its small size and limited flexibility. Before pricing a deviation, a re-
tailer may therefore grant a tolerance to its clients for deviations with respect to their
schedules. Beyond this tolerance, a price needs to be associated with this deviation.
The imbalance price is a good candidate since it corresponds to the cost faced by the
retailer. Furthermore, exposing the client to imbalance prices might encourage them
to enroll in a flexibility program. The retailer could reduce the deviation price by a
factor corresponding to the reduction of the risk resulting from the aggregation of
the clients. This reduction can be computed as follows. Considering a retailer with k
identical clients with forecast errors following Gaussian distributions correlated by
a factor ρ. The production of the ith client is given by pi,t, whereas its production
forecast is p̂i,t. Then, the covariance of a pair of clients i, j is given by ρσiσj. The sum
of correlated Gaussian random variables is studied in paper [135]. In this paper,
the authors prove that the sum of correlated normally distributed random variables







j=1 ρi,j where ρi,j is the covariance.
Using this finding, the aggregated forecast error is given by the sum of the indi-
vidual distributions. Let Pt and P̂t denote the production and the estimated produc-
tion of the retailer, which corresponds to the sum of the production and estimated
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where ci is the relative standard deviation of the client’s error. We can define the
factor φ, representing the influence of the correlation of the client’s production on
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The computation of φ for different numbers of clients k and for different correlation
coefficients ρ is showcased in Table 6.1. This table shows that for a sufficient number
of clients, with a realistic correlation of 0.2, the relative forecast error of the retailer
is 45% of the one an individual client would obtain. Thus, 45% could be used as a
potential discount on the imbalance price to define the deviation price of the client.
TABLE 6.1: Influence of the correlation of the clients’ production on
the total production of the retailer, as a function of the number of
clients k and the correlation of their production ρ.
k / ρ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 71% 74% 77% 81% 84% 87%
3 58% 63% 68% 73% 77% 82%
5 45% 53% 60% 66% 72% 77%
10 32% 44% 53% 61% 68% 74%
100 10% 33% 46% 55% 64% 71%
1000 3% 32% 45% 55% 63% 71%
10000 1% 32% 45% 55% 63% 71%
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an interaction model allowing a set of clients equipped EMSs
to provide flexibility services to the electrical system through their retailer. The scope
of this interaction model covers energy exchanges spanning from the day-ahead to
real-time. These exchanges may be simple for the most basic EMSs, while allow-
ing clients with device constraints such as rebound effects to include them in such
exchanges. The trading of flexibility is an addition to traditional retailing. If no




Introducing demand response into
renewable energy communities
The potential of final customers to offer flexibility based on the idea of renewable
energy communities (RECs) is further elaborated in this chapter. Making use of
the interaction model developed in the Chapter 6, we design an REC where part of
the REC members are flexible consumers who can post flexibility bids upon request
from the energy community manager (ECM). These bids, if accepted by the ECM,
will change the demand profile of the (flexible) members and, as such, of the REC.
The decision of activating flexibility bids may respond to different criteria – this
chapter presents a flexibility activation decision mechanism based on a cost minimi-
sation criterion.
To perform this cost minimisation, we assume that the only retailer of the REC
is the ECM1. Thus, the ECM, as provider of electricity for the REC, can trade in the
wholesale electricity market, in this case the day-ahead market, to purchase the elec-
tricity needs of the community. When performing a typical demand provisioning,
the ECM or the retailer must use forecasts of load, production within the community
and electricity prices. In addition, in this chapter we introduce one extra element the
ECM must account for: flexible consumption by flexible consumers equipped with
energy management systems (EMSs) in the form of flexibility bids spanning several
time-steps. Taking all these elements into consideration, the ECM performs the de-
mand provisioning in the day-ahead market, aiming to minimise the electricity costs
of the REC. To that end, a strategy must be developed to decide which flexibility bids
to activate. Owing to the complexity of flexibility bids, comprised of three elements:
initial activation of flexibility, idle time, and rebound (detailed later in the chapter),
the strategy for bid activation is not straightforward. In this chapter we propose an
optimisation framework at the core of such an activation strategy – one that not only
accounts for the initial activation, but also for the idle time and the rebound of the
bid, which may take place several time-steps after the initial activation.
1As per current European regulations, the ECM does not need to have the role of the retailer of the
community. However, in this paper we assume this is the case to avoid the extra layer of communica-
tion with the retailer. The model presented in this chapter can work equally assuming the standpoint
of a retailer instead of an ECM.
104 Chapter 7. Introducing demand response into renewable energy communities
Our results show that creating an REC can significantly reduce the electricity
costs of the REC members. Furthermore, we show that introducing flexibility bids
further reduces the total system costs thanks to a better matching of local supply and
demand.
7.1 Introduction
Electricity retailing is rapidly evolving in response to the emergence of new tech-
nologies such as smart meters or EMSs. These new technologies enable new forms
of decentralised electricity trading [125]. In this regard, the European Parliament in
its 2018/2001 directive has introduced the concept of RECs [11]. RECs are usually
composed of consumers and local renewable generators which are connected to the
same low voltage feeder. When an REC is established, their users may benefit from
lower electricity bills owing to: i) a greater synchronisation between renewable elec-
tricity production and consumption; and ii) a potential discount on the distribution
fee offered by the distribution system operator for all locally consumed electricity.
RECs are managed by an ECM, in charge of billing the users and ensuring the ad-
equate functioning of the REC. The role of the ECM then, includes managing the
generation assets within the REC in order to maximise the global self-consumption
of the REC, and creating an adequate business model where the financial balance is
positive.
To maximise the REC self-consumption, the ECM needs to synchronise supply
and demand. However, when relying on renewable resources such as solar photo-
voltaic (PV), the generation output cannot be controlled. A solution might involve
the deployment of storage devices such as batteries, yet their limited capacity as well
as their price make them an impractical solution for large scale implementations.
Hence, another potential way of boosting the supply and demand synchronisation
is the use of demand response (DR) or other flexibility services provided by the
users. In this regard, this chapter focuses on the development of a novel method to
deal with DR in the context of an REC with generation assets in the form of solar PV,
owned by an investor (for instance the ECM). This REC is composed of non-flexible
consumers who simply consume electricity, flexible consumers who consume elec-
tricity and offer DR, and generation assets that can sell the electricity either to the
REC or to the main network.
In this set-up, flexibility bids can be offered by the REC’s flexible consumers one
day before physical delivery. Every day at noon, the flexible consumers can post
their flexibility bids for every quarter of the following day. The ECM must then se-
lect the bids according to the best interest of the system (e.g. self-consumption max-
imisation). To that end, the ECM makes use of forecasts of consumption, production,
and day-ahead market prices. It is important to note that network constraints of the
REC are not considered during this process.
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Several works in the existing literature have tackled the issue of flexibility. In
[136], the authors present an optimisation model to study the participation of a DR
aggregator with a portfolio of DR resources in the wholesale market, highlighting
the cost opportunity offered to the aggregator, and the possibility of transferring
such a gain to promote the participation of end-users in DR programs. In [137],
several “smart” buildings are modeled to provide flexible consumption as fast reg-
ulation reserve to the grid, reporting a reduction in operating costs. The authors in
[138] study the provision of reserve with DR and stress the importance of account-
ing for the rebound effect when using flexibility bids. In [139], the authors create
a framework in which flexible consumers can provide flexibility bids while an ag-
gregator supervises the flexibility transactions, suggesting the need for interaction
between the different agents. In [140], three different market designs are proposed
for the activation of flexibility services within distribution networks. This paper
focuses on the coordination between retailer, transmission system operation, and
distribution system operation (DSO). Another work, [141], proposes the use of hier-
archical agent-based modelling for the study of the impact of DR on the day-ahead
market, showcasing a cost reduction on the user end while profits are maximised for
the retailer.
To date, no work has addressed the issue of introducing flexibility services in
the context of an REC. Although there exists literature on peer-to-peer trading, this
mechanism is based on a decentralised planner. In this chapter, we take the stand-
point of a centralised one, where the novelty lies on the introduction of flexibility
trading where consumers can submit their willingness to offer flexibility services in
the context of European RECs as they have been laid out by the European Commis-
sion. Furthermore, no comprehensive interaction model can be found in the litera-
ture where flexibility bids coming from consumers’ EMSs can be offered in an REC
managed by an ECM. Our work aims at filling this gap, introducing a novel multi-
agent model capable of simulating the operation of an REC composed of different
agents: flexible consumers, non-flexible consumers, generation assets, and ECM. In
addition to the regular operation of the REC, a strategy for activating flexibility bids
from flexible consumers, based on an optimisation problem is proposed and tested.
After this introduction, in Section 7.2, we detail the functioning of the proposed
the multi-agent the simulator. Section 7.3 presents the mathematical formulation
of the optimisation problem written to select the flexibility bids. In Section 7.4, we
introduce a test case showcasing and discussing the capabilities of the simulator.
Finally, in Section 7.5 we provide the conclusion of this work.
7.2 Simulator
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed simulator, establishing the
interactions between the agents of the REC. Moreover, the flow of information in our
multi-agent computational tool is explained in detail.
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As explained in the introduction, the goal of the developed simulator is the de-
tailed representation of the activities of an ECM and the REC it manages. The REC
is composed of a portfolio of flexibility providers among its consumers, namely the
flexible consumers. To maximise the self-consumption of the REC (or its welfare
as we will see later on the document), the ECM can use the flexibility provided by
flexible consumers when purchasing energy in the European day-ahead market.
In the developed simulator, the demand of the REC is introduced by means of
several consumers (flexible and non-flexible) that are modeled through their de-
mand profiles. The generation needed to supply such a demand comes from the
generation assets of the REC or, if needed, from the main network (outside the REC).
In this work, the ECM produces forecasts of the day-ahead market prices and the
demand of the non-flexible consumers. Then, the flexible consumers and the renew-
able generation assets provide their individual demand forecasts to ECM, who adds
them to the forecast of the non-flexible consumers. With all the demand forecasts
(flexible and non-flexible), an initial baseline is computed and the flexible consumers
are scheduled.
In addition, the ECM receives flexibility bids from the flexible consumers, and
activates these bids in order to increase or reduce the demand at certain periods. The
ECM will choose the bids that maximise the welfare of the REC which, in the case
presented, also maximises the self-consumption of the system (i.e. the part of the
demand met by local generation). A detailed explanation of the role of each agent is
provided in this section. The selection process of the flexibility bids is presented in
Section 7.3.
7.2.1 Agents
In the following, the different agents of the multi-agent simulator are presented,
highlighting the interactions between them and their impact on the simulation. The
agents of the proposed model are the day-ahead market operator, the flexible con-
sumers, the non-flexible consumers, the generation assets, and the ECM. They all
have different roles and ways of interacting.
Day-ahead market operator
this agent is meant to provide the history of day-ahead market prices to the ECM so
that the it can produce forecasts. In addition, once the day-ahead market has been
cleared and the prices are fixed (not forecasts), this agent provides the actual prices
that will be charged to the ECM for its day-ahead provisioning.
Flexible consumers
this group of agents is composed of electricity consumers that can offer demand re-
sponse (flexibility). Upon request of the ECM, these agents will compute and offer a
flexibility bid upward or downward. This flexibility offer states that, if activated, the
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flexible consumer is obliged to increase or decrease its consumption at a given point
in time. This offer also states that, at a later moment in time, the same amount of en-
ergy will be returned to the flexible consumer, decreasing or increasing its demand
accordingly (rebound). Each flexibility bid is offered at a fixed price. In principle,
each flexible consumer should design this price according to their own utility func-
tion through a bidding process. In this chapter, however, for the sake of simplicity
we consider the same price per unit of energy for all flexibility bids.
Flexible consumers have a baseline and a schedule, and while the baseline repre-
sents their consumption without flexibility, the schedule can be adjusted depending
on the flexibility bids accepted by the ECM. The EMS of each agent is responsible for
the computation of the flexibility bids and for communicating them to the ECM.
The flexibility bids are composed of three elements:
• Initial flexibility: this is the initial change in schedule offered by the flexible
consumer, it can be positive or negative and is instantaneous (i.e. it will be
activated at the appointed time for the appointed duration). The magnitude of
the initial flexibility depends on the baseline of the flexible consumer (it cannot
be greater than the baseline itself).
• Idle time: this is the time between the flexibility offered and the start of the
rebound, during this time the flexibility bid follows the original schedule.
• Rebound: this is the amount of energy the flexible consumer must recover for
the flexibility offered. It may span over several time-steps and its magnitude
is equal to the initial flexibility offered, multiplied by a factor (typically greater
than 1 in order to account for losses). We assume that the energy is equally
distributed over all rebound time-steps.
In Figure 7.1, an illustration of a possible flexibility bid is provided. Note that, in
the simulation, all three parameters: magnitude of initial flexibility, duration of idle
time, and duration of rebound, can be adjusted.
Non-flexible consumers
this group of agents contains all electricity consumers with non-flexible baselines.
These consumers do not offer flexibility bids to the ECM. In this case, the forecasts
of these agents’ consumption profiles are computed by the ECM and, therefore, de-
viations between forecast and actual consumption will not be charged to the agents.
Generation assets
in addition to the users, the REC contains generation assets, usually owned by an
investor that can be the ECM, one of the consumers, or another entity. These gener-
ation assets locally produce electricity, which can be used to meet the demand of the
REC, or be sold to the main network. In this work, we assume that solar PV is the

















FIGURE 7.1: Flexibility bids’ structure with three elements: the initial
flexibility, an idle time, and the rebound.
only available generation technology within the REC and that the locally generated
electricity will be sold primarily within the REC. However, this last assumption will
depend on the optimisation problem. The generation assets forecast their produc-
tion and submit it to the ECM.
ECM
the last agent of the simulator is the energy community manager. The role of this
agent is to receive i) price signals from DAM, ii) forecasts from flexible consumers,
and iii) forecasts from generation assets. Additionally, it must forecast the consump-
tion of the non-flexible consumers. With all this information, the ECM decides the
demand provisioning of the REC, and the flexibility bids to accept. Regarding the
demand provisioning, the ECM will act so as to maximise the self-consumption (or
welfare as presented in section 7.3) of the REC according to the optimisation problem
laid out in section 7.3, taking into account the flexibility bids. The objective of the
optimisation is to maximise the matching of demand with PV production. Finally,
the ECM will try to maximise the local electricity exchanges within the REC.
7.3 Day-ahead Flexibility activation
In this section, the optimisation problem that defines the flexibility activation and
the day-ahead schedule is formulated. The objective function of this problem aims
at maximising the welfare of the REC and, as a result, its self-consumption.
The proposed REC is composed of consumers (flexible or not), and generation
assets. This means that the system will have generation and demand profiles and,
as such, its consumption can be divided into:
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1. Local consumption: corresponds to the self-consumption of the system, i.e. the
part of the demand covered with the local PV generation;
2. Global consumption: corresponds to the imports from the main network (out-
side the REC), and typically covers the consumption not met by the local gen-
eration.
In an ideal REC, the total demand should be covered by the local production and,
only if it is not sufficient, should the system resort to imports. The rationale behind
this is that, when a high-enough percentage of the production of an REC is locally
consumed and, under the new European directive, the distribution system operator
serving the REC will offer certain discount on all exchanges taking place inside the
community. Thus, the ECM can select flexibility bids to increase or decrease the
instantaneous demand, taking into account the idle time and the rebound of each
bid so as to maximise self-consumption (minimise imports from the main network).
To account for the potential negative effect of activating bids due to their rebound
effect, a comprehensive bid activation strategy must be developed. One that not only
looks at the flexibility offered to match instantaneously demand and local supply,
but also takes into account the adverse –or not– effects of the rebound taking place
several time-steps later.
For this reason, in this work we propose a framework to perform the flexibility
bid activation according to the output of an optimisation problem. The problem is
defined as following. Let T = {1, . . . , T} represent the time discretisation of the
horizon T, where t ∈ T represents the time-steps (the resolution will depend on the
used data set). In addition, we can define a set U = {1, . . . , U} of users. In the pro-
posed framework, Du,t and Pu,t denote the demand and the production forecasts of
each user u respectively; Πl−t is the local energy price (without distribution, trans-
mission, or taxes); Πdl is the local distribution price (which contains also transmis-
sion and taxes); Πg−t is the global energy price (without distribution, transmission,
or taxes), this is the price of the energy imported; and Πdg is the global distribution
costs (including transmission and taxes).
Additionally, we must define all the parameters related to the flexibility bids. Let
B = {1, . . . , B} denote the set of flexibility bids offered by the flexible consumers.
Then, we can define the set Ib = {1, . . . , Ib} representing the discretisation of the
flexibility bid duration in time-steps, where Ib is the length of the idle time plus
the rebound effect of bid b ∈ B. In this context, every bid b ∈ B can be defined
as b = (Fi,b ∀i ∈ Ib), where Fi,b denote the volume of flexibility offered at the ith
time-step by bid b. The activation time of a bid b ∈ B is given by τb. Finally, we
can define the subset B̄(t) ⊆ B denoting the set of flexibility bids which are active
at time-step t, thus B̄(t) = {b ∈ B | t− Ib ≤ τb ≤ t} , ∀t ∈ T . Table 7.1 contains a
detailed overview of the notation used.







































Du,t − ρg−t + ∑
b∈B̄(t)
xb · Ft,b , (7.3)
ρl+t = ∑
u∈U










t ∈ R+ ∀t ∈ T , (7.5)
xb ∈ [0, 1] ∀b ∈ B . (7.6)
The goal of this problem is the selection of flexibility bids offered by the flex-
ible consumers so as to maximise the self-consumption of the REC. The objective
function (Equation (7.1)) minimises the costs subtracting the revenues of the REC.
Equation (7.2) ensures the energy balance at all time-steps. Equation (7.3) computes
the local consumption ρl−t . Equation (7.4) computes the share of locally generated
energy that is sold locally ρl+t (i.e. never leaves the REC). Finally, xb ∈ [0, 1] is a
continuous variable used to activate each bid b if its effect (activation and rebound)
contributes positively to the increase of the welfare.
7.4 Test case
In this section, we illustrate the use of the proposed framework and its main fea-
tures by providing an example for the case of an REC in Belgium with the following
characteristics:
• the simulation’s resolution is 15 minutes;
• 20 flexible consumers whose demand profiles come from data from real users
in Belgium;
• 10 non-flexible consumers whose demand profiles come from data from real
users Belgium;
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TABLE 7.1: Notation.
Symbol Meaning Units
Πg−t Global energy price e/MWh
Πl−t Local energy price e/MWh
Πdg Global distribution price e/MWh
Πdl Local distribution price e/MWh
Πg+t Global selling price of energy e/MWh
Πl+t Local selling price of energy e/MWh
Πo Cost of transmission and taxes e/MWh
Du,t Demand of user u MWh
Pu,t Production of user u MWh
ρ
g−
t Total imports of the REC from the grid MWh
ρ
g+
t Total exports of the REC to the grid MWh
ρl−t Total local consumption of the REC MWh
ρl+t Total production locally consumed by the REC MWh
Ft,b Flexibility volume offered MWh
xb Acceptance ratio of the bid %
Cb Cost of the bid e
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• 1 solar PV installation of 48 MW whose production profile is computed using
the python library PVLIB [99], calibrating the model for a location in Belgium;
• the idle time of the flexibility bids is 120 minutes;
• the payback duration of the flexibility bids is 60 minutes.
The values of the different price components used for the simulations are listed
in Table 7.2. Note that, in the proposed test case, the imports from the main grid
are charged at retail price. Thus, the ECM has an incentive to reduce the overall
consumption by matching PV generation with demand, using the flexibility bids
from flexible consumers.
7.4.1 Cost analysis
The costs of the REC (CREC) are given by equation (7.7). Results of the cost analysis
are reported in Table 7.3. Three different cases are considered for the computation of
the costs:
1. no REC is established: consumers and producers simply buy and sell the elec-
tricity from the outside market;
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2. the REC is established, but no flexibility is used: consumers and producers
benefit from certain discount on the distribution tariff;
3. the REC is established and flexibility is used: consumers and producers benefit
from certain discount on the distribution tariff and from flexibility bids.
Furthermore, we provide results for simulations corresponding to 1 day (January 2,
2017), 1 week (second week of 2017), 1 month (January 2017), and 1 year of operation
(2017). Note that January is selected to showcase the results of the costs analysis
































TABLE 7.3: Costs for the three different cases and percentage of dif-
ference with respect to the reference (first column).
Case NO REC (%) REC NO FLEX (%) REC FLEX (%)
1 day 262 ke (-) 260.6 ke (-0.006) 260.6 ke (-0.006)
1 week 1,785 ke(-) 1,730 ke (-3.1) 1,726 ke (-3.3)
1 month 7,054 ke (-) 6,863 ke (-2.7) 6,850 ke (-2.9)
1 year 65,455 ke (-) 61,303 ke (-6.3) 61,019 ke (-6.8)
From these results, we can observe how the aggregated effect over the entire year
leads to significant reductions in the total operation costs when an REC is set in place
(6.3%). And an additional reduction of 0.5% is achieved by introducing flexibility.
7.4.2 Performance analysis
To further evaluate the value of RECs and the use of flexibility, we compute the self-










t + ∑b∈B̄(t) xb · Ft,b
∑t,u∈T ×U Pu,t
. (7.9)
The available flexibility can be used to improve the matching between supply
and demand, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. The demand shift of the system (before
and after flexibility) is shown by comparing the initial with the flexible demand. In
Figure 7.2, we can observe that, in times of high local production, upward flexibility
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is activated in order to increase the self-consumption of the REC and vice-versa,
when there is scarcity of production, the flexible demand decreases as a result of
downward bid activation. In Table 7.4, these findings are summarised for the yearly
operation of an REC. A substantial increase in the utilisation of local production is
achieved when flexibility is considered (+8.1%). Subsequently, the SCR is improved
in the REC by 5.01%. A similar trend can be observed for the SSR, which increases
by 2.92% when introducing flexibility. It is important to note that these results are
sensitive to the amount of offered flexibility and to the REC configuration.























FIGURE 7.2: Initial demand (in red) vs demand after using flexibility
(in blue). The PV production is displayed in yellow. Detail of 13 days
in March 2017.
TABLE 7.4: Results of the analysis of flexibility use.
Parameter With no flexibility With flexibility Difference
SSR 33.80% 36.72% +2.92%
SCR 57.22% 62.23% +5.01%
Total demand 333,325 MWh 333,688 MWh ∼ same
Production 196,918 MWh 196,918 MWh same
Local production 112,679 MWh 122,546 MWh +8.1%
Global production 84,239 MWh 74,372 MWh -13.27%
7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter a modelling framework is proposed for analysing the benefits of cre-
ating an REC with flexible and non-flexible consumers, and with PV generation as-
sets. In this framework, an ECM is responsible for managing the REC and its par-
ticipation in the European day-ahead market. Results show a 6.3% yearly reduction
of total costs when an REC is created. A discount on the distribution tariff offered
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by the DSO when energy is produced and consumed locally has a key role on this
cost reduction. Furthermore, we account for flexibility offered by the flexible con-
sumers of the REC. We propose a bid acceptance algorithm according to which the
ECM can optimise the amount of flexibility activated in the REC while accounting
for the rebound effect. The incorporation of flexibility in the REC is shown to further
reduce the total system cost by 6.8%. The importance of the instantaneous matching
of supply and demand is showcased by an increase of the SSR and SCR of the REC
when flexibility is introduced.
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Chapter 8
How to allocate local generation in
renewable energy communities
In the previous two chapters, we simulate a renewable energy community (REC)
by means of a model of interaction (see Chapter 6), introducing flexible loads into
it and formulating an activation strategy for this flexibility (see Chapter 7). These
models rely on forecasts of demand and electricity prices to schedule the electricity
exchanges among the REC members and between them and the energy community
manager (ECM). However, when implementing a real-life REC, models relying on
forecasts may lead to suboptimal schedules due to inevitable forecasting errors. To
cope with these problems, this chapter (Chapter 8) proposes a novel methodology
to allocate the locally generated electricity among the REC members, one that relies
on real measurements of demand and production. This methodology consists of an
ex-post optimisation of repartition keys, which represent the proportion of total local
production allocated to every REC member.
This optimisation of repartition keys takes place after physical delivery of elec-
tricity and, in consequence, the actual electricity exchanges cannot be modified at
this point. However, according to the latest European regulation, the DSO allows for
modifying the meter readings even after physical delivery. Accordingly, an ex-post
allocation of local production, where the financial exchanges of the REC are opti-
mised taking into account real measurements, is possible. This ex-post allocation is
what we call the settlement phase, as opposed to the scheduling phase addressed in
previous chapters. The settlement phase is modelled through an optimisation frame-
work which (i) minimises the sum of electricity costs of the REC members, and (ii)
can enforce minimum self-sufficiency rates (SSRs) on them. We use the concept of
SSR, defined as the proportion of electricity demand covered by local production,
to introduce the ability to ensure minimum SSRs to the members of the community.
The SSR can be computed per REC member or at the REC level – while the former
can be maximised for some members at the expense of others, the latter is derived
from the load and production profiles of the REC. Imposing minimum SSRs on the
REC members (or on a subset of them), is useful to provide all members with receive
enough economic incentives to participate in the REC, since higher SSRs are linked
to lower electricity prices, assuming that the local electricity prices are lower than
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purchasing from a retailer.
The presented framework is designed so as to provide a practical approach that is
ready to use by ECMs. It is also compliant with current legislation on decentralised
electricity markets. This framework computes a set of optimal repartition keys per
metering period and per member – these keys are computed based on an initial set
of keys provided in the simulation, which are typically contractual i.e. agreed upon
between the member and the manager the REC. Note that in this chapter we employ
the term metering period to denote the resolution of the meters.
Finally, we provide a comprehensive range of scenarios where we test the pre-
sented methodology, illustrating its ability to optimise the electricity costs of an REC.
Notation
Sets
T Set of market periods {1, . . . , T}
I Set of REC members {1, . . . , I}
Parameters
At,i Initial allocation of production
Ct,i Consumption
Cnt,i Netted consumption
Kt,i Initial repartition keys
Pt,i Production
Pnt,i Netted production
SSRmini Minimum self-sufficiency rate
Xt,i Maximum allowed key deviation
ξbi Purchasing price imports
ξsi Selling price exports
ξ l−i Local price imports
ξ l+i Local price exports
ξdi Price of deviations from At,i
Decision variables
at,i Optimised allocated production
a+t Positive deviation from At,i
a−t Negative deviation from At,i
kt,i Optimised repartition keys
ssri Coverage rate
vt,i Verified allocated production
yt,i Locally sold production
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8.1 Introduction
One of the most widely accepted trends in the path toward the de-carbonisation of
the electricity sector is the decentralisation of electricity generation assets. This trend
challenges common practices in power system operations, where consumer-centric
electricity markets now play a key role [142]. Among these new potential markets
is the energy community, naturally stemming from the empowerment of final con-
sumers which, according to [143], have made community energy an effective and
cost-efficient way to meet the energy needs of citizens. An energy community is
a consumer-centric electricity market where several community members may ex-
change, among themselves, electricity produced from their own generation assets.
According to some authors, the main barrier to developing these communities is the
lack of sufficient legislation ensuring their viability [144, 145]. Aware of this issue,
regional, national, and supra-national authorities are creating new legislations and
frameworks that enable the emergence of these energy communities. The European
Parliament, in the 2018/2001 directive [11], introduced a series of legal notions such
as the renewables self-consumer (or prosumer), and the REC. According to this di-
rective, all customers are eligible to participate in an REC while maintaining their
previous status as final customers in a liberalised market, meaning that they are free
to choose their retailer. Since any customer is, according to this directive, entitled to
become prosumer, RECs may be composed of consumers, prosumers, or generation
assets owned by the REC. In this context, RECs are managed by a central entity: the
ECM.
Following the latest regulation developments on RECs, the main role of ECMs is
to compute the allocation of locally generated production among the REC members,
and to communicate it to the distribution system operator (DSO) ex-post, i.e., after
physical delivery of electricity. This allocation of local generation is computed by
the ECM by means of what is known as repartition keys. These keys represent the
proportion of available local electricity production –after-the-meter– that is allocated
to each of the REC members. After computing these keys, the ECM communicates
them to the DSO, which modifies the meter readings of the REC members accord-
ingly. The electricity flows of each member are thus divided into two. The first one
corresponds to the local production associated to each member, which is used by
the ECM to produce the local electricity bill. The second one corresponds to the de-
mand that is not covered by local production, which is sent to the members’ retailers
to process the rest of the billing. Such a concept is used by the French [146] and Wal-
loon (region of Belgium) regulation [147]. The French regulation makes use of such a
concept [146] and, a similar legislative body exists in the Walloon region of Belgium,
although without specifically mentioning the repartition keys [147]. Moreover, other
European countries are adopting similar legislative decisions [148].
Using repartition keys to modify the meter readings of REC members affects
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their SSRs. In this context, SSR represents the proportion of total consumption cov-
ered by local production, for each member. The fraction of the total consumption not
covered by local production must be supplied by retailer contracts. The proportions
of consumption supplied locally (SSR) and by the retailer (100% - SSR) have different
prices associated. Both retailer and local REC price comprise commodity, distribu-
tion, transmission and taxes, however, as per current European regulations, the DSO
may offer a discount on the distribution component of the local REC price. This is
why maximising the use of local production, that is, the SSR of the REC members,
is economically beneficial for them. Hence, computing the SSRs of the members is
crucial since it directly relates to their economic gains for participating in an REC.
According to regulation, a contract between the ECM and each REC member
must be set, depending on which, the repartition keys are computed. This compu-
tation is a two-step process. First, an initial set of repartition keys are agreed upon
between both parties, by signing a contract. These initial keys may be proportional
to the investments of the members on generation assets. Second, the actual reparti-
tion keys are computed with some general objective, for instance the minimisation of
the electricity bills of REC members. The deviations of the actual keys from the ini-
tial ones can be limited by contract i.e., the actual keys might be forced to be around
the initial ones with a tolerance, for example, of 10%. If no initial keys are set by
the contract, or if the maximum tolerance is 100%, the set of actual keys behave as
though no initial keys were set, simply optimising the general objective.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a methodology to compute
actual repartition keys based on a set of initial ones, allocating the local electricity
generation of an REC among its members, accordingly. This methodology relies on
an optimisation framework targeting a cost minimisation which is ready to use by
ECMs, offering the necessary flexibility to be compliant with current regulations. In
the rest of the chapter the actual keys are referred to as optimised keys.
Following this introduction, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows:
Section 8.2 presents a review of the existing literature on the topic and expounds the
theoretical gap this chapter aims to fill. Section 8.3 describes the problem faced by
an REC to allocate the locally generated electricity. Section 8.4 presents the problem
formulation. Section 8.5 introduces a broad range of case studies. Finally, Section 8.6
concludes the chapter.
8.2 Literature review
The current literature dealing with decentralised, consumer-centric electricity trad-
ing can be broadly divided into two groups: trading in a peer-to-peer fashion and
trading through a central entity.
In [149], the authors present an approach for a service management framework
to control and monitor decentralised energy consumers, storages, and generators
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where algorithms for automated control of these consumers are based on P2P trad-
ing. On this topic, [150] proposes a P2P algorithm based on multi-bilateral trad-
ing and product differentiation where the problem is implemented by means of a
distributed relaxed consensus and innovation approach. Another P2P framework,
based on game theory is presented in [151], where real-time energy trading is pro-
posed. In the latter work, a community of prosumers is simulated through their
net-demands, meaning that prosumers can either be net-sellers or net-buyers, de-
pending on their position. An overview of the application of blockchain technology
to P2P prosumer trades is introduced in [152], showcasing a case study of a real
community. Another literature review, this time on P2P approaches for energy man-
agement using game theory, is presented [48]. The authors in this work claim there
exists plenty of research on this topic, and provide a comprehensive overview of the
importance of game theory and its potential to be applied to P2P energy trading. In
[47], the authors observe a P2P market relying on a consumer-centric and a bottom-
up perspective. In their work, they provide consumers with the opportunity to freely
choose how to buy their electricity needs. This paper presents an overview of these
new P2P markets, exposing their motivation, challenges, market designs, and po-
tential future developments in this field, providing recommendations. A detailed
review of market proposals is provided, concluding that there are certain conditions
where P2P markets may co-exist with existing market structures. In this paper, three
types of P2P markets are presented: full P2P, community-based P2P, and a hybrid of
the two. According to the authors, the most suitable one is the hybrid in terms of
scalability. A more recent work, [49], presents an analysis where the behaviours of
prosumers and prosumers are assessed under a P2P paradigm.
With regards to trading through a central planner, the literature is significantly
less abundant and detailed, in particular when it comes to describing consumer-
centric markets such as RECs. In [50], the authors present a community based ap-
proach to future electricity markets. An energy community is presented where the
ECM acts as the interface between community member and the market. In this com-
munity, members do not interact with their retailers but rather with the ECM, who
has the ability of computing and offering electricity prices to them. Another ap-
proach based on central planning is presented in [51] where a benevolent planner
maximises the welfare of the community, redistributing revenues and costs amongst
the members of the REC so that none of them is penalised as a result of being in a
community. This problem is cast as a bi-level optimisation where the lower level
solves the clearing problem of the community and the upper level shares the profits
amongst the entities. In [46], flexibility bids from flexible consumers in a REC are
offered to the ECM, who then selects and activates them to increase the welfare of
the community. An approach based on game theory is presented in [142], where
the authors present an analysis on the viability of RECs. This paper stresses the im-
portance of allocating correctly the costs and benefits among the participants. They
propose to base the sharing rule of the gains stemming from local production and
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consumption, as opposed to only production as it is usually done. The authors in
[145] claim that benefits within REC may come from reductions on the network cost
as well reductions on retailer costs, highlighting that proper price schemes may lead
to substantial savings.
Whilst these papers offer different approaches to managing an REC, they all ad-
dress the problem of scheduling the electricity exchanges within the REC, and be-
tween the REC and the grid, disregarding the settlement phase occurring after phys-
ical delivery. This chapter proposes to fill this gap, completing the already existing
methods. Note that the settlement proposed in this chapter considers that the cus-
tomers maintain their contracts with their retailers, whereas in the existing literature
the ECM often provides all market interactions, therefore acting as a retailer. Cur-
rent regulation, however, dictates for ECM to be a mere facilitator of the internal
electricity exchanges of an REC without being a retailer.
8.3 Problem statement
To allocate the available local production injected into the grid among the REC mem-
bers, the presented methodology must compute one repartition key per member and
metering period. The metering period is defined as the meter’s resolution, e.g., 15
minutes. Repartition keys are computed with this resolution. These keys represent
the proportion of local production injected into the grid from which each member
can benefit, directly impacting on their SSRs. In addition to the metering period,
a reporting period can be defined, comprising several metering periods. The pre-
sented methodology therefore computes repartition keys for all metering periods in
one reporting period. Let T = {1, . . . , T} denote the set of all metering periods in
a reporting period where T is the reporting period duration. Accordingly, the me-
tering period is defined by the intervals (t, t + 1] contained in the reporting period
T .
In addition, a set of I REC members is defined as I = {1, . . . , I}. These members
are characterised by their total production (if any) and consumption profiles, given
as time-series with a resolution equal to the metering period, and spanning the re-
porting period. Since REC members may be prosumers, that is, they may consume
or produce electricity along the reporting period, their consumption per metering
period must be netted. This is done to subtract the behind-the-meter production of
these members. The consumption and net consumption are denoted by Ct,i and Cnt,i,
respectively. Similarly, the production must be netted to account for any behind-the-
meter consumption. The production and net production are denoted by Pt,i and Pnt,i,
respectively.
Cnt,i = max {0, Ct,i − Pt,i} ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I , (8.1)
Pnt,i = max {0, Pt,i − Ct,i} ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I . (8.2)
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Commonly, producers sell part of their netted production to the community,
which may not be able to consume it all. The local production sold by REC member
i at metering period (t, t + 1] is denoted as yt,i and bounded by Pnt,i: yt,i ≤ Pnt,i.
As stated in the introduction, the challenge of computing repartition keys in-
volves using a set of initial keys agreed upon between the REC members and the
ECM. These initial keys are given by Kt,i, and represent the initial allocation of the
available local production (whatever it is). They are set depending on the REC and
the different agreements between ECM and REC members. For instance, in the case
of an REC where the generation units are deployed thanks to an initial investment
of all REC members, the initial keys could be set as the share of each member of
the total investment of the REC. If, on the other hand, there is no initial investment,
the initial keys may indicate the initial quantity of local production promised by the
ECM to the REC members.
In this context, this chapter introduces a methodology to compute an optimal set
of repartition keys, represented by kt,i, which are based on the initial ones. This com-
putation of optimal keys aims at minimising the sum of individual billing electricity
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) ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I , (8.3)
where ξbi is the overall price for electricity including distribution, transmission, en-
ergy price, and taxes for member i; and ξsi is the price at which member i sells any
electricity surplus to the retailer. Similarly, ξ l−i is the electricity price inside the REC,
including taxes, local distribution (which may also include a fee for the transmission
system operator), and energy price; and ξ l+i is the selling price of electricity when
it is sold within the REC. Finally, vt,i represents the verified allocated production,
which is discussed later in this section, and is computed simultaneously with the
optimal set of repartition keys.
To compute the optimal set of keys that leads to the minimisation of Equation
(8.3), the methodology takes into account three sets of constraints. The first set re-
lates to the maximum allowed deviation of kt,i with respect to Kt,i. Indeed, a toler-
ance around the initial set of contractual keys Kt,i may be enforced, beyond which
the optimal set of keys kt,i cannot deviate. Such a tolerance is given by Xt,i:
Xt,i = |kt,i − Kt,i| ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I . (8.4)
The second set of constraints defines the meter readings associated to the optimal
keys. First, with the initial keys and the optimal ones, an initial allocation of avail-
able production and an optimal allocation of available production are computed,
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represented by At,i and at,i, respectively:
At,i = Kt,i ·∑
i∈I
Pnt,i ∀t ∈ T , (8.5)
at,i = kt,i ·∑
i∈I
Pnt,i ∀t ∈ T . (8.6)
The allocated production, however, is not necessarily the one accepted by the DSO
to correct the meter readings. For instance, if the total net production (Pnt,i) is greater
than the total net consumption (Cnt,i), Equation (8.6) may lead to allocations (at,i) that
are, in fact, larger than the total net consumption. To avoid such situations, a final
check computes the verified allocated production vt,i, which takes the value of the
optimal allocated production or the net consumption depending on which one is
smaller. In addition, the sum of verified allocated production must be equal to the










yt,i ∀t ∈ T . (8.8)
The final set of constraints is related to the SSRs of the REC members, i.e. the
fraction of the member’s net consumption that is covered by local production. That
is, covered consumption divided by total consumption. The covered consumption
of member i is equal to the local production allocated to this member, which is cal-
culated as Pt,i − yt,i + vt,i. However, since the allocated production may be greater
than the total consumption Ct,i, the covered consumption must be expressed as
min {Pt,i − yt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}. In this last expression, if yt,i is positive, then Pt,i − yt,i +
vt,i is greater or equal than Ct,i, and therefore the expression can be simplified as
min {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}. Consequently, the SSR of member i is given by:
ssri =
∑t∈T min {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i}
∑t∈T Ct,i
∀i ∈ I . (8.9)
Furthermore, a minimum SSR may be enforced so that the ssri is increased for
some REC members, enhancing their economic gains. This constraint, nonetheless,
can potentially increase the sum of the electricity bills of the members. An SSRmini is
thereby defined so that:
SSRmini ≤ ssri ∀i ∈ I . (8.10)
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8.4 Problem formulation
The problem of allocating locally generated production by means of repartition keys
can be expressed as a linear program.
min
z∈Z ∑i∈I ∑t∈T








at,i = kt,i ·∑
i∈I





yt,i ∀t ∈ T (8.13)
yt,i ≤ Pnt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.14)
at,i − At,i ≤ a+t ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.15)
At,i − at,i ≤ a−t ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.16)
vt,i ≤ at,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.17)
vt,i ≤ Cnt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.18)
∑
i∈I
kt,i ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T (8.19)
kt,i − Kt,i ≤ Xt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.20)
Kt,i − kt,i ≤ Xt,i ∀(t, i) ∈ T × I (8.21)
SSRmini ≤
∑t∈T min {Pt,i, Ct,i}+ vt,i
∑t∈T Ct,i
∀i ∈ I (8.22)











Z ⊆ [0, 1]×R8+.
The objective function (8.11) aims at minimising the sum of electricity bills of the
REC members (see Equation (8.3) in Section 8.3) as well as an additional term, which
is introduced to deal with cases with multiple solutions to the optimisation problem.
This may, for example, occur when the sum of the net consumption of the members
of the REC is greater than the sum of the net production, and all members buy and
sell energy at the same price to both retailers and REC. In such a context, this extra
term favours a solution that distributes the local production equally among the REC
members, something we believe is desirable. Without this term, the allocation in
these cases would be uneven, favouring some users depending on the optimisation
solver numerical preferences. The fictive costs ξdi associated to this term must be low,
e.g. less than 0.1e/MWh, so that they will not lead to a solution that corresponds to
repartition keys associated with larger billing costs.
Equation (8.12) computes the optimised allocated production. Equation (8.13)
sets the total allocated production equal to the total production sold by the REC
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members. Equation (8.14) limits the production sold to the total available produc-
tion. Equations (8.15) and (8.16) compute the positive and negative deviations of
allocated production, respectively. Equations (8.17) and (8.18) limit the verified al-
located production to the smaller value between allocated production and demand.
Equation (8.19) limits the sum of the repartition keys of the REC members to 100%.
Equations (8.20) and (8.21) compute the repartition key deviations. Finally, Equa-
tion (8.22) computes the self-sufficiency rate of every member and enforces a min-
imum self-sufficiency rate. This last equation may lead to infeasible solutions (by
enforcing an unattainable SSRmini ), in which case new SSR
min
i need to be defined by
the ECM.
Note that the numerator of Equation (8.22) is a linear form of the numerator of
Equation (8.9). The two versions can be shown to be equivalent. Focusing on the
numerator in Equations (8.9) and (8.22): If Pt,i > Ct,i, the net consumption Cnt,i is
null, and thereby vt,i = 0 as per Equation (8.18). In this case, the two numerators
become equal to min {Pt,i, Ct,i}. If Pt,i ≤ Ct,i, the net consumption Cnt,i is not null,
more precisely Cnt,i ≥ 0, and thereby vt,i ≥ 0. Then, by definition of vt,i:
vt,i ≤ Cnt,i = Ct,i − Pt,i (8.23)
Pt,i + vt,i ≤ Pt,i + Cnt,i = Ct,i. (8.24)
As Pt,i + vt,i ≤ Ct,i, the numerator in Equation (8.9) becomes:
min {Pt,i + vt,i, Ct,i} = Pt,i + vt,i. (8.25)
which is equal to min {Pt,i, Ct,i}+ vt,i since Pt,i ≤ Ct,i.
8.5 Results
This section introduces four different test cases as well as a complexity analysis. The
first and second test cases illustrate the functioning of the methodology for differ-
ent time horizons and number of REC members. The third one elaborates on the
possibility to enforce a minimum SSR for the REC members. The proposed method-
ology requires an initial set of repartition keys from which an initial allocation of
production is determined. How to compute these initial keys is the subject of de-
bate, therefore, the last test case (iv) analyses the impact of using different initial
repartition keys. Furthermore, it also tests the constraint enforcing maximum repar-
tition key deviations (Xt,i). In all test cases except for the last one, the initial keys
consist of a pro rata attribution according to each member’s average consumption,
as shown in [142, 153]. In addition to the initial keys, a set of price signals is needed
for the optimisation, listed in Table 8.1.
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8.5.1 Test case 1: performance on a simplified example
The first test case provides a simplified example to acquaint the reader with the
most important features of the tool. This example features an REC with two pure
consumers (User1 and User2, in red), one pure producer (User3, in green) and one
prosumer (User4, in orange). The optimisation horizon is two metering periods, the
first one with more production than consumption, and the second with more con-
sumption than production. Table 8.2 presents the inputs used for this simulation
including: (i) consumption which is positive for consumption and negative for pro-
duction; (ii) initial keys; and (iii) initial allocated production. Note that the units in
this example are kWh. All these parameters are computed as a pre-process of the
optimisation problem. By comparing the consumption and initial allocated produc-
tion in Table 8.2, it can be seen that the initial allocation of production is suboptimal.
For metering period one, albeit there is more total production than total consump-
tion not all the REC members see their electricity demand met, whereas for metering
period two, the distribution of the local production leads to spillage in User4 and to
under-supply in User1 and User2.
TABLE 8.2: Test case 1 – inputs.
Metering period User1 User2 User3 User4
Consumption
2017-03-01 00:00 0.17 0.21 -0.50 0.08
2017-03-01 00:15 0.21 0.23 -0.30 -0.02
Initial repartition keys
2017-03-01 00:00 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.089
2017-03-01 00:15 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.089
Initial allocated production
2017-03-01 00:00 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.04
2017-03-01 00:15 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.03
This initial situation is then used by the optimisation problem to recompute the
keys. The results of this optimisation are presented in Table 8.3 which lists the
consumption-related and production-related outputs. In this table, an overall re-
arrangement of the keys with respect to the initial ones can be observed. At metering
period one, the keys for User1 and User2 are decreased, whereas the key of User4 is
increased. Conversely, at metering period two, the inverse flow occurs. The new set
of keys leads to an optimal allocation of the production among the REC members by
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which any deficit of local production is supplied by the retailers, whereas any excess
is sold to them.
TABLE 8.3: Test case1 – outputs.
Metering period User1 User2 User3 User4
Optimised repartition keys
2017-03-01 00:00 0.39 0.45 0.00 0.16
2017-03-01 00:15 0.47 0.53 0.00 0.00
Optimised verified allocated production
2017-03-01 00:00 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.08
2017-03-01 00:15 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00
Production sold locally to the REC
2017-03-01 00:00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00
2017-03-01 00:15 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.02
Production sold to the main network
2017-03-01 00:00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
2017-03-01 00:15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Additionally, Table 8.3 shows the distribution of local production: local sales (en-
ergy delivered to REC members) and global sales (energy sold to the retailer). In the
first metering period, local sales amount to 0.46, which is the total demand of the
system. The production surplus (0.04), is sold to the retailer as global sales. In the
second metering period, local sales are 0.30 + 0.02, which corresponds to the total
available production. Since, at this metering period, there is greater demand than
supply, there are no global sales. The maximisation of global sales observed in these
results depends on the price signals imposed in the simulation. In this case, since
the selling price is the same for all producers, the optimisation cannot discriminate
between them when allocating local and global sales, and provides one of the possi-
ble solutions. However, this parameter can be adjusted in the optimisation (i.e. one
price signal per producer), leading to a ranking of producers.
8.5.2 Test case 2: performance on a realistic example
This second analysis introduces a more realistic set-up where an REC with 23 net
consumers and 1 net producer is simulated over one year of operation. Input con-
sumption data corresponds to real measurements of small- and medium-volume
electricity consumers in Belgium. The initial repartition keys fed to the optimisation
are based on a proportionality principle of the annual consumption of the members
with respect to the total accumulated consumption of the REC. The maximum key
deviation Xt,i allowed is not bounded.
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Figure 8.1 shows the electricity costs of all members with and without participa-
tion in an REC after the optimisation of the keys. In this figure, positive values imply
a cost, whilst negative values imply a revenue for the REC members. For this set of
prices, deploying an REC reduces the electricity costs of the members by around
30% (some REC members reach more than 50%).
FIGURE 8.1: Costs of the REC members.
8.5.3 Test case 3: minimum SSR
The second test case showcases how the constraint imposing a minimum SSR works.
This analysis makes use of the same REC and price signals as in the previous test
case.
(A) Without minimum SSR
bound.
(B) With an enforced mini-
mum SSR of 42%
FIGURE 8.2: SSR of the consumers after the repartition keys optimi-
sation.
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Figure 8.2 shows the SSR of the members of the REC, after running the optimi-
sation with SSRmini = 0% and SSR
min
i = 42%. In this figure when no bound on
the SSRmini is imposed, the SSR of the members ssri is freely selected to minimise
the global costs of the REC. The values of ssri span from 32.5% for User20 to 94.1%
for User21 (see Figure 8.2a). As the problem is progressively tightened by enforc-
ing more restrictive values of SSRmini for all the REC members, a transfer from the
members with highest levels of ssri to those with lower levels takes place. Upon
reaching the maximum feasible value of SSRmini = 42%, a more uniform ssri for all
REC members can be seen (see Figure 8.2b). Note that for this example, enforcing
an SSRmini greater than 42% leads to an infeasible problem where the system does
not generate sufficient local electricity to keep increasing it. Tightening the optimi-
sation problem may decrease the average SSR of all members, since some members
are forced to give up part of their ssri to increase other members’ SSRs. In this par-
ticular example, the consequence is that the average SSR of the all REC members is
eroded, decreasing from 58% to 56%. However, the same does not apply to the SSR
of the REC, as this SSR only depends on the total local production, and this does not
change by enforcing tighter values of SSRmini .
Enforcing a minimum SSR has an impact on the electricity costs of the REC
members. Figure 8.3 illustrates the difference in costs caused by the enforcement
of SSRmini = 42% compared to the case where it is left free (0.0%). This figure shows
that members who are forced to give up their ssri when enforcing an SSRmini , incur
higher costs than before enforcing any SSRmini and conversely for the others. In par-
ticular, the gains of REC members range from 0.25% for User16 to 9.5% for User23,
whereas the losses range from −1.5% for User2 to −6.5% for User20.
FIGURE 8.3: Difference in the REC members costs, with and without
enforcing any minimum SSR of 42%.
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8.5.4 Test case 4: impact of initial repartition keys
The last test case presented in this chapter illustrates the impact of employing dif-
ferent initial repartition keys. Moreover, it also showcases the functioning of the
constraint imposing a maximum key deviation. In this context, key deviations are
represented by the difference between optimised and initial repartition keys of each
REC member (kt,i − Kt,i). To perform this analysis, a smaller REC is selected, com-
posed of six members: five net consumers (User1 – User5) and one net producer
(User6). The simulation horizon is reduced to one month (April) because of the high
number of runs required to perform the following analyses.
This example tests different types of initial repartition keys:
• Uniform: evenly distributed among the REC members – all members with pos-
itive net demand receive the same percentage of the local production.
• Proportional static: Each member obtains a percentage of the local production
which is proportional to their average demand over the simulated period –
each member receives a different initial key, constant over time.
• Proportional dynamic: Each member obtains a percentage of the available lo-
cal production which is proportional to their instantaneous demand – each
member receives a different initial key per metering period of the simulation.
Table 8.4 lists the total consumption and production of the system and total allo-
cated production achieved with the three types of initial keys. With the proportional
dynamic keys, the local production is used up to 76% more than with uniform keys,
and 29% more than with proportional static keys.
TABLE 8.4: Allocated production for the different initial keys.
Total demand 37.50 MWh
Total local production 11.35 MWh
Allocated production with uniform keys 5.02 MWh
Allocated production with proportional static keys 6.85 MWh
Allocated production with proportional dynamic keys 8.87 MWh
In the following, the evolution of several parameters over a range of maximum
allowed key deviations Xt,i given as parameters, is shown. The allowed deviations
span from 0%, meaning that the optimised keys cannot deviate from the initial keys,
to 100%, meaning that the optimised keys may deviate as much as needed, taking
any value in [0, 1]. Since dynamic keys lead to the most optimal distribution between
local and global sales as long as the price ξbi is the same for all members (i.e., same
retailer contract), the sales do not change for different values of Xt,i when these keys
are implemented. For this reason, the different parameter evolutions shown in the
rest of this section do not contain the impact of using dynamic keys. This also indi-
cates that dynamic keys are a suitable solution when no other constraint is required,
and purchasing prices ξbi are similar across REC members.
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The first of the parameters studied is the spread between local sales (yt,i) and
global sales (Pnt,i − yt,i). This spread is strictly positive if local sales are greater than
global sales. Figure 8.4 shows that for both sets of initial keys, allowing free key
deviations (Xt,i = 100%) leads to the same spread between local and global sales.
However, they differ when Xt,i < 100%. When applying proportional static initial
keys, the spread is always positive and increases with the value of Xt,i. On the other
hand, applying uniform initial keys leads to negative spreads when Xt,i < 5%. This
analysis shows that when no limitation on the maximum key deviation is imposed,
the optimisation finds the same solution regardless of the initial key. However, when
this constraint is tight (Xt,i < 100%), the selection of initial keys has a notable impact
on the results.
FIGURE 8.4: Total locally sold and globally sold production for a
range of maximum key deviations (Xt,i).
The individual costs of the REC members, for a range of Xt,i from 0% to 100%, are
shown in Figure 8.5. All net consumers (User1 – User5) see their costs reduced as the
maximum key deviation allowed becomes less restrictive. The net producer (User6)
electricity revenue increases as the costs of the consumers decrease. In this case,
positive values indicate negative costs (or revenue), which increase by the given
percentage. The variation in member’s costs in response to a relaxation of the max-
imum key deviation allowed results in similar trends when using either uniform or
proportional static initial keys. The extent of these variations is different though,
being one order of magnitude larger for uniform keys. The savings of User1 – User5
for uniform keys span from 1% to 8%, whereas for proportional static they span from
0.5% to 4%. The increase in gains of User6 is 16% with uniform keys and 8% with
static keys. These differences prove that uniform initial keys lead to a highly subop-
timal solution compared to proportional static ones. This remark highlights the idea
that creating keys that are proportional to the demand of the REC members seems
to be a good practice, which concurs with current practices [153].
A final analysis is presented in Figure 8.6, showing the difference in allocated
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FIGURE 8.5: Costs of the members for a range of maximum key devi-
ations (Xt,i) relative to the costs when Xt,i = 0.
deviations, relative to the initial situation when no deviation is allowed. In this last
figure, the effect of relaxing the maximum allowed key deviation is not shown for
proportional dynamic keys since, as in Figure 8.5, the changes are negligible. The
trends followed by the members’ allocated production is similar for uniform and
static keys. In both cases this trend is upward when relaxing the value of maxi-
mum allowed key deviation. However, the extent is different, and the members
involved too: while in the uniform keys case the allocated production increases for
User1 and User4 to in excess of 100%, for static keys it only reaches 70% for User3.
The difference in these results stems from the different demand profiles of the REC
members. For User3, the average electricity demand is, on average, lower than for
the rest. Thus, when applying uniform keys, the allocated production is sufficient to
cover the demand of this member, since the percentage of allocation is the same for
all of them. However, when applying proportional static keys, the initial allocated
production given to User3 is low – it depends on average demand (which indeed
is relatively low), but it has to cover instantaneous demand (which might be high).
For this reason, the initial solution does not provide enough supply to User3 with
static keys, and therefore the methodology must increase the optimised keys for this
particular REC member.
8.5.5 Complexity analysis
In the final section of the results, we present an analysis of the complexity of the
methodology proposed. The number of constraints of the optimisation is Ncons =
9|T ||U |+ |T |+ |U | and the number of variables Nvar = 17|T ||U |+ 2|T |+ |U |. Table
8.5 introduces the running times for different complexities, ranging from 15 days
with 10 REC members to one month with 100 members. The optimisation problem
is implemented with Pyomo in Python 3.8 and solved with the open source solver
CBC. Simulations are performed on a GNU/Linux machine with an Intel® Core™
i7-8665U and 16 Gb of RAM.
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FIGURE 8.6: Allocated production of the REC members for a range
of maximum key deviations (Xt,i) relative to the allocated production
when Xt,i = 0.
TABLE 8.5: Running times of the proposed algorithm.
|T | |U | Ncons Nvar Build time [s] Solve time [s]
1,440 10 131,050 247,690 5.01 5.96
2,880 10 262,090 495,370 9.71 12.23
1,440 50 649,490 1,226,930 20.36 27.72
2,880 50 1,298,930 2,453,810 43.55 56.55
1,440 100 1,297,540 2,450,980 39.67 58.93
2,880 100 2,594,980 4,901,860 85.92 133.93
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a methodology to deal with the settlement phase of an REC
to optimise the sum of electricity bills and to enforce minimum SSRs in some of the
REC members – a methodology that is compliant with current regulations and ready
to use by an ECM. After physical delivery of electricity, the DSO permits modifying
the meter readings. This implies that the financial flows of the REC members can
be determined in a settlement phase that changes the meter readings, and that splits
these flows into two: one directed to the ECM corresponding to electricity consump-
tion within the REC; and another sent to the retailers corresponding to the electricity
consumption covered by a traditional retailing process. To modify the meter read-
ings, this chapter makes use of repartition keys, which represent the percentage of
total local production provided to each member. The methodology presented in this
chapter computes an ex-post allocation of local production in an REC by using these
keys. The repartition keys are optimally computed by a linear program that min-
imises the sum of individual electricity costs of the REC members, and that may
use an initial set of keys as starting point. This methodology enables, by adding the
right constraints, the control of some parameters such as the self-sufficiency rate of
the REC members, or the deviations between optimised repartition keys and initial
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ones. These keys can be optimally computed based on another set of –initial– keys
that is an input of the simulation.
Various test cases illustrate this methodology, testing the functioning of the opti-
misation framework as well as its parameters. Such tests show that this methodol-
ogy results in an allocation of local production that leads to lower operational costs
than when no REC is established. Moreover, this approach can be used to enforce
minimum self-sufficiency rates on the REC members, enhancing the economic gains
of some of them that might, otherwise, be left without sufficient allocated produc-
tion by a traditional global welfare optimisation. Finally, simulation results indicate
that using initial keys consisting of a pro rata attribution of each REC member in-
stantaneous consumption is a good practice when the retail electricity price of all of
them is similar. The methodology presented in this chapter has been tested and is









The unstoppable rise of distributed renewable electricity generation resources (DER),
driven over the last decades by commercial and regulatory factors (as seen in Chap-
ter 1) has brought about several challenges for the adequate functioning of the elec-
tricity distribution network. Such challenges can be broadly divided into technical
and regulatory – this thesis has focused on the latter, exploring this type of chal-
lenges from a modelling standpoint. In particular, this research has unfolded in two
main directions: (i) the study of regulatory frameworks consisting of the metering
technology, the distribution tariff design, and other incentive mechanisms; and (ii)
the development of new frameworks for the integration of DER based on decen-
tralised electricity markets. Accordingly, this manuscript has been divided in two
main parts that address the two main elements of this research.
9.1 Part I
In the first part of the thesis we have formalised and built a simulation-based ap-
proach to assess the impact of a wide range of regulatory frameworks on the penetra-
tion of DER and the economic sustainability of the distribution network. Such an ap-
proach is based on agent-based modelling where the agents are the final customers
of a distribution network and the distribution system operator (DSO). These agents
take actions over a discrete-time dynamical system, making the system evolve.
On the one hand, final customers’ actions consist in deploying DER installations
composed of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and/or batteries to reduce their elec-
tricity costs. This is controlled through an optimisation framework followed by an
investment decision process. The optimisation framework is instantiated in the form
of a mixed integer linear problem that computes, for each agent, the optimal capac-
ity of PV panels (in kWp) and batteries (in kWh) to be deployed to minimise their
levelised value of electricity (LVOE)1. As for the investment decision process, it com-
pares, for every customer the LVOE with the LCOE resulting if no DER installation
1The LVOE is computed as levelised annual costs (electricity imports from the grid) minus revenue
(electricity exports to the grid) divided by levelised annual demand. The difference between the LVOE
and the more traditional levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) is that whilst the former accounts for
costs and revenue of the prosumers, the latter can only account for costs, therefore not presenting the
complete picture of the economic benefit of deploying DER installations since it can only show the
avoided costs but not the revenue.
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is deployed. The result of this comparison is filtered through a Bernoulli distribution
that determines whether the optimally sized DER installation is deployed.
On the other hand, the DSO has the ability to adjust the distribution fee to en-
sure its economic sustainability. This is controlled through an accurate modelling
of its remuneration strategy, which depends on the regulatory framework. In par-
ticular, our approach enables the simulation of two different metering technologies,
net-metering and net-billing, as well as four different types of distribution fee which
depend on energy consumption (volumetric), power consumption (capacity), avail-
ability of an access point to the grid (fixed), and time of energy or power consump-
tion (ToU). Additionally it is also possible to introduce any combination of these
metering technologies and fees.
The evaluation of these actions at each time-step of the discrete-time dynam-
ical system results in a trajectory of actions from which the evolution of several
variables can be extracted: DER adoption, PV panel and battery capacities, elec-
tricity imports and exports from and to the grid, and distribution tariff. Finally, us-
ing this simulation-based approach with different regulatory frameworks facilitates
their comparison based, on the different set of trajectories they induce. The poten-
tial of this approach thus lies in its ability to accurately discriminate between the
possible outcomes of employing distinct regulatory frameworks in order to provide
sound arguments that underpin the selection of one of them. This tool can serve as
guidance for policy makers and regulators to build new combinations of metering
technology and distribution tariff design, aiming to achieve certain specific objec-
tives (e.g. promoting the adoption of DER). By means of this simulation-based tool,
they can compare the strengths and drawbacks of distinct options before applying
them in real life.
Concerning the design of this tool, the contributions of this thesis are:
• The mathematical formalisation of the simulation-based approach, which en-
capsulates the salient features of all the most commonly used metering tech-
nologies and distribution tariff designs.
• A computational tool encoding such a mathematical formalisation to help pol-
icy makers and regulators design regulatory frameworks.
Furthermore, in the context of this thesis, we have extensively tested this simulation-
based approach with a broad range of regulatory frameworks, covering all their
most common features. Our findings offer insights on the impact of (i) the metering
technology, and (ii) the distribution tariff design.
Regarding the metering technology, we observe that regulatory frameworks based
on net-metering provide enormous incentives for potential prosumers to deploy
DER installations. In particular, this technology highly boosts the adoption of PV
installations. However, it does not incentivise the deployment of batteries under
any distribution tariff design. Furthermore, this large DER deployment comes at a
high cost: net-metering creates very significant electricity cost differences between
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consumers and prosumers, where consumers bear most of the distribution costs.
This leads to substantial cross-subsidies from consumers to prosumers, and jeop-
ardises the economic sustainability of the DSO. In addition, this metering technol-
ogy may lead to a “death spiral” where the distribution tariff increases dramatically
– the DSO looses revenue due to prosumers reduced contributions and must ad-
just the tariff upward to compensate (see Figure 1.1). In contrast, employing net-
purchasing as metering technology help reduce, though not eliminate, the risks of
cross-subsidisation incurred by net-metering. Moreover, this technology reduces
peak power withdrawals and injections, in particular when capacity-based fees are
applied, suggesting that these two elements strongly complement each other. This
system may also lead to a “death spiral”, especially if it is associated to a fully volu-
metric distribution fee.
As for the distribution tariff design, our results suggest that regulatory frame-
works based on volumetric fees (including ToU) offer the best incentive for PV panel
and battery deployment. These frameworks, though, lead to the highest inequalities
between consumers and prosumers in terms of electricity costs. When applying
mostly capacity fees, the integration of storage devices is promoted, as these devices
can limit the peak of consumption of prosumers. However, these fees lead (as the
previous ones did) to a cost distribution between consumers and prosumers where
the former bear most of the network costs. Frameworks based on fixed fees sig-
nificantly limit the incentives for DER deployment, therefore they hardly show any
impact on the distribution of grid costs. Finally, frameworks based on a combination
of these fees lead to various different outcomes which, to a greater or a lesser extent,
induce “death spiral” behaviours and the promotion of DER installations.
An overall conclusion of our analysis is that, whilst the regulatory framework in
place plays a major role in the way the distribution network is expected to evolve,
all of them lead, to some extent, to an increase in distribution rates as a result of DER
deployment (with the exception of fully fixed fees). This indicates that, considering
current legislations where the DSO is financed through distribution fees to the final
customers, a trade-off will always emerge between promoting the adoption of DER
technologies and containing the distribution rates – one is not possible without the
other. Designing holistic policies supporting DER adoption and regulating the elec-
tricity distribution network is, therefore, key to facilitate a seamless and sustainable
energy transition.
9.2 Part II
The second part of this thesis has studied new frameworks to promote the inte-
gration of DER based on decentralised electricity trading and, in particular, on re-
newable energy communities (RECs). According to the latest European regulations,
RECs are communities of final customers (consumers or prosumers) who may bene-
fit from renewable electricity produced locally. These communities are managed by
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a central entity: the REC manager (ECM). Since RECs are a rather new concept, the
existing literature in this topic is scarce. Aiming to fill this gap, we have proposing
several modelling solutions for RECs, focusing on their economic viability.
The first step toward modelling RECs has been the design of a generic model
of interaction, based on agent-based modelling where the generic agents are: con-
sumers and prosumers, retailer and ECM, wholesale market, and transmission sys-
tem operator. This approach enables simulating different decentralised electricity
markets, such as aggregator models or RECs. In addition, our model allows for the
introduction of flexible consumers. Since this is a generic model, it is necessary to
adapt it to the desired context by selecting the agents to be used in the simulation.
Once designed, the model of interaction has been instantiated to simulate the
scheduling of electricity exchanges within an REC. This instance is built so that the
consumers and prosumers represent the REC members, and the ECM and the re-
tailer are the same entity. The ECM is therefore responsible for managing the REC
and for its participation in the European day-ahead market, acting as the unique re-
tailer of the REC. Flexibility bids are introduced with flexible consumers, and their
economic impact is assessed by means of a bid acceptance algorithm. This algo-
rithm is formulated as an optimisation framework that takes into account forecasts
of demand and production within the REC, forecasts of day-ahead prices, and flex-
ibility bids from flexible consumers. With these inputs, the optimisation framework
determines the flexibility bids to be accepted by the ECM in order to minimise the
costs of performing the demand provisioning in the day-ahead market. If the bids
can be partially accepted, the optimisation framework can be instantiated as a lin-
ear problem. Otherwise it is instantiated as a mixed integer linear problem. A test
case running this minimisation problem shows a significant yearly reduction of total
costs when an REC is created, compared to the case where the final customers resort
to classical retailing contracts. This cost reduction can be attributed to a discount on
the distribution tariff, offered by the DSO when energy is produced and consumed
locally. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that further cost reductions are possi-
ble when flexibility bids are introduced in the simulation, owing, mainly, to a better
matching of supply and demand within the REC.
After studying the scheduling of RECs, where the electricity exchanges are com-
puted based on forecasts of demand, production, and electricity prices, we have
analysed a settlement phase. Due to forecasting errors, the scheduling phase leads,
inevitably, to suboptimal solutions. To overcome this problem, we have created a
novel algorithm that allocates locally generated electricity among the REC members
in an ex-post phase where the actual production and demand are known. This is
what we call the settlement phase. This phase takes place after physical delivery of
electricity and, therefore, the electricity flows cannot be modified at this point. How-
ever, since the financial exchanges depend on the meter readings and these can be
modified after physical delivery according to the latest regulations, an algorithm can
be laid out to optimise the financial flows of the REC members. At the core of this
9.3. Limitations and future research 141
algorithm is the concept of repartition keys, which represent the percentage of total lo-
cal production allocated to each member. Each REC member is assigned one key per
metering period (the resolution of the meter) and thus the production is allocated. In
addition, an initial set of keys can be assigned, so that the algorithm can re-allocate
an initial distribution of local production. The keys are optimised so as to minimise
the sum of individual electricity costs of the REC members. This optimisation is
instantiated in the form of a linear program that, in addition to minimise the elec-
tricity costs, can enforce minimum levels of self-sufficiency rates (SSRs) on the REC
members. This allows for increasing their incentive to participate in the REC since,
without a sufficiently high SSR, some REC members may be better-off with classical
retailer contracts. This methodology represents a ready-to-be-used approach which
is compliant with current regulations. We have extensively tested this methodol-
ogy, with and without initial repartition keys, demonstrating its ability to lower the
operational costs of a group of consumers, when an REC is established.
In this second part of the thesis we have provided the following contributions:
• A generic model of interaction which employs agent-based modelling to sim-
ulate RECs accounting for flexible demand.
• An optimisation framework to control the activation of flexibility, aiming to
minimise the sum of electricity costs of the REC members.
• An optimisation framework that optimises the financial flows of REC mem-
bers, using the concept of repartition keys.
Assuming that the electricity exchanges within the REC are associated to a lower
price than the retail tariff, the overall conclusion is that creating an REC to replace
traditional retailing contracts can result in lower electricity costs for the REC mem-
bers. If, in addition to a regular REC, flexible consumption is allowed, the electricity
costs of the REC members can be further reduced. Finally, optimising repartition
keys to determine the allocation of local production after physical delivery is shown
to be a practical way of steering clear of forecasting errors whilst minimising elec-
tricity costs thanks to the ex-post modification of the meter readings.
9.3 Limitations and future research
The models developed in the context of this research present some limitations. The
most relevant ones are discussed in this section.
Concerning the simulation-based approach presented in the first part of this
manuscript, the investment decision of prosumers is limited to a one-off deployment
of DER installations. This means that, once prosumers deploy a DER installation, our
approach prevents them from reinvesting, and early adopters cannot expand their
installations even if the conditions are favourable. Enabling prosumers to reinvest
is a potential improvement of our simulation-based approach. In addition, only a
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fixed variety of consumption profiles are considered, which cannot evolve over time.
Real customers, nonetheless, are likely to change their consumption patterns by, for
instance, purchasing an electric vehicle, which is currently not considered in our ap-
proach. Our approach relies on several parameters that must be precisely tuned in
order to perform real-life simulations, this tuning phase can be challenging since it
requires a substantial amount of data and work. Finally, our simulation-based ap-
proach models the distribution network as a zero-sum game where the DSO costs
are constant over time. However, certain distribution tariff designs may result in col-
lective benefits such as peak power withdrawn or injected reductions that are only
possible owing to private investments from prosumers. Quantifying these aspects,
allowing for evolving DSO costs can potentially extend the scope of analysis.
As for the limitations of our approach to model decentralised electricity markets
such as RECs, the interaction model created to deal with the scheduling phase of
RECs is designed so that the ECM activates and benefits from flexibility based solely
on energy. However, this approach could be extended by defining capacity prod-
ucts. This capacity would be activated depending on the needs – a flexibility bid of
capacity should include a reservation and an activation cost. In our framework, flex-
ibility bids offered by flexible consumers are independent from the actual needs of
the ECM, and flexible consumers post these bids based on their own consumption.
An alternative option could be for the ECM to notify flexible consumers of a flexibil-
ity need, and only then would they post flexibility bids. Moreover, the scheduling
phase of the REC only takes into account one market floor: the day-ahead market.
An additional optimisation step, closer to physical delivery, might further reduce the
electricity costs of the REC due to improved forecasts. As for the settlement, when
this phase is simulated, our approach does not consider the real time control of the
electricity exchanges, only using the final consumption and production profiles of
the REC members. A mixed approach where both electricity (through a control al-
gorithm) and financial exchanges (through the algorithm presented in this thesis)
are optimised may help reduce the electricity costs of the REC. Finally, electricity
charges based on peak power consumption that better reflect the costs of withdraw-
ing electricity from the distribution network might be included in this phase. These
charges can help reduce not only the REC costs, but also relieve potential congestion
in the distribution network.
In addition to these limitations and potential for improvement, some additional
research directions can be considered. Modelling the physical constraints induced
by the integration of DER, such as over-voltages, may provide a broader view of the
limits of our approach. In addition, considering the option of changing the topology
of the network, aiming to model future investments in infrastructure depending on
the DER penetration, can help better evaluate the DSO costs. Finally, restrictions on
the imports and exports of prosumers might be introduced. These restrictions may
represent some of the physical limits of the installations, offering a more realistic






A multi-agent system approach to
model the interaction between
distributed generation deployment
and the grid
This paper introduces a multi-agent dynamical system of the interaction between
electricity consumers, the electricity distribution system operator, and the technolog-
ical (generation, storage) and regulatory (tariff design, incentive schemes) environ-
ments. For any type of environment, our dynamical system simulates the evolution
of the deployment of distributed electricity generation, as well as the evolution of
the cost of distribution. The system relies on the assumption that individual electric-
ity consumers behave statistically as rational agents, who may invest in optimised
distributed renewable energy installations, if they are cost-efficient compared to the
retail electricity tariff. The deployment of these installations induces a change in the
aggregated net consumption and generation of the users of a distribution network.
By modelling the cost recovery mechanism of the distribution system operator, the
system simulates the evolution of the retail electricity tariff in response to such a
change in the aggregated consumption and production.
A.1 Introduction
The integration of distributed electricity generation technologies (DRE), such as so-
lar photovoltaic panels (PV), into the distribution networks (DN) has been made
possible by the use of incentive schemes, as these technologies used to be less eco-
nomically competitive than conventional ones [154]. The inclusion of a sizeable
amount of DRE installations, nonetheless, may cause severe strain on the distribu-
tion systems, since they are not engineered to absorb large amounts of distributed
generation (DG) [86]. The nature of the strain imposed on the system can be multi-
faceted, and may stem from technical problems such as over-voltages in the low volt-
age distribution system [25], or regulatory problems including the over-compensation
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of DRE owners and the potential failure of the cost recovery mechanisms of the dis-
tribution system operators (DSO) [36].
In our work, we aim at creating a methodology for testing the impact of any reg-
ulatory and technological environments on the deployment of DRE installations and
on the distribution component of the retail electricity tariff (simply distribution tariff
from now on). The methodology we describe in this paper is based on a multi-agent
discrete-time dynamical system formalisation, in which the agents interact with an
environment. On the one hand, the agents of such a system are the DRE owners,
the non-DRE owners, and a (unique) DSO. On the other hand, the environment (the
DN), is composed of a set of rules including the aforementioned incentive schemes,
the tariff design of the DN (e.g. volumetric tariffs or capacity tariffs), and the cost of
distributed generation and storage technologies.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and test this methodology. In particular,
our main contributions are the following:
• We provide a description of our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system
formalisation, used to simulate the evolution of an electricity distribution sys-
tem by modelling the interactions of individual agents (DRE owners, non-DRE
owners, and DSO), with the environment. This is presented in the Methodol-
ogy section.
• We introduce a test case in which we compare different incentive schemes. In
particular we compare two distinct compensation mechanisms (net-metering
and net-purchasing) as described in [33]. This is explained in detail in the Test
Case section.
A.2 Methodology
In this section we elaborate on the modelling of our multi-agent discrete-time dy-
namical system. The purpose of such a system is to evaluate, over a given time
horizon, and for any environment,
1. the impact of the environment on the rate of adoption of DRE installations;
and
2. the impact of the penetration of a significant amount of DRE installations on
the distribution tariff.
The result of the first evaluation impacts the second one, which in turn also influ-
ences the first evaluation at the subsequent time step, through a feedback mecha-
nism.
In the proposed approach, electricity consumers, interacting with a unique DN,
are modelled as rational agents that may invest in optimally sized grid-tied DRE
installations if these are cost-efficient compared to the retail electricity tariff. More-
over, the distribution tariff is adapted according to the evolution of DRE generation
A.2. Methodology 147
within the DN. In this framework, three distinct components defining the behaviour
of the agents: (i) the optimisation of DRE units, (ii) the investment decision process, and
(iii) the computation of the distribution tariff. As a reminder, the agents are the DSO
and the users of the DN. There are two distinct groups of users: group A which de-
notes the users who may deploy a DRE installation, and group B, which comprises
the users who cannot invest in a DRE installation due to technical or economic con-
straints. The latter is therefore left out of the two first components (optimisation and
investment decision), since these two, as discussed below, assign the optimal sizing
configuration and the investment decision on DRE installations.
Our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system works as follows. At the initial-
isation of the system, we assume zero installed DRE capacity for all users. Then, at
every time-step, and assuming a tariff design based on volumes of energy traded, the
system updates the proportion of consumers who have deployed a DRE installation,
as well as the distribution tariff. The detailed work flow of the model is represented
by a data flow diagram in Figure A.1, and the full description of this multi-agent sys-
tem, including the code, can be found in [155]. The three components are described
in the following.
A.2.1 Optimisation of DRE units
As represented in Figure A.1, all potential DRE installations (group A) are optimised
following the first component of the multi-agent system. Assuming that the storage
dynamics and the investment costs of the DRE can be described by linear mappings,
we formalise this optimisation problem as a linear program (LP). The inputs of this
LP comprise the consumption and the potential production profiles of each individ-
ual agent, as well as several parameters that are user-independent (i.e. the same for
all the users). These parameters are the prices of PV and battery, the retail electricity
tariff at every time-step, and the efficiency, the depth of discharge and the lifetime of
the batteries. The potential DRE installations are optimised so as to minimise their
levelised cost of electricity (LCOE). Thus, the resolution of this optimisation prob-
lem outputs the optimal sizing configuration (PV and battery capacities) that leads
to a minimised LCOE, as well as the LCOE, which is the objective function. We use a
standard definition of the LCOE in this model: the average total cost to deploy and
operate a DRE installation, divided by the total energy consumed by the user over









where the capex are represented by i0, the yearly opex at year y are ξy, the yearly
demand at year y is defined as dy, and r represents the discount rate. Finally, the
lifetime of the DRE installations (i.e. the optimisation horizon of this LP) is set to Y
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years. Note that this horizon is not the same as the horizon over which the evolution
of the multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system is studied.
A.2.2 Investment decision process
This component is used to decide, for each individual agent in group A, whether to
deploy a DRE installation with the optimised sizing configuration indicated by the
DRE optimisation. To model such a decision making process, we make use of a price
ratio between the optimised LCOE of each agent, and the retail electricity tariff at ev-
ery time-step of the dynamical system. Such a price ratio, denoted by Γ, will adopt
a value in [0, 1], since the LCOE of the DRE installations cannot be greater than the
retail electricity tariff due to optimality constraints (since the DRE installations are
grid-tied, the feasible region of the optimisation problem is upper bounded by the re-
tail electricity tariff). Then, by using a Bernoulli distribution in which the probability
p is a linear function of the computed Γ, the investment decision can be controlled
by a random variable β drawn from the distribution B (1, p), where β ∈ {0, 1} by
definition of the Bernoulli distribution. According to such a linear function, low val-
ues of Γ (i.e. when the LCOE of the optimised DRE unit is of reduced proportions
compared to the retail tariff) result in high probability p of drawing a variable β = 1,
which indicates a positive investment decision. Similarly, when Γ is high, the prob-
ability of drawing a variable β = 0 will be high, suggesting a negative investment
decision for the agent. Finally, when all of the possible investment decisions have
been computed for all of the individual agents, those agents whose investment deci-
sion is positive are prevented from investing in the subsequent time-steps. Hence, in
our simulator, the possibility of expanding an installation after its initial deployment
is not permitted.
Modelling the investment decision-making process in such fashion ensures the
deployment of some DRE units even when the viability of the DRE installations lie at
the economically feasible limit (for instance when the PV prices are high or the retail
electricity tariff is low), representing the behaviour of those users who are eager to
invest. Likewise, this investment decision-making mechanism will prevent some
agents from investing even under favourable conditions, representing those agents
more reluctant to invest.
A.2.3 Computation of the distribution tariff
Finally, in our multi-agent system, an overall demand reduction in the DN might
occur as a result of the progressive deployment of DRE units, which self-consume
part of their electricity needs. Assuming that the revenues obtained by the DSO are
computed as a monotonically non-decreasing function of the energy charged to the
users, this overall demand reduction will cause a loss in revenue, inducing a need
for adjusting the distribution tariff to offset the losses.
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To adjust the distribution tariff, the following inputs are required: the net con-
sumption of all the agents of the DN (groups A and B), and the retail electricity tariff
at every time-step of the dynamical system. Then, we represent the cost recovery
scheme of the DSO at every time-step by computing the potential economic imbal-
ances created by the DRE installations deployed within the DN. If the revenue of
the DSO at a particular time t does not match its incurred costs (assumed constant
over the simulation horizon), an economic imbalance appears (which can be posi-
tive or negative). Thus, the adjustment of the distribution tariff must account for
both the potential imbalance and the gradual aggregated net demand reduction in




∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (A.2)
where Π(dis)t+1 is the distribution tariff of the next period, C are the incurred costs of
the DSO, ∆t represents the imbalance between costs and revenues at period t, and
D̂t+1 is the expected aggregated demand (kWh) of the next period.
A.3 Test Case
To illustrate the functioning of our multi-agent system, an example inspired by the
current regulation policy in the Walloon region of Belgium is presented in this sec-
tion. Hence, a tariff design based on volumes of energy traded (paid in e/kWh) is
considered. Moreover, to test different environments, we use three distinct incentive
schemes, based on the choice of compensation mechanism (the manner electricity
traded between the DRE and the grid is recorded). The compensation mechanisms
considered are: (a) net-metering (NM): this system consists of one meter that records
imports (DRE← Grid) by running forwards, and exports (DRE→ Grid) by running
backwards, therefore, this means that both directions are assigned with the same
monetary value, namely the retail electricity tariff; and (b) net-purchasing (NP): this
option consists of two independent meters for imports and exports, in this setting
imports are paid for at retail electricity tariff, and exports are paid at a selling price
(SP). With NM the total exports are upper bounded by the total imports, however,
with NP there is no upper limit. The three evaluated cases are: (i) NM, (ii) NP
SP=0.04e, and (iii) NP SP=0.08e. In the three cases the retail electricity tariff is
initially set to 0.22e.
At every time-step of the multi-agent system simulation, we keep track of the
deployed DRE units, and of the distribution tariff adjustment. Thus, we can compute
the evolution of the system in terms of rate of DRE deployment and distribution
tariff evolution. The results of the testing of the multi-agent system with the three
different environments are summarised in Figure A.2.
150
Appendix A. A multi-agent system approach to model the interaction between
distributed generation deployment and the grid
FIGURE A.1: Data flow diagram of the proposed multi-agent system.
The flow of actions occurs from top to bottom. The individual users
of group A, characterised by their load, undergo an optimisation. The
optimisation requires the technology costs, the tariff design, and the
retail electricity tariff, as well as the user load. The individual results
of the optimisation are used by the investment decision model, which
compares the LCOE of the individually optimised installations with
the retail tariff, yielding a positive or negative investment decision
for each potential installation. Finally, the revenues derived from the
aggregated net consumption of all users of group A and of group B
are compared with the (fixed) DSO costs, and the distribution cost is
updated.
This figure depicts the two metrics considered: evolution of distribution tariff
(left axis) and evolution of DRE deployment (right axis), for the three cases. Regard-
ing the distribution tariff, we observe a similar 0.02e increase for cases (i) and (ii)
after 10 years, due to the loss of revenue of the DSO in both cases, derived from
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FIGURE A.2: Evolution of the distribution tariff (left axis) and evolu-
tion of DRE deployment (right axis). The deployment of DRE units
induces an increase in the distribution tariff. Such an increase fea-
tures a different extent depending on the environment (composed of
tariff design, incentive scheme, and technology cost).
the DRE deployment. This indicates that both cases are more inefficient distributing
the DSO costs than case (iii). As for the DRE deployment, we can observe a greater
deployment for cases (i) and (iii) both in the trend and in the final outcome after the
simulated period, than for case (ii). This suggests that case (ii) is outperformed in
terms of DRE deployment fostering by cases (i) and (iii). These distinct behaviours
can be explained, case by case, by the optimal solution identified by the optimisation
of DRE units component of the multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system:
• Case (i): with this environment, it results optimal to import and export the
same volume of electricity so that the electricity bill is reduced (netting 0 kWh
consumed). This leads to installations without batteries (since storage and grid
are perfect substitutes). Eventually with this setting the DRE owners will not
compensate the DSO for their grid use.
• Case (ii): with this environment, imports must be reduced to decrease the
bill, leading to highly autonomous installations (large PV + battery capacities).
Eventually with this setting the DRE units will become completely indepen-
dent.
• Case (iii): by increasing the SP with respect to the previous case, the DRE own-
ers business case is to become electricity producers, selling it to offset their
electricity bills. This leads to installations with large PV capacites as well as
some storage. With this setting the DRE owners still pay the DSO for their grid
use, since they rely on it during periods with low PV production.
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A.4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system to describe
the interaction between the distribution networks and the consumers. In such a
system: (i) electricity consumers interacting with a single distribution network are
modelled as rational agents that may invest in optimised distributed renewable en-
ergy installations; and (ii) the distribution tariff is adapted according to the evolution
of the DSO’s revenues, depending on the distributed renewable energy that is pro-
duced and consumed in the distribution network.
To illustrate the performance of the multi-agent system, we have designed and
simulated three different scenarios, starting with the current regulation in the Wal-
loon region of Belgium, and further exploring other incentive schemes. The simu-
lator allows to illustrate the impact of the regulation policies on many aspects: (i)
the evolution of the electricity distribution tariff, and with it, the evolution of the
retail electricity tariff; (ii) the evolution of DRE deployment; and (iii) the optimised




Exploring Regulation Policies in
Distribution Networks through a
Multi-Agent Simulator
This paper presents a multi-agent simulator that describes the interactions between
the agents of a distribution network (DN), and an environment. The agents are the
users of the DN and the electricity distribution system operator. The environment
is the set of rules (tariff design, technology costs, or incentive schemes) that impacts
the agents interactions. For a given environment, we can simulate the evolution
of the agents and the environment itself. We assume the electricity consumers are
rational agents that may deploy distributed renewable energy installations if they
are cost-efficient compared to the retail electricity tariff. The deployment of such
installations may alter the cost recovery scheme of the distribution system operator,
by inducing a change in the way the user use of the grid. By modelling the cost
recovery mechanism of the distribution system operator, the system simulates the
evolution of the retail electricity tariff in response to such a change in the aggregated
consumption and production.
B.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, proactive policy making has supported a major paradigm
shift in the power generation sector, resulting in a progressive energy transition from
fossil fuels to renewable energy sources [156]. Such an energy transition is shaping
the future of the electricity system: in this context, numerous incentive mechanisms
are fostering a notable integration of distributed renewable electricity (DRE) gen-
eration technologies, such as solar photovoltaic panels (PV), into the distribution
networks (DN). However, those incentive mechanisms might have been used with-
out the adequate understanding of the underlying problems they may entail: since
DN are not engineered to absorb large amounts of distributed electricity generation
[86], the inclusion of a vast volume of DRE may cause severe technical problems [25].
Additionally, regulatory problems may appear also as a result of DRE adoption [36].
In our work we focus on the latter, which range from the over-compensation of DRE
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owners to the potential failure of the cost recovery mechanisms of the distribution
system operators (DSO) [33].
This paper aims at presenting a methodology for assessing the potential regu-
latory problems stemming from a set of regulation rules (including the incentive
mechanisms) that stimulates a heavy DRE adoption. Thus, with this methodology
we may take any set of regulation rules as inputs, and compute their impact on a
DN. Such an impact is measured with two metrics: (i) the evolution of the retail
electricity price (simply retail price from now on) over time, and (ii) the evolution of
the proportion of DRE-owners and non-DRE owners in the DN over time. The set of
rules that drives these evolutions is known as an environment, and consists of three
elements, as explained in [42]:
• tariff design: this consists of the type of charges applied to the customers for
their grid use (e.g. volumetric tariffs, or capacity tariffs);
• technology costs evolution: this includes the prices for generation and storage
technologies; and
• incentive mechanism: this is the combination of technologies and/or support
schemes that help DRE become economically competitive, (e.g. a monetary
aid awarded to the DRE owners over the lifetime of the DRE).
To simulate the impact of a given environment on a DN, we need to introduce a set
of agents who will interact with it, over a finite time horizon. There are three types
of agents:
• DRE owners: users of the DN that own a DRE installation (also known as pro-
sumers);
• non-DRE owners: users of the DN that do not own a DRE installation (also
known as consumers); and
• distribution system operator (DSO): operator of the DN.
As a result of the agents interactions with the environment, the DN will evolve in
a dynamical system. At every time step of this system, the two mentioned metrics
will be computed, enabling the observation of such an evolution.
The methodology presented in this paper is based on a multi-agent discrete-time
dynamical system formalisation that models the interactions of a some agents with
an environment, and computes the resulting evolution of the DN. From this evolu-
tion, we may compare different environments. Our main contributions are:
• We provide a description of our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system
formalisation. Such a formalisation allows us to test different environments,
in particular we introduce (i) two tariff designs, and (ii) two incentive mecha-
nisms. This is detailed in Section B.2.
• We show the simulator functioning by testing different environments. This is
presented in Section B.4.
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B.2 Methodology
In our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system, we model the electricity users as
rational agents who are —in principle— exposed to retail prices, and that may invest
in optimally sized DRE installations, provided that these are cost-efficient compared
to the retail price. As a result of users deploying DRE installations, the DSO cost
recovery mechanism may be altered, inducing a change in the distribution compo-
nent of the retail price (distribution tariff from now on) for the subsequent time-step
of the dynamical system. These two effects (DRE adoption and distribution tariff
evolution), are computed at every time-step of a discrete-time dynamical system in
which the interactions of the agents with the environment will drive the evolution of
the DN. Thus, in this methodology we: (A) start by explaining how the interactions
between the agents and the environment occur, (B) elaborating then on the different
introduced environments, and (C) and finalising by providing a description of the
agents modelling.
B.2.1 Interactions
The interactions between the agents and the environment are computed at every
time-step of our dynamical system. These interactions depend on the nature of the
agent, namely:
• the DRE owners interact by trading electricity with the DN. These trades occur
in the form of imports: DN→ user, and/or exports: DN← user;
• the non-DRE owners interact also by trading electricity with the DN. In this
case these trades occur only in the form of imports: DN→ user.
• the DSO interacts by computing a distribution tariff that allows it to break-
even.
Through these interactions, the agents incur costs and collect revenues. The relation
between costs and revenues will drive the evolution of the DN. Computing these
interactions, at every time-step, involves calculating: (1) the yearly electricity costs
of the users, (2) the yearly electricity revenues of the users (if any), and (3) the new
distribution tariff determined by the DSO according to its cost recovery mechanism.
These calculations depend on the environments, which are defined next.
B.2.2 Environments
In the presented multi-agent system, we introduce a number of options to build an
environment:
Depending on the tariff design:
• a1 - Volumetric: electricity trades are paid for/collected according to volumes
of energy [e/kWh].
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• a2 - Volumetric and capacity: two terms, the first one is volumetric [e/kWh],
and the second one is based on a fixed charge per capacity contracted by the
user [e/kWp].
Depending on the technology costs:
• b1 - Linearly decreasing trend over time.
Depending on the incentive mechanism: in particular we focus on the compensation
mechanism. By compensation mechanism we refer to the manner the electricity
trades between the users and the DN are recorded [73]. We consider two distinct
compensation mechanisms, as described in [33]:
• c1 - Net-metering (NM): system consisting of one meter that records the im-
ports by running forwards, and the exports by running backwards, this entails
that both directions be assigned with the same monetary value, namely the
retail tariff. Furthermore, the total exports are upper bounded by the total im-
ports for a determined billing period, per user.
• c2 - Net-purchasing (NP): system consisting of two separate meters for the
imports and the exports respectively, this implies that the imports are paid for
at retail tariff, whereas the exports are paid at a selling price.
Constructing an environment necessitates choosing one element per option. Con-
sequently, with these settings we can create four different families of environments:
• e1 = a1+b1+c1
• e2 = a1+b1+c2
• e3 = a2+b1+c1
• e4 = a2+b1+c2
Each of these families depends on the retail price, the capacity price, and/or the
selling price. Consequently, it is possible to create any number of environments by
setting different values of these three prices.
The three calculations introduced in subsection B.2.1 (costs of the users, revenues
of the users, and cost recovery mechanism of the DSO) depend on the family of
environments. LetN = {1, . . . , N} denote the set with the time-steps of our discrete-
time dynamical system. And let I = {1, . . . , I} denote the users of the DN.
Family of environments e1 the electricity costs of the users are computed accord-
ing to equation (B.1). The revenues of the users are φi,n = 0 for this environment,
since under net-metering the produced electricity is not sold to the grid. Finally the
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DSO computation of the new distribution tariff for the following time-step is com-





















∀n ∈ N (B.2)
with ∆(d)n−1 = R̂
(d)
n − R(d)n , where R(d)n are the actual measured revenues, and R̂(d)n are









i,n ∀n ∈ N (B.3)
Family of environments e2 the electricity costs and the revenues of the users are
computed according to equations (B.4) and (B.5) respectively. The DSO computation











n ∀i, n ∈ I ×N (B.5)
Family of environments e3 the electricity costs of the users are computed by means
of equation (B.6). The users revenues are φi,n = 0 (same rationale as before). The
DSO computation of the distribution tariff follows equation (B.7). Furthermore, in
































∀n ∈ N (B.8)
with ∆(c)n−1 = R̂
(c)
n − R(c)n and ∆(d)n−1 = R̂
(d)
n − R(d)n , where R(c)n and R(d)n are measured
once the period is completed, R̂(c)n is determined by means of equation (B.9), and
R̂(d)n is computed as in the family of environments e1 (see equation (B.3)).
R̂(c)n = Π
(cap)
n · I ∀n ∈ N (B.9)
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Family of environments e4 the electricity costs of the users are computed with
equation (B.10). The revenues of the users are computed as in the family of environ-
ments e2 (equation (B.5)). The distribution tariff is computed as in environment e3













i,n total imports of user i at period n
ρ
(+)
i,n total exports of user i at period n
ψi,n electricity costs of user i at period n
φi,n revenues of user i at period n
Ω
(d)
n costs of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
Ω
(c)
n costs of the DSO (capacity) at period n
∆(d)n−1 imbalance of the DSO (volumetric) of period n− 1
∆(c)n−1 imbalance of the DSO (capacity) of period n− 1
R̂(d)n expected revenues of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
R̂(c)n expected revenues of the DSO (capacity) at period n
R(d)n actual revenues of the DSO (volumetric) at period n
R(c)n actual revenues of the DSO (capacity) at period n
D̂n expected demand of the users at period n
Ĉn expected peak demand of the users at period n
Π(sp)n users selling price at period n
Π(cap)n capacity price at period n
Π(in)n retail price at period n *
Π(dis)n distribution tariff at period n *
λn costs of energy, transmission, and taxes *
* The relation between Π(in)n and Π
(dis)





λn ∀n ∈ N .







n , D̂n, and Ĉn. These parameters are computed when modelling the agents of the
system. The other parameters in table B.1 (Π(sp)n , and λn) are inputs of the model.
The rest of table B.1 are variables whose computations have been presented in this








n , and Π
(in)
n ).
B.2.3 Agents of the system
Once we have introduced the different environments, and how the interactions with
these occur, we can describe how the agents are modelled. In our system we have
three types of agents: DRE owners, non-DRE owners, and DSO. The first two are the
users of the DN, whereas the third one is the operator of the DN.
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DRE owners
these users are modelled relying on an optimisation framework instantiated in the
form of a linear program (LP). This LP minimises the levelised cost of electricity
(LCOE) of the DRE installation. The LCOE is the average total cost to deploy and
operate a DRE installation, divided by the total energy consumed by the user over





i,n . The LP formalisation is presented in the next section (Section B.3).
non-DRE owners
at the initialisation of the system, we assume zero installed DRE capacity for all
the users (i.e. all users are non-DRE owners). Then at every time-step, the system
updates the proportion of users who have deployed a DRE installation. Thus, we
define two groups of non-DRE owners: group A: denoting the users who may deploy
a DRE installation, and group B: comprising the users who cannot invest in a DRE
installation due to technical or economic constraints. We model these two groups
differently:
Group A we resort to the same LP we use to model the DRE owners. However,
in this case we use it to extract the LCOE of the potential DRE installation a user of
this group could deploy. By comparing this LCOE with the retail price, a gradient-
like driver is created: if the LCOE is lower than the retail price, the user will have
a probability p > 0 of actually deploying the DRE installation that leads to such an
LCOE. Once a user from group A deploys a DRE installation, it is modelled as a
DRE owner until the end of the simulation. If a user group A does not deploy a DRE
installation at a particular time-step, it is modelled in the same fashion as group B
users, for this particular time-step. However, at the subsequent time-steps, this user
will have a new opportunity of deploying a DRE installation.
Group B we compute the yearly electricity demand of every user, which is covered
entirely by the DN.
DSO
the last of the agents is modelled by computing, at every time-step, its cost recovery
mechanism, as introduced previously. Then, the DSO will calculate a new distribu-
tion tariff for the subsequent time-step that allows it to break-even. To compute this
cost recovery mechanism, the following parameters are required: Ω(d)n , Ω
(c)




n costs of the DSO related with the volume of energy distributed to the users of
the grid. At the initialisation of the system, we assume a balanced system where the
costs of the DSO are fully recovered by its revenue. Thus, we assume the initial costs
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equal to the initial revenues (aggregated demand of all users times the distribution
tariff). At every time step the revenues may decrease due to the DRE deployment.
Hence, we measure the total actual revenues of the DSO (R(d)n ). Assuming that the
cost recovery mechanism recovers all the previous economic imbalances, we use





n costs of the DSO related with the capacity required by the users of the grid.
Similarly to the previous case, we assume a balanced initial state where the costs
of the DSO are fully recovered by its revenue. Thus, we assume the initial costs
equal to the initial revenues (aggregated capacity fees of the users). At every time
step, the DRE deployment may cause the fees to vary, altering the actual revenues
from capacity fees (R(c)n ). These revenues are used as DSO costs for the subsequent
time-step (R(c)n−1 = Ω
(c)
n ).
D̂n expected volume of energy distributed at every time-step. It is computed be-
fore the initialisation of the period, and corresponds to the last observed aggregated
demand (Dn−1) of the users, thus Dn−1 = D̂n. Hence, this does not take into account
the DRE installations that may have been deployed from n− 1 to n.
Ĉn expected aggregated peak demand of the users at every time-step. As in the
previous case, it is computed before the initialisation of the period, and corresponds
to the last observed aggregated peak demand (Cn−1) of the users, thus Cn−1 = Ĉn.
The DRE installations potentially deployed at the previous period are not taken into
account.
B.3 LP Formalisation
In this section we formalise the optimisation framework in the form of an LP, used
to model the DRE owners and the group A of the non-DRE owners. On the one
hand, the DRE owners are modelled to compute their electricity trades, which were
introduced in the previous section as imports and exports. On the other hand, the
non-DRE owners of group A are modelled to determine their minimised LCOE, ob-
tained for an optimally sized DRE installation.
The optimisation horizon is set to Y ∈ N years which are divided into 8760
time-steps (Y × 8760). Let T = {0, . . . , T − 1}, with T = 8760, represent a time
discretisation of one year (in hours). Moreover let Y = {0, . . . , Y − 1}, represent
the years of the optimisation. All of the parameters and variables presented in this
section depend on N . Furthermore, this LP runs for every individual user in set I .
Let χ represent the investment costs as a linear function of technology prices and
sizing configuration. These costs are computed according to the following equation:
χ = p · P(pv) + Y
B
· b · P(bat) (B.11)
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where p represents the optimal PV size in kWp, b is the optimal battery size in kWh,
P(pv) and P(bat) are the technology prices (PV and battery respectively), and B is
lifetime of the battery.
The yearly costs of operation are represented by ξy, and computed by means of
the following equation.
ξy = µy + my + ζy ∀y ∈ Y (B.12)
where µy are the yearly electricity costs, my represents the yearly costs of operation
and maintenance, and ζy stands for the recovered costs. The electricity costs depend
on the family of environments: for family e1 we use equation (B.13), for e2 we use
equation (B.14), for e3 we use equation (B.15), and for the family of environments e4



















































+ Π(cap) ∀y ∈ Y (B.16)
where ρ(−)t are the hourly imports, and ρ
(+)
t represents the hourly exports. Π
(in)
and Π(cap) are the retail and the capacity price. These prices are fixed across the
entire LP horizon, and correspond to the nth prices determined by the discrete-time
dynamical system. The operation and maintenance costs my are computed according




· p + 1
100
· b ∀y ∈ Y (B.17)
Finally, the recovered costs are also environment dependent. In light of this, fami-











∀y ∈ Y (B.18)
The energy balance of the system depends on the imports ρ(−)t , exports ρ
(+)
t ,
the electricity produced by the PV array kt, the hourly demand U
(d)
t , the maximum
hourly production U(p)t , the energy flow into the battery j
(−)
t , the energy flow out of
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the battery j(+)t , the efficiency of charge η
c and discharge ηd the batteries, and the
depth of discharge of the batteries dod. The energy flows into and out of the battery
also depend on the variation of the state of charge (soc) between t− 1 and t. Thus,
the following equations control the energy balance, taking into account the state of











t ∀t ∈ T , (B.19)
with:
kt = p ·U(p)t ∀t ∈ T (B.20)
j(−)t ≤ b · F(−) ∀t ∈ T (B.21)
j(+)t ≤ b · F(+) ∀t ∈ T (B.22)





+ j(−)t · η(c) ∀t ∈ T \ {0}
soc0 ∈ [b · dod, b] for t = 0
(B.24)
Finally, let LCOE denote the general objective function that represents the lev-









where the yearly demand of the system is defined as dy = ∑T−1t=0 U
(d)
t , and r repre-
sents the discount rate.
B.4 Test case
To illustrate our multi-agent discrete-time dynamical system, an example is pre-
sented. In this example, we simulate one environment of each family of environ-
ments. Thus, we create four environments, according to the four described families:
• Env. A: corresponds to the family of environments e1. We propose a volumetric
tariff with a compensation mechanism consisting of net-metering. In this case,
the distribution tariff is initially set to Π(dis)0 = 0.09e/kWh.
• Env. B: corresponds to the family of environments e2. This case is based on a
volumetric tariff with a compensation mechanism consisting of net-purchasing.
As in the previous case, the distribution tariff is initially set to Π(dis)0 = 0.09e/kWh.
The selling price is fixed to Π(sp)n = 0.08e/kWh (constant over the simulation).
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• Env. C: corresponds to the family of environments e3. We create this case
with a distribution tariff with two components: volume and capacity. The first
component represented with a volumetric fee conveyed to the users by means
a distribution tariff which is initially set to Π(dis)0 = 0.045e/kWh. The second
component is a capacity fee, set initially to Π(cap)0 = 223e for installations up
to 10 kWp, this term will not evolve in our simulation, since we do not let the
users adjust their peak demand.
• Env. D: corresponds to the family of environments e4. As in the previous case,
there are two terms. The capacity term is the same as case C (Π(cap)0 = 223e for
installations up to 10 kWp which cannot evolve in our simulations). The dis-
tribution tariff term is initially set to Π(dis)0 = 0.045e/kWh. Furthermore, the
selling price is fixed to Π(sp)n = 0.08e/kWh.
The value of λn is fixed to 0.13e/kWh for all cases. The technology costs are
initially set to P(pv) = 1500e/kWp and P(bat) = 300e/kWh; they are assumed to
evenly decrease at every period n by 0.07%. The optimisation horizon Y is set to 20
years. The efficiencies are set fixed to η(c) = 0.95 and η(d) = 0.95. Finally the dod is
fixed to 10%.
At the initialisation of the system, all the users are non-DRE owners. Hence,
to represent every agent in the proposed multi-agent tool, the model includes two
groups of medium size residential users (peak demand of around 3 kW). Group A:
modelling the heterogeneity of DN users involves the representation of every user
as an individual agent. To introduce them in the simulation, the multi-agent model
necessitates their electricity demand profile and their production profile. In the anal-
ysed test case, we create different synthetic demand profiles with the help of the
CREST model [98]. As for the production profile, we count on real PV measure-
ments expressed in kW/kWp. Group B: the remaining customers of the DN must be
modelled only in terms of net energy off-take.
At every time-step of the multi-agent system simulation, we keep track of the
deployed DRE units, as well as of the distribution tariff adjustment. Thus, we can
determine the evolution of the deployed capacities of PV and battery. Moreover, it is
possible to compute the evolution of the distribution tariff for each case. Two figures
depict the two metrics considered: the evolution of DRE deployment and optimal
size: Figure B.1; and the evolution of the distribution tariff: Figure B.2, for the four
distinct environments.
Regarding the size of the installations, we observe two different behaviours of
the four environments:
• A and C do not deploy batteries, these two environments rely on NM as in-
centive mechanism, therefore not deploying batteries since, with this system,
batteries and imports are perfect substitutes. Since there is no incentive to sell
electricity (see equations (B.13) and (B.15)), the PV capacity is adjusted to sim-
ply cover their peak demand.
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FIGURE B.1: Cumulative PV and battery capacities of the deployed
DRE, over the presented discrete-time dynamical system. The eco-
nomically optimal size of the deployed DRE installations is influ-
enced in a large extent by the environment. In this figure, we observe
these different users behaviours under four distinct environments.
• B and D deploy some batteries to become more self-sufficient, reducing the
imports. PV deployment results 2.5 times larger than in the other two envi-
ronments, since there exists an incentive to sell electricity (see equations (B.14)
and (B.16)). The difference between B and D lies in the fixed capacity term,
which makes difficult the recovery of the installation costs for case D.
Regarding the distribution tariff, the upper sub-figure in Figure B.2 indicates that
introducing a capacity term (Env. C and D) will considerably reduce the effect of
an increasing distribution tariff, induced by the DRE deployment. However, when
inspecting the lower sub-figure in Figure B.2 (change in distribution tariff relative
to the initial state), we can observe that the increase in the distribution tariff occurs
predominantly in those environments with NM as incentive mechanism (Env. A and
C), demonstrating the unfitness of this compensation mechanism to cope with DRE
deployment.
B.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a multi-agent simulator to describe the interaction between
distribution networks and consumers, for any regulatory technical environment. In
this system, electricity consumers interacting with a single distribution network are
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FIGURE B.2: Evolution of the distribution tariff. The deployment of
DRE units induces an increase in the distribution tariff. Such an in-
crease features a different extent depending on the environment.
modelled as rational agents that may invest in optimised distributed renewable en-
ergy installations. The distribution tariff is adapted according to cost recovery mech-
anism of the DSO (must break-even), that depends on the distributed renewable
energy that is produced and consumed in the distribution network.
To illustrate the performance of the multi-agent system, we have designed and
simulated four different examples based on the four families of environments intro-
duced in this paper. The simulator allows to illustrate the impact of the regulation
policies on many aspects: (i) the evolution of the electricity distribution tariff; (ii) the
evolution of DRE deployment; and (iii) the optimised configurations of distributed
renewable energy installations (production and storage capacities).
Preliminary results show a more volatile distribution tariff when net-metering
is chosen as incentive mechanism, as a result of the deployment of distributed re-
newable energy units. This remains true also when a capacity term is added to the
distribution costs. These results can be further explored in a future work, by scaling
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